The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics'· A Methodological Study JAMES M. GUSTAFSON Professor of Christian Ethics Tale University, The Divinity School Ultimately for Christian ethics, a biblically informed theology provides the bases for the final test of the validity of particular judgments: For Christians these judgments ought to be consistent, consonant, and coherent with the themes that are generalized to be most pervasive or primary in the biblical witness. HE facets of the project indicated by the title are many and com­ Tplex. Indeed, this article can only seek to provide some order, while doing some justice to the complexity. Certain markings can be fixed which will set both limits and direction for the present discussion; these ought to enable the reader to avoid some possible confusions. First, the title indicates that this study does not concentrate primarily on what might properly be called "biblical ethics.55 Biblical ethics would be the study of the ethics in the Scriptures. In itself this is a complex task for which few are well prepared; those who are specialists in ethics generally lack the intensive and proper training in biblical studies, and those who are specialists in biblical studies often lack sophistication in ethical thought. A comprehensive study of biblical ethics would, of 430 The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics Interpretation course, render an effort to develop the place of Scripture in Christian ethics easier, for one important question is the relation of biblical ethics to constructive Christian ethics. The problem here is parallel to the relation of the theology found in the Bible to constructive Christian theology. A study of biblical ethics would include various concerns. One is the concrete moral teachings of the Scriptures—what content they give to right conduct, and to ends and purposes that are good. Biblical notions of justice, of peace, of the good life, of love, would be developed. Another concern would be the forms of moral discourse in Scripture: moral commands, laws, the examples of persons, narratives of actions that are judged to be faithful or unfaithful to God's moral will, parables and alle­ gories, paraenetic instructions, and others. Such a study could be done without reference to uses the findings would have for constructive pur­ poses. The study of biblical ethics requires focus on yet another concern, namely, the theology in the Scriptures which both validates and provides content to the moral teachings. For the people of the Bible, morality was not separated from religion in the way that it has been both in theory and in practice in later developments; ethics was not separated from theology. God and his relations to men and the world were conceived in moral terms, as well as in other terms, and this makes theology an integral part of biblical ethics. Since there are theology in Scripture, this analytical task is in itself complex; its use as a basis for constructive Christian ethics is even more so. In the present study we are alert to the problems raised by the absence of a full development of what are the biblical ethics, and this absence in­ dicates where certain assumptions and warrants that are not fully justified can be found in our proceedings. A second marking is that our primary attention is not a critical analysis of writings in Christian ethics in order to see how Scriptures are used by various theologians and ethicists. Rather, the present modest constructive effort, makes proposals that are subject to the critical scalpels of others. Two helpful articles have recently been published. Edward LeRoy Long has provided one framework for interpretation in his article, "The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics." David H. Kelsey's article "Appeals to Scripture in Theology55 provides a pattern that is also suggestive for the 431 study of Christian ethics.1 Intensive critical analysis of the ways in which Scripture is used in the literature of Christian ethics would yield the range of options from the past and provide a sturdier framework for positive proposals than that given in the present article. Some analysis of this sort is done here, but its function is subservient to other aims. A third marking is more difficult to shape with precision. It calls at­ tention to the fact that how an author uses Scripture is determined to a considerable extent by how he defines the task of Christian ethics. In­ deed, how one defines the field and method of ethics, whether specifically Christian or more general, will make a difference in his uses of Scripture. For example, if the study of ethics is focused on the structure of moral arguments about particular acts, the question of this article would be, How is Scripture used in particular moral arguments? Kelsey's develop­ ment of Toulmin's distinctions between data, warrant, and backing would be immediately applicable. If, however, one includes in ethics a concern for the formation of the moral agent, then Scripture will be used in quite a different way.2 Or, if one attends to a vision of the future good, or to the ontological structure of morality, his uses of Scripture will be gov­ erned accordingly. While I would argue that the scope of Christian ethics is rather inclusive, many aspects will be left relatively unattended in the present article.3 In this paper I intend to develop the significance and the limitations of the uses of Scripture in Christian ethics. I shall also indicate some of the various points or levels in Christian ethical reflection where Scripture is used. To keep at least a backdrop of concreteness in view, I shall draw attention to a complex event which has exercised the moral passions of the American people, namely, the invasion of Cambodia by American troops from South Vietnam in the last days of April, 1970. Many articulate Christians have judged this to be morally wrong and have participated in various forms of action to express their indignation about it. Our major 1. Edward LeRoy Long, "The Use of the Bible in Christian Ethics," Interpr., XIX (1965), 149-62. David H. Kelsey, "Appeals to Scripture in Theology," JR, XLVIII, (1968), 1-21. For a study of Rauschenbusch's use of Scripture, see J. Gustaf son, "From Scripture to Social Policy and Social Action," Andover-Newton Quarterly, IX (1969), pp. 160-69. 2. I have developed a proposal on this point in "The Gospels and Moral Life," read at the Pittsburgh Festival of the Gospels, April, 1970, and to be published in the second volume of papers from that conference. 3. For elaboration of this see Gustafson, Christ and the Moral Life (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968) Chap. I, and "Theology and Ethics," The Scope of Theology, Daniel T. Jenkins, ed. (Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1965), pp. 111-32. 432 The Place of Scripture in Christian Ethics Interpretation and long-range question is this: Why do Christians judge this to be morally wrong? How does Scripture enter into their judgment? To keep the paper manageable it is confined to moral judgments about actions and does not extend to the positive determination of what alternative courses of action are morally better, or what means and ends ought to be used. Before an attempt is made to answer directly this last question, however, it is necessary to isolate the points in the decision-making and action pro­ cesses where moral assessments are pertinent. These are in the assessment of the meaning of the history in which the events take place, the motives and intentions of the decision-makers, the circumstances in which it is deemed proper to act, and the consequences of the action. It is also neces­ sary to sort out some of the more general issues in the uses of Scripture in ethics before we come to address the major question more directly. Final­ ly, in addressing the question, it will be clear that other Christian ethicists might well wish to claim more or less than I do for the place of Scripture, but it is hoped that at least the points at which the arguments can be made will be clear. The Cambodian invasion Not all who believe the invasion of Cambodia to be a mistake would necessarily judge it to be morally wrong; even fewer would judge it to be wrong for "Christian ethical" reasons. The adjectives that would qualify the "wrong" suggest the various frameworks of interpretation that can be used in evaluating the action. The argument is made that it is legally wrong. Persons who have de­ fended the right of American military forces to be in Vietnam on legal grounds, in compliance with commitments, and at the invitation of a legally constituted government, draw a distinction between Vietnam and Cambodia precisely on those two points. There is a violation of the delicate fabric of international law when a power moves into the territory of another nation without invitation of its government, and without treaty commitments that require it. The observation that the move is illegal could contribute to two different sorts of arguments about its immorality. First, it is immoral for a nation to violate international law. Second, it is not possible to universalize the principle used to justify the breaking of the law. To do so would seem to legitimate the invasion of any nation 433 by any other nation in circumstances judged to be similar to those existing in Cambodia. Second, the argument is made that it is a military mistake. Here the appeal is not to a legal standard, but to previous military experience of a similar sort that has not led to the intended or desired consequences.