View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Scholarship at UWindsor University of Windsor Scholarship at UWindsor OSSA Conference Archive OSSA 9 May 18th, 9:00 AM - May 21st, 5:00 PM Tu quoque arguments, subjunctive inconsistency, and questions of relevance Colin Anderson Hiram College Scott .F Aikin Vanderbilt University John Casey Northeastern Illinois University Christoph Lumer Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive Part of the Philosophy Commons Anderson, Colin; Aikin, Scott .;F Casey, John; and Lumer, Christoph, "Tu quoque arguments, subjunctive inconsistency, and questions of relevance" (2011). OSSA Conference Archive. 74. http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/ossaarchive/OSSA9/papersandcommentaries/74 This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences at Scholarship at UWindsor. It has been accepted for inclusion in OSSA Conference Archive by an authorized conference organizer of Scholarship at UWindsor. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Tu quoque arguments, subjunctive inconsistency, and questions of relevance COLIN ANDERSON Department of Philosophy Hiram College P.O. Box 67 Hiram, Ohio 44234 USA [email protected] SCOTT F. AIKIN Department of Philosophy Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN 37240 USA [email protected] JOHN CASEY Department of Philosophy Northeastern Illinois University 5500 North St. Louis Ave. Chicago, IL 60625-4699 USA [email protected] ABSTRACT: Tu quoque arguments regard inconsistencies in some speaker‘s performance. Most tu quoque arguments depend on actual inconsistencies. However, there are forms of tu quoque arguments that key, instead, on the conflicts a speaker would have, were some crucial contingent fact different. These, we call subjunctive tu quoque arguments. Finally, there are cases wherein the counterfactual inconsistencies of a speaker are relevant to the issue. KEYWORDS: Circumstantial Ad Hominem, Relevance, Tu Quoque Arguments 1. INTRODUCTION The objects of tu quoque arguments are speaker inconsistencies. Such inconsistencies are manifested in two ways: inconsistencies between commitments (cognitive inconsistency) and inconsistencies between proposals and deeds (practical inconsistency). The basic schemata for tu quoque arguments, then, are: Zenker, F. (ed.). Argumentation: Cognition and Community. Proceedings of the 9th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation (OSSA), May 18-21, 2011. Windsor, ON (CD ROM), p. 1-7. COLLIN ANDERSON, SCOTT F. AIKIN, AND JOHN CASEY Cognitive: 1. Speaker S asserts that p. 2. S also asserts not-p (or some q inconsistent with p). 3. Therefore, S is unreliable and/or p is not acceptable. Practical: 1. Speaker S proposes action a. 2. S fails to a. 3. Therefore, S is unreliable and/or a is not acceptable. Our interest is in further variation in the second premise of the two argument schemata. In standard cognitive and practical tu quoque arguments, the speech acts and the actions are past or present actualities. And so, S really must have said not-p (or q), and S must really have failed to a. However, there are forms of tu quoque arguments that key on the conflicts a speaker would have, were some crucial contingent fact different, rather than on the speaker’s actual inconsistencies. In essence, they are arguments which run that were conditions different, speaker S would believe or act differently, and this difference is rele- vant to the support for S’s commitments. As such, there is a close connection between these forms of subjunctive inconsistency and ad hominem circumstantial arguments. However, because the inconsistency between two actions is the main argumentative fea- ture of these arguments, we will consider them primarily tu quoque in form. However, their circumstantiality is a key to their evaluation for relevance. Following Govier (1999) and Aikin (2008), we will assume that though tu quo- que arguments widely inherit the relevance failures of their ad hominem family, there are specifiable conditions for forms of speaker inconsistency to be relevant to an issue. For example, hypocrisy can be evidence of ignorance or incompetence, and thereby relevant to speaker reliability. Hypocrisy can be evidence that some proposal is too difficult to perform, and, as a consequence, is relevant to the proposal’s acceptability. Finally, tu quoque arguments can reveal double standards for judgment. Our focus here will be on this final feature, that of maintaining consistency and quality of standards for judgment. Our plan is as follows: We will first outline the subjunctive frame for tu quoque arguments. We will focus on fallacious versions to highlight the form. We will then pro- vide non-fallacious versions of subjunctive tu quoque arguments. 2. SUBJUNCTIVE TU QUOQUE AS FALLACY FORM The basic form of subjunctive tu quoque arguments is captured by two colloquialisms. First, a cognitive version: “If you were in that situation, you’d be singing a different tune.” Second, a practical version: “If you were in his/her place, you’d do the exact same thing.” These colloquialisms are criticisms of some view (that p) or action (a), and these criticisms call attention to the contingencies that allow a critic to espouse a harsh judg- ment of what was done or said. The critic, it is proposed, occupies a position that has dis- torted her capacity to judge the situation properly. Were things different (and the current position changed), the critic’s judgment would be different, too. This, again, is a point where there is significant overlap between these forms of tu quoque and circumstantial ad hominem. Our objective here, first, is to clarify the structure of these arguments, and se- cond, to articulate some criteria of relevance for these counterfactuals. Let us begin with considerations of some irrelevant subjunctive inconsistencies. 2 TU QUOQUE ARGUMENTS 2.1 Capital Punishment The political and moral legitimacy of capital punishment is a widely debated subject in the United States. Those opposing capital punishment hold there is no rehabilitative value to the death penalty, there is no evidence for deterrence, and even if a person did deserve death, it is inappropriate for anyone to enact it. In response, the following rejoinder is offered: Capital Punishment: You are against capital punishment now, but what if your child were taken, beaten, sexually abused, and then murdered? Ten to one, you’d change your tune. The argument is that were critics of capital punishment to experience the grief and horror consequent of some crimes, their retributive inclinations would be sparked. They would see the value in giving others the full measure of retribution. Schematized: P1: Under conditions Φ, S says a is wrong. P2: Under conditions Ψ, S would say a is right. Of course, in the argument here, there’s no stated conclusion. But as functioning in de- fense of the death penalty, it has suppressed commitments: P3: Conditions Ψ are the appropriate conditions to make a judgment regarding a, and conditions Φ are inappropriate conditions. C: Therefore, a is right. The problem is that P3 is false with the capital punishment case. Conditions Ψ are condi- tions of being a victim (at least an indirect victim) of a crime, but it is clear that such a perspective yields distortions that run afoul of the requirements of retributive proportion- ality. Victims maximize assessments of their suffering and perpetrators minimize the suf- fering they cause, and so if a victim is then placed in the position of determining a pro- portionate punishment for a perpetrator, there will be a magnitude gap between the harms (See Baumeister 1999: 160, and Mandel 2002: 186). Consequently, that the opponent of the death penalty would burn with murderous revenge under those conditions is irrelevant to the question of what the proper punishment is. 2.2 Jus in bello Let us consider a further case of subjunctive inconsistency that is not second but third personally addressed (and so, as Aikin (2008: 161) notes, should be is or ea quoque in- stead of tu). Imagine a war crimes trial wherein a general is accused of indiscriminate use of force. Many non-combatants died, and the opposing force had not been using them as human shields. Yet the general had ordered the areas firebombed. At the hearing, the general may concede that she is bound by the rules of warfare and she broke them; how- ever she poses the following counterfactual: 3 COLLIN ANDERSON, SCOTT F. AIKIN, AND JOHN CASEY Jus in bello: I ask you: in all honesty, do you believe that if Country X’s military were in a similar situation, with our heavily defended military positions, but our civilian centers open to attack… would the X military have shown restraint? Would they have inflicted those casualties? Of course they would have! The first problem with the argument is that even if X’s military were to actually do the same thing under those circumstances, it does not mean that X’s civilians deserve this. Second, the argument runs afoul of another jus in bello prohibition against disproportion- ate reprisal (even counterfactual reprisals). Regardless of how the argument fails other standards, in this case, the counter- factual posed is not about the contingency of the position of those who judge whether an action is wrong (as opposed to capital punishment from earlier), but on the contingency of those who are perpetrators and victims. Were things different, the victims would have willingly been perpetrators. Schematized: P1: Under conditions Φ, A performs a (which harms B). P2: Under conditions Φ, B would perform a (which would harm A). Again, the conclusions as well as relevant moral premises are suppressed, but as a defense of A, they must be: P3: If any S would do a under conditions Φ, then S does not have a moral claim against any who a under Φ.