Naming the Wise: the Sophos, the Philosophos and the Sophistēs in Plato Trinidad Silva University College London This thesis is submitted for the degree of PhD in Classics DECLARATION I, Trinidad Silva, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 2 ABSTRACT In the first half of the fourth century BCE, when Plato is writing his dialogues, the titles ‘sophist’ and ‘philosopher’ have no widely-accepted application and, as a result, the use of them for some purposes rather than others is controversial and subject to dispute. In the tradition that follows Plato, ‘philosophy’ becomes a term of art and the philosophos is distinguished from the class of the sophistai and other alleged sophoi such as poets, orators and politicians. Considering Plato is among other competitors for the appropriation and legitimisation of these labels, the present dissertation examines the importance each of these notions have in the Platonic corpus, drawing attention to the way they are (re)defined and appropriated, whether they are novel or distinct. By observing examples in pre-Platonic and Platonic literature, section I of the thesis focuses on sophos/sophia, section II on philosophos/philosophia and section III on sophistēs. The investigation allows us to reassess two problems that have not been fully considered in Platonic scholarship: (i) Plato’s conception of sophia within the Greek tradition of wisdom, and (ii) the identity of and distinction between the philosopher and the sophist in Plato’s dialogues. I intend to consider both Plato’s inheritance from the tradition and Plato’s own contribution to creating an identity for the sophistēs and the philosophos from a deeper understanding of sophos/sophia. The legacy of the precedent tradition is reflected by the presence of the agonistic, authoritative, and moral strands. Plato’s contribution, on the other hand, is reflected by the presence of two elements, namely the principle whereby these titles are meaningful names, and a consistent conceptualisation of them in epistemic terms. I propose that Plato makes use of the meaning of these words by conceiving of them more as descriptors than as titles of authority or reputation. By using ‘real’ definitions, he is allowed to confront the ‘apparent’ with the ‘real sophos’ (Apology), to create a narrative of love for the philosopher (Phaedo, Lysis, Symposium and Republic), and to argue that the sophist ‘seems to know’—hence the name sophistēs (Sophist). 3 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 1. The Problem 9 2. The State of the Question 15 3. Approach 18 4. Platonic Sophia 21 5. Linguistic Considerations 24 6. Methodology 27 SECTION I: SOPHIA/SOPHOS 1. SOPHIA/SOPHOS IN PRE-PLATONIC LITERATURE 33 1.1. Every Sophia: Examples in Archaic and Lyric Poetry 35 1.2. The Context of Contest: Agonistic Sophia 38 1.3. Sophos: the Man of Intelligence 41 1.4. The Moral Strand: Examples in Tragedy 45 1.5. Characterisation of the Sophos: the Clever and the Intellectual 51 1.6. The Sophos in Aristophanes’ Clouds 55 1.7. Conclusion 59 2. INTRODUCING PLATO’S SOPHOS: THE KNOWER 61 2.1. Intelligence and Knowledge 63 2.2. Sophia as Intelligence in Plato 65 2.3. Sophia as Knowledge in Plato: The Theaetetus 67 2.3.1 The Argument of the Sophōteros Man: Experts, Seeming Experts and Moral Experts 70 2.4. Virtue as a Kind of Sophia and Sophia as a Kind of Knowledge 75 2.4.1. The Laches 76 2.4.2. The Protagoras 77 2.4.3. The Republic 81 2.5. Philosophical Sophia and the Good Life: The Euthydemus 82 2.6. The Sophoi: Apparent and Real 86 2.6.1. Apparent Sophia 87 2.6.2. Interlocutors’ and Socrates’ Sophia 89 2.7. Conclusion 92 3. THE APOLOGY 95 3.1. Socrates Sophos: a Term of Blame 97 3.1.1. The Intellectual Sophos 100 3.2. A ‘Sort of Sophos’ 103 3.3. Socrates and the Reputed Sophoi 107 3.3.1. The Politician and the Poet: Merely Apparent Sophoi 109 3.3.2. The Sophia of the Craftsmen 112 3.3.3. Socrates’ Comparative Sophia 115 3.4. Things Worth Knowing: The Rhetoric of Real and Apparent 118 3.5. Conclusion 121 5 SECTION II: PHILOSOPHIA/PHILOSOPHOS 4. INTRODUCING PLATO’S PHILOSOPHOS: THE LOVER 125 4.1. The phil(o)- Compound and Philosophia in Pre-Platonic Literature 127 4.1.1. Towards Philosophical Philosophia? Philosophia and Sophia in Heraclitus 131 4.1.2. Pythagoras: the ‘Platonic’ Philosopher 133 4.2. Platonic Philosoph- 135 4.3. The Love Characteristic of Philosophia in Plato 138 4.4. The Lysis and the Symposium: Friendship and Desire 141 4.4.1. The Lysis: the Philosopher as a Friend 142 4.4.2. The Symposium: the Philosopher as a Lover 147 4.4.3. Love and Knowledge 150 4.5. Philosophy as a Practice for Dying: the Phaedo 152 4.6. Conclusion 155 5. THE REPUBLIC 157 5.1. The Philosopher as a Lover (Books V, VI and IX) 158 5.2. Is the Philosophos a Sophos? 161 5.3. The Psychological Make-up of the Philosopher 164 5.4. The Philosopher’s Cognitive Capacity: Philosophers and Lovers of Sights and Sounds 166 5.5. Plato’s Use of Public Opinion in his Characterisation of the Philosopher 172 5.5.1. The Relativisation of Usefulness 175 5.5.2. Identifying the Real Philosopher: Nature and Education 177 5.5.3 The Apparent Philosopher 179 5.6. Conclusion 181 SECTION III: SOPHISTĒS 6. INTRODUCING PLATO’S SOPHISTES: THE INDEFINABLE 185 6.1. What and Who is a Sophistēs? 186 6.2. The Deinos Sophistēs 188 6.3. The Class of Sophistai 192 6.4. The Platonic Sophist: The Indefinable 194 6.4.1. The Problem of Definition 196 6.4.2. The Sophists’ Area of Expertise 198 6.5. The Sophistai 202 6.6. The Sophists’ Reputation 206 6.7. Conclusion 213 7. THE SOPHIST 215 7.1. The Sophist: One Name, One Kind 217 7.2. Multiple Definitions: The Sophist’s Appearance 222 7.3. Sixth Definition: Noble Sophistry or Philosophy? 226 7.4. The Sophist’s Amazing Capacity 229 7.5. Between Darkness and Light: the Sophist and the Philosopher 235 7.6. Final Definition: From Imitation to Deception 238 7.7. Conclusion 241 6 8. CONCLUSION 243 9. BIBLIOGRAPHY 249 7 Here is the test of wisdom; Wisdom is not finally tested in schools; Wisdom cannot be pass’d from one having it to another not having it; Wisdom is of the Soul, is not susceptible of proof, is its own proof, Applies to all stages and objects and qualities, and is content, It is certainty of the reality and immortality of things, and the excellence of things; Something there is in the float of the sight of things that provokes it out of the Soul. Walt Whitman, Leaves of Grass, 82 Song of the Open Road. 8 INTRODUCTION 1. The Problem Because we take for granted that Plato is a philosopher and place him within the history of philosophy, we often forget the question of the way he positioned himself (as a philosopher) in the Greek tradition of wisdom. Not only do we take for granted that Plato is a philosopher; we assume that we know what a philosopher is for Plato. The question invites further analysis. In the fourth century BCE, Plato is fashioning the identity of the philosopher in contradistinction to other intellectuals and shaping his conception of sophia and philosophia by contrast to competing notions and models of education. In this regard, we also tend to assume that Plato draws a distinct antagonism between the philosopher and the sophist. Sophistēs, another label in use to designate a wide range of experts, teachers and intellectuals, seems to offer a perfect counterpoint to spotlight the virtue of the philosopher. Thus, by means of contrast, we also take for granted who and what a sophist is in Plato. It seems, in fact, that the dramatic tension that Plato achieved through the hostility between some individuals identified as sophists and the philosopher (i.e. Socrates) developed from his dialogues to find its own place in the history of philosophy, and became a commonplace. The problem, as with all commonplaces, is that the question is often overlooked. By placing Plato within a context where the appropriation and legitimation of these labels is contested, I offer a fresh outlook into the way he presents his philosophy (and his philosopher). Because philosophos and sophistēs are constructs rather than specialised terms, I look at the way they are conceptualised in Plato. A central claim of my thesis is that Plato understands both terms in relation to sophia/sophos. Plato embraces the cultural and authoritative weight that sophia traditionally has, and uses different attitudes towards the sophoi to create the identity of the philosopher and the sophist. To understand the extent of Plato’s contribution, I examine the philosopher and the sophist on the foundations of a deeper understanding of the notion of sophia/sophos in pre-Platonic and Platonic literature. I consider the importance each of these notions have in the corpus, drawing attention to the way they are (re)defined and appropriated. This allows us to see the presence 9 of both the novel and traditional elements underlying Plato’s rhetoric in naming ‘the wise’. The initial point of inquiry is triggered by a phenomenon observed in our language: the words ‘philosopher’ and ‘sophist’ are transliterations (not translations) from Greek philosophos and sophistēs.