Toward a Pragmatic Ontology of Scientific Concepts Olin M. Robus A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2018 Reading Committee: Andrea Woody, Chair Arthur Fine Cass Weller Joseph Rouse John Manchak Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Philosophy ©Copyright 2018 Olin M. Robus i University of Washington Abstract Toward a Pragmatic Ontology of Scientific Concepts Olin M. Robus Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Professor Andrea Woody Philosophy I argue that current projects in ‘naturalized metaphysics’ fail to be properly naturalistic, and thereby fail in their stated aim to take one’s metaphysics from science. I argue that naturalism must involve the idea of taking science seriously, and that this can only be spelled out in terms of taking not only the theories of science seriously, but also its practice and its socio-linguistic situatedness seriously as well. This accords with naturalism because not doing so draws anar- tificial (non-natural) distinction between the epistemic products of science as essence, and its socio-linguistic and practical features as accidents. The picture of naturalism which falls out of this is a form of pragmatism. Once this isspelled out, the question becomes, what is the appropriate attitude for the pragmatist/naturalist to have toward ontology? It is not the same as that of traditional metaphysics, since such an attitude (that metaphysical theorizing can make positive epistemic contributions) requires a priori com- mitments which themselves are (1) not subject to empirical review, and (2) are anthropocentric and so potentially distorted. But the pragmatist/naturalist will not go the opposite way, and say that metaphysics is meaningless either, since (true to their pragmatic commitments) ontol- ii ogy does things for the scientist and the layperson. It is a mistake to reject it wholesale, since the task of asserting what there is, exposing such an ontology to criticism, both empirical and logical, and revising it, has both small-scale and large-scale consequences. On the small-scale, ontologies are a guide for thinking—scientists, engineers, and lay people can and do use mod- els of existence to navigate occurent problems in their day-to-day lives. Whether this is posing research hypotheses, developing protocols for generating new materials, or cooling off a cup of coffee, ontology plays a role. Large-scale consequences are more weighty, and more difficult to see. These large-scale consequences have to do with the aims and values which individuals and societies possess, and their interrelation with ontology. This certainly was at the forefront ofthe earliest ontologies—the Epicureans and Stoics built their moral philosophy on the basis of what ontology they thought was correct. This sort of practice goes on, unabated, today, though with virtually no overt acknowledgement of this important interdependency. How, for the pragmatist, do we make sense of ontological talk, if we are to eschew tradi- tional metaphysics? Ontology—the naturalist/pragmatist declares—is a tool. Ontology helps us do things, whether it be predict behavior, understand phenomena, blame or forgive someone, and hope or despair about a life after this one (for example). Building an ontology is about build- ing our own concepts, and this, in turn is a negotiation between our beliefs, experiences, and commitments, and the beliefs, experiences, and commitments of with whom we’re discursively engaged. iii Contents Copyright ............................................ i Abstract ............................................. ii Table of Contents ....................................... iv Acknowledgments ....................................... vii Introduction 1 0.0 Naturalism & Metaphysics ............................... 1 0.1 What is Scientific Metaphysics? What is Metaphysics? ............... 5 0.1.1 Four Kinds of Naturalism ........................... 15 1 Putnam, Stein, & Space-Time 22 1.0 Introduction ....................................... 22 1.1 Time and Special Relativity ............................... 23 1.1.1 Putnam, Eternalism and the Relation R ................... 25 1.1.2 Arthur Prior and a priori Scruples ....................... 30 1.1.3 Howard Stein and the Equivocality of Theory ................ 33 1.1.4 What Can Settle the Choice Between R and R0? ............... 36 1.2 Objections ........................................ 39 1.2.1 Does General Relativity Offer a Better Metaphysical Basis? ......... 40 1.2.2 Symmetry, Interpretation, and Fundamentality ............... 42 1.2.3 Is the a priori Anti-Naturalist? ......................... 47 2 Naturalism & the a priori 49 2.0 Introduction ....................................... 49 2.1 Statements of Rejection ................................. 52 2.2 Taking Science Seriously ................................ 55 2.3 Why Does Naturalism Reject the a priori? ....................... 57 2.3.1 The Role of the a priori ............................. 57 2.3.2 An Epistemological Foundation ........................ 62 2.4 Two Principles of Naturalized Metaphysics ...................... 63 2.4.1 Science and Conceptual Revolution ...................... 65 2.4.2 Naturalism and the ‘Quinean Realization’ .................. 69 2.4.3 A Naturalistic Substitute ............................ 71 iv 3 Ontological Structuralism 74 3.0 Introduction ....................................... 74 3.1 A Sophisticated Naturalism ............................... 75 3.1.1 Origins of Structural Realism ......................... 75 3.1.2 Structure as Metaphysics ............................ 78 3.1.3 Mathematical Fixed-Points ........................... 86 3.2 Taking Structuralism Seriously ............................. 88 3.2.1 Two Naturalistic Failures ............................ 89 3.3 Between Math and the World .............................. 99 3.3.1 Pythagoreanism or ‘Real’ Structure? ..................... 99 3.4 Conclusion ........................................ 103 4 Pragmatism & Scientific Metaphysics 104 4.0 Introduction ....................................... 104 4.1 Practice, Concepts, and Pragmatism .......................... 108 4.1.1 The Turn to Practice .............................. 108 4.1.2 Metalinguistic Negotiation ........................... 120 4.1.3 A Pragmatist View of Concepts ........................ 123 4.2 Metaphysics in Practice: Astrobiology and Life .................... 125 4.2.1 Definitions of Life, the Problem ........................ 126 4.2.2 A Pragmatic Approach ............................. 133 4.2.3 Jovian Tornadoes ................................ 137 4.3 Conclusion: Why ‘Metaphysics’? ........................... 144 Appendices 146 Appendix A ........................................... 146 Appendix B ........................................... 150 Bibliography 151 v For Patricia. 1 Acknowledgments For better or worse, this dissertation is the product of 9 years of graduate study, and afull32years of experience and education. I have been extraordinarily lucky to have many wonderful teachers, friends, mentors, and role-models to help me get to this point. I could not have done this without their guidance and inspiration, and I can only hope that this dissertation is an adequate token of my appreciation. My first and most profound debt of gratitude is to my family, who at an early ageinculcated in me a desire to learn, and taught me an admiration and respect for inquiry. I am the product of my environment and upbringing, and insofar as I have any redeeming qualities, intellectual or otherwise, I owe them to the love, patience, and quiet brilliance of my mother and father. Another debt of gratitude is owed to the University of Washington Department of Philosophy, and its faculty, staff, and graduate students. My philosophical education truly began ingradu- ate school, and were it not for interactions with my fellow graduate students and departmental faculty, I might have very different beliefs and ideas than I do today. For that I am thankful. In particular I am indebted to Jon Rosenberg, my friend and colleague. I owe much of my philosoph- ical worldview to my many discussions with Jon over the past decade. I am indebted to the undergraduates in the many courses I have taught in these past years at the University of Washington. Their skepticism, confusion, and enthusiasm have been a source vii of frustration, consternation, and inspiration. They say nothing focuses the mind quite likethe prospect of death, but the prospect of facing 30 dubious and intelligent undergrads surely comes close. I have learned more philosophy in my discussions with my students than from any talk I’ve ever attended, or any paper or book I’ve ever read. To all my students, thank you. I would also like to thank my dissertation committee for their interest, support, and engage- ment with this project. Their comments, feedback, and questions have improved my own ar- guments considerably, and while there will be inevitable points of disagreement, their advice, insight, and wisdom have been most valuable. In particular I must thank my committee chair, Andrea Woody, for her help and guidance in the writing of this dissertation. For their help reading through drafts of this document, and for their careful editing sugges- tions, my thanks to Ben Robinson and Matt Robus. Their attention to detail and willingness to endure my prose have improved this work immeasurably. While they have surely caught the most egregious