Who will build Rogun HPP? “Construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power station using Tajikistan’s own forces can give impetus to the development of many branches of the national economy, development of fundamental and applied research and studies, preparation of its own highly qualified personnel and much anything else. But a necessary condition to make it possible is the availability of the government’s vision of this problem and of the ways of solving it, coupled with firm political will of the leadership of the country”, said Rashid Ghani Abdullo, a political scientist (Dushanbe, Tajikistan), in an article written exclusively for cabar.asia. Rogun HPP is the largest hydroelectric power plant of the Vakhsh cascade and has a strategic importance for Tajikistan, since it is believed that Rogun HPP will pull the country out of the energy crisis, which breaks out every winter because of the seasonal flow of water. The construction of this hydropower plant is important both for the population, as well as for the development of energy- intensive industries. This will provide surplus of electricity, and Tajikistan will be able to export it without any problems. This export will not be costly, as this will only require the construction of power transmission lines, which is much cheaper than building roads, railways and pipelines. In addition, the availability of this facility will allow to regulate the flow of water year-round and rid the country of droughts and floods, which in turn will give an impetus to the development of agriculture. The presence of this large energy object, provided that Tajikistan will be able to build it on its own, allow to give an impetus to the emergence and development of new industries, will give the country new competencies and ultimately transform the country from a phase of pre-industrial society into an industrial and post- industrial. After all, the construction of the largest hydroelectric power station will strengthen the position of Tajikistan in the negotiation processes. However, the republic has faced with great difficulties, and it became a hostage of political circumstances when implementatig this major energy project. Why did not the Soviet Union build Rogun HPP? The Rogun project will soon celebrate its fiftieth anniversary, if we count from the time of its initial development in 1968. Unlike the other similar project – the Nurek hydropower plant, construction of the Rogun HPP on the Vakhsh river has resulted in a long and painful process, although, in the beginning, all worked supremely well for this major Central Asian hydroelectric site. In 1968, when the Nurek hydropower plant was being actively built, the General Directorate for Energy and Electrification of the Council of Ministers of the Tajik SSR requested the Central Asian branch of the “Hydroproject” Institute in Tashkent city to develop a technical project of the Rogun hydroelectric power station. (1) The project was drawn up in 1974 and Who will build Rogun HPP? approved by the State Construction Committee of the USSR. (2) In accordance with it, the capacity of the power plant was supposed to be 3,600 MW. Six of its power units of 600 MW were supposed to produce 13.1 billion kWh a year. A reservoir with full storage of 13.3 km3 and useful storage of 10.3 cubic kilometers of water was supposed to ensure the production of a given amount of electricity. To create such a reservoir, the project provided for the construction of a rockfill dam with height of 335 meters, using local materials (3). Rogun HPP, with its high-rise dam, was originally conceived not only for electricity generation, but also as a key element of the whole system of regulation of the flow of the Vakhsh River, a system that allows, in conjunction with other hydropower facilities downstream, to maintain the optimum level of water in Amu Darya at all times. Practical works on the implementation of the Rogun project began in 1976. On December 27, 1987, the Vakhsh river was blocked. The construction of the dam had begun. Installation and operation of the first two power units was planned already for the next year or two. However, these plans remained plans. They were never realized. The established process of construction of the Rogun HPP was disrupted by political events, provoked by perestroika. In the late 1980s, in line with the development of the restructuring processes in the entire Soviet Union, political participation of the population in Tajikistan had also increased. It took many forms and was full of not less diverse political content. One aspect of this activity was open and rigid confrontation, at first glance, between the so-called democratic forces and the authorities of the republic. In fact, behind this confrontation, which was possible only against the background of weakening of the power structures of the Soviet state during perestroika, there was a more serious phenomenon – the clash of different regional and political elites for the possession of power in the republic. People dissatisfied with the proportions of access to power and participation in real decision-making that had been well established during the previous decade (mainly representatives of the south-east of the country) were actively demanding the revision of the status quo. The elites (representative of the North) who had actual power in the country did not want to change anything. In the ensuing fight, the opponents of official authorities actively demanded to stop not only the construction of the Rogun hydropower plant, but also a number of other important and necessary for the country objects that were being erected mainly in the regions south of Anzob pass, in particular the battery factory in Kulyab. The fight about the Rogun HPP comprised everything: active demonstrations by famous artistic people who had gained some political significance, somehow associated with regional political elites, striving for changes in the country, who gained political ional- political elites, and their protests in Moscow, and the information and political support they got from like-minded people in the large capital city, and the organization of protests by Who will build Rogun HPP? residents of areas around the place of construction of the Rogun power plant. Eventually, the station became the first major victim of political confrontation in the country. The ruling authorities at that time surprisingly quickly succumbed to the pressure and froze its construction. Were they so weak? Hardly. In a much more complex situation in February 1990 and onwards, up until the transfer of power in Moscow to Boris Yeltsin and his team in August 1991, which initiated the precipitous collapse of the USSR, the ruling authorities in Tajikistan were confident enough to respond to the pressure from their opponents. Regional political elites standing behind the so-called democratic forces were not so naive to abandon the Rogun project. Judging by the way the events unfolded later, the struggle to curtail the project was a way of ensuring mass support for the real forces behind the anti- Rogun actions, the support which could then be used as an effective tool in the struggle for power. I have not doubt that, once in power, they would resume the construction of that hydroelectric power station, as the possession of a powerful source had not been a burden for any government. In this case, they could count on the support of those in Moscow who struggled and eventually came to power, and who were allies of the opponents of the Tajik government at that time. But all this did not happen. What happened in reality had never been expected by anybody: the Soviet Union collapsed. The collapse of the united country resulted for the newly independent state of Tajikistan in the collapse of the economy, civil war, territorial and political fragmentation, loss of control and general economic impoverishment. Nobody cared about the Rogun hydroelectric power station, and the former grand construction was abandoned. In 1993, in a situation where the station was actually unattended – professionals and everybody left the Rogun, fleeing from war and economic turmoil – a flood destroyed the dam and partially flooded tunnels and the turbine room, which previously had been almost ready. Impossible to construct using local resources, but investors do not hurry to invest The cumulative effect of these factors throughout the 1990s made the resumption of the construction almost impossible. Only after stabilization of the military-political situation in the country and certain positive developments in terms of significantly advancing restoration of the statehood and manageability of the republic, the possibility of resuming the implementation of the Rogun project became more vivid. However, the consequences of the collapse of the economy after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the civil war led to the fact that the republic had neither the financial capacity, nor the respective competencies for the implementation of such a large project on its own. Under these circumstances, the republic was forced to seek assistance of potential investors. The latter were not quick to respond favorably to Tajikistan’s appeals, due to the uncertainty of the prospects of return on investment, not to mention the commercial gain. Who will build Rogun HPP? Besides, there were not many potential investors. Rogun HPP is a very large scale and financially very costly project. The assessment by experts of the volume of funds required to complete the construction of this power plant range from about three to six billion dollars. This amount of money may be affordable only for very large foreign private companies or group of companies, as well as States having the opportunity to finance the implementation of such projects directly from the budget or through related companies.