The London School of Economics and Political Science Explaining violence against civilians: Insurgency, counterinsurgency and crime in the Middle Magdalena Valley, Colombia (1996-2004) Gonzalo A. Vargas A thesis submitted to the Development Studies Institute of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, February 2010 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author. I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. 2 Abstract During the last decade there has been intense controversy over the nature of contemporary armed conflicts and their connection with religion, ethnicity, crime and natural resources. Central to the discussion is the question of why armed organisations use violence against civilians. Recent contributions underscore the self- interested behaviour of individuals and suggest that war, violence and collaboration are increasingly driven by personal ambitions rather than political goals. Combatants, warlords and politicians seem less interested in victory than in satisfying their lust for power and money, usually at the expense of the population; meanwhile, fearful but rational civilians try to exploit the opportunities that conflict throws up, engaging in individualistic alliances with armed organisations and even prompting the use of violence against their fellows. These trends, it is argued, are compounded by the convergence between crime and warfare, and the Colombian conflict is often cited as a typical example. This dissertation examines these claims by studying a recent outbreak of violence against civilians in the Middle Magdalena Valley, in Colombia, that left nearly 2,000 civilians dead and more than 110,000 people forcefully displaced. Based on data obtained from official and unofficial sources on conflict and violence, interviews with key informants and news reports, the dissertation argues that violence was used by armed organisations and, to a lesser extent, by the state, to extend and strengthen the territorial and political control they had over the region. Despite the salience of illegal economies, there is no evidence that economic motives have significantly contributed to the production of violence. Furthermore, civilian collaboration went beyond the narrow sphere of private interests as politicians, parties and social organisations took part in alliances with armed organisations and aimed to advance the interests of the social groups they represented. The dissertation thus challenges common misconceptions and influential contributions in the field of armed conflict and political violence; it also sheds light on the nature of the Colombian conflict. 3 Acknowledgements The author is grateful for their support and feedback to his supervisors at the LSE, Jean-Paul Faguet and John Harriss. Chris Lundt, James Scott, Stathis Kalyvas, Dennis Rodgers and two anonymous reviewers provided helpful advice on papers prepared as part of this research. The Middle Magdalena Valley Peace and Development Programme provided invaluable support during the fieldwork; German Plata, Ademir Luna, Cesar Moreno and Carolina Rojas were particularly helpful in identifying and contacting interviewees and in providing access to precious archives, data and memories. This PhD was partially funded by the EU’s Alban Programme (Project ID E03D02657CO); the LSE also provided substantial financial support. The author is grateful to these institutions and, above all, to his family for their unconditional support. 4 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 15 1. VIOLENCE, ARMED CONFLICT AND TYPES OF WARFARE—A LITERATURE REVIEW 23 1.1 Conventional warfare 26 1.2 Irregular warfare 28 1.2.1 Guerrilla warfare 29 1.2.2 Counterinsurgency 32 1.2.3 Civilian collaboration and violence 35 1.3 New wars and pseudo-wars 39 1.4 Violence against civilians in Colombia 43 1.4.1 Nature and purpose 44 1.4.2 Magnitude 49 1.5 Challenges 52 2. RESEARCH STRATEGY 56 2.1 The advantages of studying a region 56 2.2 Fieldwork and data sources 62 2.2.1 Data and sources 62 2.2.2 Qualitative sources 73 2.3 From the evidence to the questions and debates: combining quantitative and qualitative sources and methods 75 5 3. THE MIDDLE MAGDALENA VALLEY: A HISTORY OF CONFLICT AND VIOLENCE 81 3.1 The roots of conflict 82 3.1.1 The role of the state 82 3.1.2 Social and economic conflicts 84 3.1.3 Ideology and the Cold War 93 3.2 Emergence and consolidation of armed organisations 96 3.2.1 Insurgencies 96 3.2.2 Paramilitaries 105 3.3 Armed conflict in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1988-1995 112 3.4 Discussion 114 4. SCALE, TRENDS AND AIMS OF VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE MAGDALENA VALLEY, 1996-2004 117 4.1 Pushing back the insurgency: trends and outcomes of armed conflict from 1996 to 2004 119 4.2 Main forms of violence and their scale 123 4.2.1 Civilian deaths 124 4.2.2 Kidnappings 127 4.2.3 Forced displacement 129 4.3 Producers of violence against civilians 130 4.3.1 Insurgents 130 4.3.2 Paramilitaries 135 4.3.3 Government forces 138 4.3.4 Unidentified or unknown perpetrators 139 6 4.4 Explaining the aims of violence through its spatial correlates 140 4.4.1 Identification of the model 142 4.4.2 Results 149 4.4.3 Paramilitary killings 151 4.4.4 Insurgent killings 154 4.4.5 Discussion 157 4.5 Conclusion 160 5. TERRITORIAL CONTROL AND BEYOND: COUNTERINSURGENCY AND VIOLENCE IN BARRANCABERMEJA 163 5.1 The ‘Logic of Violence in Civil War’ 164 5.2 Armed conflict and violence in Barrancabermeja 166 5.2.1 Barrancabermeja—at the edge of the Colombian state 167 5.2.2 Crushing the insurgency 168 5.2.3 Descriptive statistics 183 5.3 Testing the ‘Logic of Violence’ in Barrancabermeja 187 5.3.1 Methods 187 5.3.2 Results 191 5.4 Discussion 195 5.4.1 Guerrillas’ selective violence—was it insufficient? 195 5.4.2 Paramilitaries’ selective violence—how was it possible in zones z3 and z4? 196 5.4.3 Paramilitaries’ selective violence—excessive in zone z1? 197 5.4.4 ‘Alliances’ and socioeconomic segregation 198 5.5 Conclusion 202 7 6. MORE THAN VICTIMS? CIVILIAN COLLABORATION, LOCAL POLITICS AND ALLIANCES IN SOUTH BOLIVAR 206 6.1 Crime and the demise of politics in contemporary armed conflicts 207 6.2 South Bolivar—beyond the edge of the state 210 6.3 The struggle for territorial and political control in south Bolivar 214 6.3.1 The rise of the insurgency 214 6.3.2 The counterinsurgent campaign 217 6.3.3 Magnitude, trends and outcomes of armed conflict 221 6.4 Armed conflict and social mobilisation: from allegiance to alliances 223 6.4.1 The peasant marches of 1996 and 1998 224 6.4.2 The local opposition to the demilitarised zone 227 6.5 Discussion 230 6.6 Conclusion 233 7. VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS AND THE NATURE OF ARMED CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE MAGDALENA VALLEY 234 7.1 Zones of control and the rationale for violence 236 7.1.1 Violence as a means for territorial control 238 7.1.2 Violence for political control followed territorial control 239 7.1.3 Ransom kidnappings lacked a political rationale 241 8 7.2 Violence and irregular wars—concepts, evidence and implications 243 7.2.1 Territorial control—the main determinant of violence 243 7.2.2 All politics is local—even in wartime 245 7.2.3 The limits of criminalisation 252 7.2.4 Summing up—violence and the strategies of irregular warfare 256 7.2.4 Methodological implications 257 8. REFERENCES 260 9 LIST OF TABLES, FIGURES AND MAPS Tables Table 1.1. Violence against civilians and types of warfare— comparative criteria 43 Table 2.1 Victims of kidnapping, forced disappearance and arbitrary detention, 1996-2004 72 Table 4.1 Dead combatants according to groups involved in hostilities, 1996-2004 120 Table 4.2. Insurgent activity: quarterly averages of events by period 122 Table 4.3. Civilians and combatants killed by group, excluding hostilities, 1996-2004 127 Table 4.4. Conflict-related civilian kidnappings in the Middle Magdalena Valley, 1996-2004 129 Table 4.5 Cross sectional regression analysis of the municipal civilian death tolls 150 Table 4.6 Cross-sectional regression analysis of paramilitary killings 153 Table 4.7 Cross-sectional regression analysis of insurgent killings 156 Table 5.1. Civilian and combatant deaths in urban Barrancabermeja, 1996-2004 184 Table 5.2. Hostilities and combatants’ deaths by phase 184 Table 5.3. Conflict-related civilian deaths by organisation and phase 186 Table 5.4. Conflict-related kidnappings in Barrancabermeja 186 Table 5.5. Zones of control in Barrancabermeja and operational criteria 189 Table 5.6. Comunas and zones of control in urban Barrancabermeja, 1996-2004 191 Table 5.7. Selective civilian deaths by organisation and phase 192 Table 5.8. Selective civilian deaths by organisation and zone of control 193 Table 5.9. Conflict-related violence and socio-economic strata in 199 10 urban Barrancabermeja: civilian deaths per 100,000 population (annual average, 1996-2004) Table 5.10. Occupational categorisation of victims of conflict-related killings and kidnappings in Barrancabermeja, 1996-2004 199 Table 6.1.