CHAPTER 22 THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET JOINS I N EN Commodore Farncomb returned to Lingayen Gulf and hoisted pendant in Shropshire on 22nd January, the amphibious phas e of the operation was over . Things were quiet in the Gulf itself after som e days of considerable tension . Between 10th and 18th January TG .77.2, including Shropshire and Warramunga, operated off the Gulf as part of the Luzon Defence Force' in support of the Escort Carrier Group, and as cover against enemy surface forces. The escort carriers flew larg e numbers of sorties each day, and covered the offensive on shore until captured airfields could be brought into operation . Until 13th January , Kamikaze attacks were a major worry, both to ships in the Gulf and to the reinforcement convoys and those returning to Leyte, and considerable damage to ships was incurred, with many casualties . These attacks cease d on that date, however. As was learned after the war, by 12th January the Japanese had expended their aircraft in the Philippines . Many had bee n withdrawn to Formosa, where they reorganised at Tainan airfield, an d the Kamikazes were next heard from on 21 January when they attacked TF .38 ; bu t for the most part, from 13 January to the Iwo Jima operation, they remained grounded . For the Allies they now seemed but a horrible dream . Unfortunately, like other bad dreams, this one recurred . 2 On 13th January General MacArthur landed and set up his headquarter s in Dagupan, and the same day General Krueger assumed command o f Sixth Army ashore . By 16th January Sixth Army controlled a beach-hea d almost 30 miles deep and of about the same width . On 17th January, with shore-based fighters operating from Lingaye n airfields, General Kenney became responsible for all air operations ove r Luzon, and the Luzon Defence Force was dispersed . On the 18th TG .77. 2 re-entered the Gulf and anchored in the Transport Area at the southern end, where it remained until the end of the month . Eight of the escort carriers, with a screen of 14 destroyers, sailed under Rear-Admiral Durgi n for Ulithi in preparation for the Iwo Jima operation . Six others, with a similar screen, under Rear-Admiral Stump, remained with Seventh Fleet until the end of January, operating with Berkey's Close Covering Grou p off north-western Mindoro . The securing of the Mindoro-Lingayen communication line was a majo r concern of Admiral Kinkaid's, since it was the only practical route to th e beach-head while the Japanese held northern Luzon and Manila . It had to be assumed that the enemy would try to cut it by surface force attack, ' 1 Formed on 10th January, the Luzon Defence Force comprised TG's 77 .2 (Bombardment and Fire Support Group), 77 .3 (Berkey' s Close Covering Group), and 77 .4 (Durgin's Escort Carrier Group), with Admiral Oldendorf as over-all commander . 2 Morison, Vol XIII, p . 152 . 3 It was only about three weeks since, as stated earlier, an enemy cruiser and destroyer force had bombarded Mindoro after the American landing there . Jan 1945 FRUITFUL ACTIVITIES 595 and an attempt was made to destroy the means of his doing so. Throughout January Halsey's Third Fleet ranged the South China Sea, with the aircraf t of TF.38 striking heavily at widespread targets including Indo-China , Hainan, Hong Kong, the Pescadores, Formosa, the Sakishima group an d Okinawa. In spite of continuous bad weather, Third Fleet's activities i n support of the Luzon campaign were fruitful. During its South China Sea foray it sank or destroyed 61 Japanese ships totalling 301,376 tons , and destroyed 615 aircraft. When endorsing Halsey 's Action Report of the China Sea sortie, Nimitz described it as "well conceived and brilliantl y executed", but regretted "that more important targets were not withi n reach of the Task Force 's destructive sweep ". These "more important targets" were the Japanese capital ships, which had retired well out of range of Third Fleet aircraft. The enemy hit back on 21st January, when TF.38 was about 10 0 miles east of Formosa, in a series of Kamikaze attacks which damaged a number of ships and caused fatal casualties . In all, the cost to Thir d Fleet in its South China Sea attacks was 201 carrier aircraft, 167 pilot s and crewmen, and 205 sailors who were killed in the Kamikaze attacks on the 21st. Third Fleet arrived at Ulithi on 25th January. At midnight on the 26th Admiral Spruance assumed tactical command vice Halsey, and Third Fleet became Fifth Fleet . As such it was to operate under Spruance at Iwo Jima in the immediate future . II The forthcoming Iwo Jima operation, and that scheduled for Okinawa , caused Nimitz now to seek release of Pacific Fleet units from the Philip- pines as soon as possible . Kinkaid and MacArthur were reluctant to le t them go . The admiral stressed his need of cruisers and destroyers t o protect the Luzon Defence Force and the merchant shipping at Lingayen , Mindoro and Leyte and to screen the convoys . MacArthur concurred, but was himself more concerned over Nimitz's intention to recall from Seventh Fleet California and New Mexico, two of the six battleships, for repair s to battle damage . He felt that this would leave Seventh Fleet in a wea k position between two Japanese naval forces—one including the battleship s Ise and Hyuga, which had been located in Lingga Roads, Singapore ; and the other formed around Yamato, Nagato, Haruna and Kongo in the Inland Sea. Nimitz, for his part, though sympathising generally with Kinkaid and MacArthur, did not share MacArthur's apprehensions of an enemy battle - ship attack on Seventh Fleet, and considered that the best defence of th e Philippines would be offensive operations against Japan . He commented that if a local naval defence force capable of meeting all heavy ships lef t in the Japanese fleet were retained continuously on station, further majo r operations in the Pacific would have to be postponed indefinitely . In the event Oldendorf, with California and New Mexico, left Leyte on 22nd January. The other four Pacific Fleet battleships—Pennsylvania, 596 THE BRITISH PACIFIC FLEET JOINS IN Jan-Fe b West Virginia, Colorado and Mississippi, constituting TF .72.2 under Rear- Admiral Weyler, remained with Seventh Fleet until 10th February . Kinkaid was also granted temporary retention of the cruisers Portland and Min- neapolis, and of 22 of the destroyers he sought. To protect the Mindoro- Lingayen line he now allotted 4 light cruisers, 17 destroyers, 6 escor t carriers and 4 destroyer-escorts to a task group to be alternately com- manded by Rear-Admirals Berkey and Stump . Shropshire, Arunta and Warramunga formed part of Weyler ' s TG.77.2, the Lingayen Defenc e Force, until 10th February, when Weyler and TG .77.2 returned to Pacifi c Ocean areas. Farncomb, as CTU .77.3.5—Shropshire (Flag), Portland, Minneapolis, and destroyers Conway, Eaton, Braine,4 Frazier,5 Arunta and Warramunga—reported to Rear-Admiral Berkey for duty, and was give n the mission to remain at Lingayen as covering and defence force . III One Australian ship particularly active at this period was Warrego. By 29th January the army, driving south from Lingayen Gulf, had advanced to San Fernando . 6 Progress had been hindered by the Japanese blowin g up bridges, ripping up the railway and building road blocks. To help things along the navy, on 29th January, landed XI Corps on the coas t of Zambales Province, about 45 miles across a mountain range from Sa n Fernando. This landing took place over beaches in front of the little town s of San Felipe, San Narciso and San Antonio, with the object of sealing off the Bataan Peninsula . Rear-Admiral Struble commanded Amphibiou s Group 9 in Flagship Mount McKinley. Two transport divisions, with a number of Liberty ships and the necessary landing craft, landed some 30,000 troops under the close cover of light cruiser Denver and two destroyers, and army aircraft from Leyte . Warrego, which had left Lingayen Gulf for Leyte for repairs on 12th January, sailed thence for the landing operation on 26th January as part of a screen of 15 ships accompanying a convoy of 24 transports . The area was reached at dawn on the 29th . Denver and the two destroyers were ready to bombard when word was received that no enemy were there , and landings were made without bombardment . Before the landing Warrego and YMS316 marked inshore shoals . Later in the morning they proceede d to Subic Bay, where the Americans occupied Olongapo, at the bas e of the Bataan Peninsula, on 30th January, and carried out surveys an d marked wrecks . They continued this work until the survey was complete d on 19th February, landing armed parties to erect survey marks as required . H.M.A.S. Cape Leeuwin7 visited Subic Bay during this period, and Byrne , Warrego's commanding officer, recorded that "the mail which she brought 4 Conway, Eaton, Braine, US destroyers (1942-43), 2,050 tons, five 5-in guns, ten 21-in torped o tubes, 35 kts . 6 Frazier, US destroyer (1942), 1,620 tons, four 5-in guns, five 21-in torpedo tubes, 33 kts . e This is the San Fernando some 20 miles north of Manila Bay, not to be confused with the tow n of the same name on the north-eastern extremity of Lingayen Gulf, which was bombarded by Australia and Shropshire on 6th January .