SSStttooonnnyyy BBBrrrooooookkk UUUnnniiivvveeerrrsssiiitttyyy The official electronic file of this thesis or dissertation is maintained by the University Libraries on behalf of The Graduate School at Stony Brook University. ©©© AAAllllll RRRiiiggghhhtttsss RRReeessseeerrrvvveeeddd bbbyyy AAAuuuttthhhooorrr... Colonialism, Natural Right, and the Problem of Jurisdiction: Modern Natural Law Theory and Hegel’s Critique A Dissertation Presented by Chad Kautzer to The Graduate School in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University August 2008 Copyright by Chad Kautzer 2008 Stony Brook University The Graduate School Chad Kautzer We, the dissertation committee for the above candidate for the Doctor of Philosophy degree, hereby recommend acceptance of this dissertation. Eduardo Mendieta – Dissertation Advisor Associate Professor of Philosophy Philosophy Department, Stony Brook University Jeffrey Edwards – Chairperson of Defense Associate Professor of Philosophy Philosophy Department, Stony Brook University Allegra de Laurentiis Associate Professor of Philosophy Philosophy Department, Stony Brook University Jeffrey Paris Assistant Professor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy, University of San Francisco This dissertation is accepted by the Graduate School Lawrence Martin Dean of the Graduate School ii Abstract of the Dissertation Colonialism, Natural Right, and the Problem of Jurisdiction: Modern Natural Law Theory and Hegel’s Critique by Chad Kautzer Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy Stony Brook University 2008 It has been commonplace to associate the modern natural-law tradition with the social contract, which grounds legitimate political sovereignty and, occasionally, private property in an implicit or explicit consensual act. Whether the result is absolutism or republicanism, the individuals constituting the contractual foundation of political society are typically theorized in a state of nature . This tradition, however, also offers a set of nonconsensual arguments for the same—arguments traditionally obscured or marginalized in the secondary literature, for they have not been recognized as responses to pressing justificatory problems engendered by European colonialism’s extra-national jurisdictional and proprietary claims. Although Hegel was an advocate of colonialism, arguing it to be a structural necessity in his Philosophy of Right , he also articulated one of the most trenchant critiques of the natural-law and social-contract tradition, undermining the philosophical foundations of previous rights-based claims in the colonies. In this dissertation, I reconstruct, compare, and critique of modern natural law (particularly Locke) and German Idealist (particularly Hegel) justifications of colonial jurisdiction and the theories of right, property, sovereignty, and personality that constitute them. In addition to an epistemic and materialist reading of Locke’s theories of property and sovereignty in the context of British colonialism, an immanent critique of Hegel’s Phenomenology on the significance of modern colonialism for objective spirit, and the problems of colonial jurisdiction in the Philosophy of Right , my project tells something of an untold story about the evolution of the concept of dominium in theories of public and private right. This story supports the conclusion that the irresolvable problems with respect to the establishment of colonial jurisdiction, through public or private means, are also problems for the establishment of jurisdiction, and thus of right, within the colonizing nation-states themselves. iii Dedicated to Alissa Betz Former Philosophy Department Secretary Current Assistant to the Chair Friend iv Table of Contents Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................vi Introduction........................................................................................................................1 Chapter One: Locke on Natural Law, Property, and Personality.....................................11 I. Natural Law, Property, and Punishment...........................................................12 II. Property, Personality, Duty, and Value...........................................................26 III. Recognition and Locke’s Epistemic Self.......................................................35 Chapter Two: Dominium , Jurisdiction, and Colonialism.................................................66 I. Dominium , imperium , and ius gentium .............................................................75 II. The Revived Corpus, the Franciscans and the Conciliarists............................86 III. The Neo-Thomists..........................................................................................96 IV. Grotius on Property and Punishment............................................................107 Chapter Three: Locke’s Two Treatises and the Juridical State of Nature.......................114 I. Filmer and the First Treatise ............................................................................114 II. Accumulation and the Rise of Absolutist Private Dominium .........................125 III. The State of Nature and Nonconsensual Jurisdiction....................................131 IV. Concluding Remarks.....................................................................................148 Chapter Four: The Abstract Right and Terror of Modern Colonialism in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit .............................................................................154 I. World-historical Spirit and the Individual........................................................160 II. Reason, Ethical Substance, and the Rise of Personality.................................175 III. Culture and the Phenomenology of Colonialism...........................................188 IV. Freedom, Terror, and Private Punishment.....................................................202 Chapter Five: On Jurisdiction and Colonialism in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right ............220 I. The Idea of Freedom and the Will....................................................................231 II. Right, Property, and Contract..........................................................................243 III. Civil Society and the Necessity of Colonization...........................................266 Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................282 Bibliography ....................................................................................................................290 v Acknowledgments I would like to thank Bini Adamczak, Volkan Cidam, Sara Costa-Sengera, Sabine Flick, Andreas Folkers, Dascha Klingenberg, Flo Maak, Marc-Oliver Maier, Sarah Ortmeyer, Matthias Plieninger, Markus Redlich, Jari Sengera, Greta Wagner, Elke Weyel, Lena Weyel, and above all, Manuel Schottmüller, Farnaz Shahshahani Far and Daniel Loick for their friendship and hospitality during my stays in Frankfurt and Berlin, where most of the work on this dissertation was completed with financial support from the Deutsche Akademische Austauschdienst (DAAD) and the Max Kade Foundation. Axel Honneth’s generous invitation to join his weekly colloquium in Frankfurt exposed me to the brightest social and political theorists in the Frankfurt School tradition, as well as the ‘barbarians at the gate’ in DemoPunK and the Institut für Vergleichende Irrelevanz (IvI) on Kettenhofweg—just a stone’s throw from the Institut für Sozialforschung . Stateside, I am deeply grateful to my family for their unwavering support over the years and for attending my dissertation defense, despite their many other obligations. I would also like to acknowledge my father, Al Kautzer, who died while I was applying to graduate school. Although he probably wouldn’t have taken much interest in what I studied, I believe he would have been proud that I finished what I started and actually got a job out of the deal. I probably would not have applied to graduate school without the encouragement of Mike and Mary Beth Spittel, Devah Pager, and Jolanda Sallmann. I always look back at our days together in Madison, Wisconsin with a warm heart and a big smile. Jolanda always kept me honest, yet also inspired. In theory and practice, academia and activism, Jolanda is the practical kind of critical theorist I continually aspire to be. I deeply cherish her friendship and admire the great work that she does. Jolanda’s parents, Joe and Joann , and sister Jenny have been like a family to me and I will always be infinitely grateful for their support and friendship. I cannot imagine what life would have been like at Stony Brook University without Shannon Hoff, Shannon Lundeen, and Meghant Sudan. If it weren’t for their friendship and humor I probably would have gone AWOL, if not crazy. My advisor, Eduardo Mendieta, with his boundless energy, always pushed me to do more than I thought possible, but he always proved right. The excellence exhibited in the courses, reading groups, and scholarship of Jeff Edwards and Allegra de Laurentiis has provided me with a professional standard for which I will always strive. I also owe them a great debt of gratitude for their stewardship of the Transatlantic Collegium of Philosophy , which made my latest and most productive stay in Germany possible. For the immeasurable amount of help, advice, life-saving humor, and general support, I want to thank