Verbum VI/1, pp. 25–37 1585-079X/$ 20.00 c Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2004 WHY A PHILOSOPHER CAN AND SHOULD READ ST. THOMAS AQUINAS John F. X. Knasas University of St. Thomas Center for Thomistic Studies 3800 Montrose Blvd. 77006–Houston, Texas, USA [email protected] I begin by explaining how Aquinas understands the task of the theologian so that theology necessarily includes much philosophy. I then present two philo- sophical theses from Aquinas and describe their relevance for contemporary discussion to the contrary: first, Aquinas' immediate and direct realism of sen- sation versus the priority of consciousness since the critical turn and, second, Aquinas' view of the thing's existence as a unique kind of act or attribute of the thing versus the contemporary fact-view of what is meant by the thing's existence. 1. I am a philosophy professor and I think that I know and am respectful of the norms of philosophical discourse. One of those norms involves the avoidance of ad hominem reasoning. In ad hominem reasoning one concludes either to the truth or falsity of what is said on the basis of the one saying it. A philosopher knows that this reasoning is illegit- imate because the insane can utter truths and the sane can utter false- hoods. For example, we can plant the arithmetical proposition 3+2=5 on the lips of a maniac. Does that make the proposition any the less true? How, then, is a philosopher to proceed? The philosopher's total concentration must be on the content of what is said and the intrinsic evidence oVered for the truth of that content. Given one's revulsion for the speaker, this exercise can often be excruciating. But the philo- sophical vocation demands total fidelity to truth and that entails an in- vestigation of what is said on its own merits. The philosopher cannot 26 john f. x. knasas take the easy road and accept what is said because it is uttered by the most “current” thinkers, is published by the most prestigious houses, or taught at “Ivy League” schools. Neither should he reject what is said because it is the opposite of these things. For eight weeks in the Spring semester 2000, I taught two courses in Vilnius. At the Pedagogical University, I lectured on Aquinas' philo- sophical basis for obligation, or moral necessity. At Vilnius University, I spoke on the 20th Century Thomistic Revival. Both assignments gave me good contact with students and faculty. One attitude that I noticed immediately on the part of many was the ad hominem dismissal of the philosophical character of Aquinas' thought and that of his followers, the Thomists. The master and his disciples were believing Catholics, i.e., members of an authoritatively teaching Church. Hence, the real basis for what they said could only be religious. The given impression was that if a Catholic is to do philosophy credibly, the Catholic would do better to choose as a philosophical instrument the thought of Kant or Husserl. Philosophy is diYcult, and so it is understandable why many would like to deal with what philosophers say in an ad hominem manner. Be- sides, it is often embarrassing to admit that one does not understand the reasons for what is said. It is always much easier to brush oV an obtuse position by saying that its basis is religious. But I want to plead that my fellow philosophers remain true to the norms of philosoph- ical discourse and resist the quick and easy behavior of ad hominem dismissal. In particular I want to urge this in respect to St. Thomas Aquinas (1225?–1274). Prima facie it may appear that I have no case. A Dominican friar, Aquinas was self-admittedly a theologian, and he acknowledged that theology is religiously based. Theology's basis is Divine revelation accepted on faith. In contrast, philosophy proceeds in virtue of the natural capacity to understand found in all humans. Hence, the audience of theology is much more parochial than that of philosophy. In reading Aquinas, would not a philosopher be “barking up the wrong tree”? The question is reinforced today by theologians, even Catholic ones, who would not be caught dead doing philosophy. For them it is a badge of honor that they do theology without philosophy.¹ But it would be myopic to take this as true of Aquinas' own understanding of theological practice. For Aquinas theology is more expansive and in- ₁ For a description of these theologians, see John Paul II, Fides et ratio, paras. 61–62. why a philosopher can and should read st. thomas aquinas 27 clusive than is suggested by the narrower views of today's theologians.² Aquinas saw his duty to explain, to make understandable, the content of Divine revelation. But that content includes two kinds of truth: truth accessible to natural reason (e.g., God's existence, uniqueness, spirituality, and even moral truths as are found in the Ten Command- ments) and truth inaccessible to natural reason (e.g., the Triune nature of God, Christ in the Eucharist, Christ as the Son of God). To be es- pecially noted is that even naturally known truth is included in God's speaking to us. This inclusion is not redundant on God's part. Left to our own resources only few after a long time and with much error would attain it. For example, many philosophers reasoned to God but identified God with a body or with a finite being. Hence, to avoid the impropriety of humans returning God's revelation by addressing the sun, God also informs us that he is an infinite spiritual being. In prin- ciple, natural reason could have reached these conclusions but in fact, natural reason did not and probably would never have. My point, then, should be clear. Since Aquinas' duty as a theo- logian is to explain God's revelation to his fellows and since God's revelation includes truths knowable by natural reason, then when in the course of doing his theology Aquinas explains naturally knowable truths, Aquinas will necessarily be doing philosophy. In his own re- flections, a philosopher can turn to Aquinas at those times Aquinas is philosophizing. In sum, do not think that because Aquinas is a theo- logian, then the only things that he says are theological. It is not as simple as that. Aquinas' acknowledgement of naturally knowable truths is more than lip service. His seriousness is underlined, for example, by his rejection of the famous Proslogion argument for God of St. Anselm (1033–1104). Anselm claimed that if God is thought of as the greatest conceivable, then God would have to be thought of as an existent, for it is greater to exist than to not exist. Aquinas concedes that the argument concludes to something but not exactly to what Anselm in- tends. The argument shows that if you think of the greatest conceiv- able, you must think of it as existing. But this necessity of thought is distinct from any necessity of aYrmation. You can think of something as existing, even necessarily, and for all that not be aYrming it to exist. As theologically attractive as Anselm's simple and direct argument for God is, Aquinas rejects it for the much more convoluted and diYcult ₂ The following explanation is taken from Etienne Gilson, History of Christian philo- sophy in the Middle Ages, Random House, New York, 1955, pp. 366–368. 28 john f. x. knasas Aristotelian argument from motion. Does not Aquinas' critique of An- selm show that Aquinas is interested in more than making points for a religiously dictated agenda? Before a point can perform that service, it must pass the philosophical test. Aquinas is cognizant of philosophical procedure and is honestly trying to practice it. Hence, he is a thinker that a philosopher can also read. 2. But there are good philosophers and poor philosophers, philosoph- ers who practice the craft better than others. Obviously, philosophers ought to spend their time and energy reading the former. So, even if Aquinas' theologizing is not to the detriment of his philosophizing, what grounds does one have for thinking that Aquinas is a good philo- sopher rather than a mediocre one? I want to mention two grounds that are also central positions in Aquinas' larger philosophy. First, today it is widely regarded that philosophy came of age with the “critical turn.” The turn consists in the recognition that the ex- istence of consciousness is more evident, hence more foundational, than the existence of the world. Though the understanding of con- sciousness has undergone many permutations since the critical turn was made, it is still the focus of philosophy, even in post-modernism. What necessitated the turn and has perpetuated it are scenarios in the methodic doubt exercise described in the Meditations on First Philosophy of René Descartes (1596–1650). Two of these scenarios are classic ones. The first is the dream/hallucination possibility. I have dreamed or hallucinated that I was reading a philosophy article; how do I know that I am not dreaming or hallucinating right now? My inability to articulate a fool-proof answer prevents any assertion of the world's ex- istence. Second, also from Descartes but especially from the British Empiricists (Locke, Berkeley, and Hume) comes the critique from the relativity of perception. I see the field of poppies as red, a color-blind person sees the field as gray. Who sees the real color of the poppies? To stay perfectly impartial, these philosophers insist that we have to answer, “Maybe nobody sees the real color.” The colors that we see may just exist in our perception.