Peter Borschberg1 The Seizure of the Santo António at Patani. VOC Freebooting, the Estado da I´ndia and Peninsular Politics, 1602-1609 Historical Background t the end of the sixteenth century, Dutch In the first two decades of the seventeenth A traders, initially under the flags of the century, the VOC sought to gain a foothold and voorcompagniën (regional overseas trading consolidate its role in the region. As is known firms) and subsequently also under the banner from the histories of Europe, the Dutch fought a of the United Dutch East India Company long and protracted war of “liberation” from (commonly known by its original initials, VOC), Spanish “tyranny”, a process known as the Dutch arrived in the waters of insular and mainland Revolt. After Portugal was “conquered” in 1580 Southeast Asia in search for trading opportuni- by Philip II of Spain, who thereafter ruled as ties. Their Portuguese competitors regarded Philip I of Portugal, the Hollanders’ war against this penetration into “their region” as a clear Spain was extended to cover Portugal as well. infringement of exclusive rights of trade which With the inception of Dutch voyages to the East they historically asserted and defended by deed Indies, Hispano-Dutch and Luso-Dutch hostili- and word.2 The arrival of the Dutch marked the ties were further projected beyond Europe, beginning of fierce competition for markets, including significantly Southeast Asia, a region political influence and military supremacy that which according to the Treaties of Tordesillas would characterise and give shape to the history (1493) and Saragossa (1529) broadly fell into of the region in the final years of the sixteenth the Portuguese sphere of interest.3 and the opening decades of the seventeenth The projection of conflict from the European century. to the Asian scenario pursued two key strategies. The heightened Luso-Dutch competition The first was to inflict as much damage as during this period expressed itself in various possible to Portuguese and Spanish assets, both forms. The Portuguese flexed their military on land and at sea. The Dutch launched muscle, and more often than not, backed their offensives on key Iberian positions, including show of might with hard-nosed diplomacy. the Moluccas, Manila, Macao and Malacca, scoring initial successes chiefly in the first- Journal of the Siam Society 90.1 & 2 (2002) 59 04 P 59-72 59 8/8/05, 14:41 60 PETER BORSCHBERG mentioned region. At sea the Dutch attacked whence to prey on Portuguese merchant Portuguese merchant shipping bound from shipping. Hirado (“Firando”) and Macao to Malacca and The Lusitanian counterparts from Lisbon to Goa, and also Spanish galleons en route between Goa, Malacca and Macao were not complacent Manila and the Mexican port of Acapulco. about their losses. After André Furtado de The second aspect of Dutch policy was to Mendonça assumed authority as Captain of contain the spread of Portuguese and Spanish Malacca, punitive expeditions were dispatched influence. This was achieved by courting in the South China Sea’s monsoon season of independent kings and princes in the region, and 1603-4 and again in 1604-5, because Johor offering them “protection” and assistance against established and maintained friendly relations possible encroachment by the Iberian powers, with Dutch “traders”. Simultaneously, the in return for special — but usually exclusive — Portuguese armada stationed in the Johor River trading rights. For this reason VOC Admirals estuary anticipated the arrival of their merchant concluded a web of treaties with several Asian vessels inbound from Japan, China and Macas- sovereigns during the first decades of the sar, and lent them naval escort through the seventeenth century,4 but the Dutch were fully treacherous waters of the Singapore Straits to 8 aware that not all sovereigns in the region Malacca. required their “assistance”.5 Such treaties were The seizure of the Santo António took place usually concluded with kings and princes of against the backdrop of heightened tension between the Dutch, Johoreans and the Portu- smaller territories, and it was fully recognized guese over security in the Straits of Singapore even in Europe that the great kings of Asia — and the Johor River estuary. It remains a including the Emperor of China, and of course hitherto largely neglected chapter that marks an the King of Siam — were well in a position to important turning point in regional politics, hold their own.6 Thus, it becomes clear from diplomacy and trade. The Santo António the opening years of the seventeenth century, that incident provides an interesting snapshot that European trade and influence in Southeast Asia reveals much about the complexity and the ran on at least two major and politically distinct fragility of political relations, the balance of tracks. power on the Malay Peninsula, as well as the As mentioned, one aspect of Dutch strategy flow and nature of intra-Asian trade in the early of the early seventeenth century was also to win seventeenth century. over and ally themselves with kings and princes With special regard to issues surrounding in strategic locations throughout Southeast Asia. regional politics and diplomacy, the Santo One of the best-known alliances was forged in António incident specifically also marks an 1603 between the King of Johor and Jakob van important shift in Patani’s relations with the 7 Heemskerk. In February that year, the Dutch Portuguese and paved the ground for improved Admiral captured with the assistance of his new relations with the Dutch. By turning its back Johorean allies a Portuguese carrack, the Santa on Lusitanian traders and the comparatively Catarina, in what are now the Straits of peaceful, if sometimes strained, relations with Singapore and the Johor River. The cargo was Portuguese Malacca, Patani hoped to reposition brought back to Europe and sold at a public itself commercially, especially since the Dutch auction where it yielded a sum that was truly (unlike the Portuguese) had at the time no direct staggering in its time. In the early phase of the access point in the trade with China.9 Doubt- VOC’s corporate life, freebooting arose as, lessly, the moves of both Patani as well as the and remained, a lucrative activity for the Dutch. VOC were carefully monitored by regional The Straits of Singapore and the Johor River competitors, including specifically also the estuary quickly emerged as preferred spots from Johoreans (who were allies-in-arms with the Journal of the Siam Society 90.1 & 2 (2002) 04 P 59-72 60 8/8/05, 14:41 The Seizure of the Santo António at Patani. 61 VOC Freebooting, the Estado da I´ndia and Peninsular Politics, 1602-1609 Dutch after 1603 and with whom Patani had a river anew. In fact, Furtado de Mendonça dynastic quarrel),10 Pahang and perhaps most attacked Batu Sawar in the early weeks of 1604, important of all, the Siamese court in Ayutthaya. and demanded from the Johor monarch that he As is known, King Ekathosarot would soon cut off contacts with the Dutch for good, expel dispatch Siam’s first ever diplomatic mission to VOC factors from his capital (and preferably the West, namely to Prince Maurice of Orange, hand them over to the Portuguese), as well as the Stadholder of Holland and Zealand.11 This confiscate their assets.19 Of course the king did move was taken with considerable alarm by not oblige, and such heavy-handed diplomatic Philip III/II, the King of Spain and Portugal,12 pressure only served to strengthen the resolve but some years later the Siamese court actively of the Johoreans against the Portuguese as well sought to steer relations with Portugal on an as their trading interests in the region. improved diplomatic footing.13 In early May, 1604, three ships belonging to the fleet of Admiral Wijbrand van Warwijk, the Furtado de Mendonça, Wijbrand van Hollandia, Vlissingen and Sphaera Mundi, Warwijk and Dutch Freebooting in the Straits arrived in Johor waters and after a formal of Singapore exchange of diplomatic gifts20 and niceties as well as ascertaining trade opportunities in the The seizure of the Santo António took place region, Van Warwijk set sail for Patani and China in the immediate context escalating of violence on 20 May, 1604. He later returned with the in the Straits of Singapore and the Johor River monsoon winds in December that year without estuary. The King of Johor, ‘Ala’udin Ri’ayat having been able to conduct trade in China.21 Shah III, had opened his territory to Dutch Warwijk’s ships cast anchor off the coast of traders and lent active assistance to the seizure Tioman in early January 1605 where they laid of the Santa Catarina in February 1603.14 in wait to prey on richly laden carracks from André Furtado de Mendonça, a senior Japan, Macao, and Macassar. Portuguese officer and war hero, succeeded The return of Van Warwijk to the Malay Fernão d’Albuquerque in September 1603 as Peninsula marked in some symbolic way the Captain and Governor of Malacca.15 He used beginning of Furtado de Mendonça’s annus the opportunity of his new appointment to launch horribilis in his position as Captain Major of an offensive against Johor, on the diplomatic as Malacca. The year 1605 saw the Portuguese well as strategic front. In October, 1603, Estêvão Estado da I´ndia in insular and peninsular Teixeira de Made was dispatched with an Southeast Asia stretched to its limits, financially armada to await the arrival of the Portuguese as well as militarily. The Dutch were stepping merchant fleet from Japan, Macao and