Rolling Back the Islamic State

Rolling Back the Islamic State

Rolling Back the Islamic State Seth G. Jones, James Dobbins, Daniel Byman, Christopher S. Chivvis, Ben Connable, Jeffrey Martini, Eric Robinson, Nathan Chandler C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1912 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-0-8330-9756-9 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2017 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Cover: Iraqi forces advance against Islamic State militants in Mosul (Suhaib Salem, Reuters). Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface In 2014, the Islamic State conducted a blitzkrieg into Iraqi cities, such as Mosul, and seized significant chunks of territory in Syria and Iraq. Its leader, Abu Bakr al‑Baghdadi, declared a pan‑Islamic caliphate and eventually expanded the group to include eight formal provinces; more than a dozen informal provinces; and tens of thousands of inspired individuals across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America. This report examines the Islamic State and offers a global strategy to roll the group and its movement back. It assesses key coun‑ tries where the Islamic State has controlled territory: Iraq, Syria, Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, and Afghanistan. It also analyzes the group’s global efforts to spread its ideology; move money, material, and people; secure resources; and conduct attacks. The report should be of interest to poli‑ cymakers, academics, and general audiences that want to learn more about the Islamic State and strategies to counter the group. This research was sponsored by a generous grant from the Smith Richardson Foundation and conducted within the International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD). NSRD conducts research and analysis on defense and national security topics for the U.S. and allied defense, foreign policy, homeland security, and intelligence communities and foundations and other nongovernmental organizations that support defense and national security analysis. For more information on the International Security and Defense Policy Center, see www.rand.org/ nsrd/ndri/centers/isdp or contact the director (contact information is provided on the web page). iii Contents Preface ............................................................................. iii Figures and Tables ...............................................................vii Summary .......................................................................... ix Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii PART I The Challenge and Approach ................................................... 1 CHAPTER ONE Introduction ....................................................................... 3 CHAPTER TWO The Rise and Decline of the Islamic State ...................................13 CHAPTER THREE U.S. Strategy ......................................................................39 PART II Country Campaigns .............................................................71 CHAPTER FOUR Iraq .................................................................................73 CHAPTER FIVE Syria ................................................................................93 CHAPTER SIX Libya ............................................................................. 107 v vi Rolling Back the Islamic State CHAPTER SEVEN Nigeria ........................................................................... 121 CHAPTER EIGHT Egypt ............................................................................. 137 CHAPTER NINE Afghanistan ..................................................................... 153 PART III The Global Campaign......................................................... 173 CHAPTER TEN The Ideological and Information Campaign ............................. 175 CHAPTER ELEVEN Recommendations ............................................................. 201 APPENDIXES A. Per-Troop Rollback Cost Methodology ................................ 219 B. Security, Economic, and Humanitarian Assistance Cost Methodology .............................................................. 227 Abbreviations ................................................................... 235 References ....................................................................... 237 Figures and Tables Figures S.1. Islamic State Control of Territory in Iraq and Syria, Winter 2016–2017 .................................................. xiv S.2. Islamic State Global Attacks, 2014–January 2017 ...............xv 2.1. Islamic State Organizational Structure ...........................17 2.2. Location of Islamic State Twitter Supporters .................... 27 2.3. Examples of Formal and Informal Islamic State Provinces .... 30 2.4. Number of Islamic State Attacks ................................. 34 2.5. Global Islamic State Attacks, 2014–2016 ........................ 36 4.1. Islamic State Control of Territory in Iraq ........................ 84 5.1. Islamic State Control of Territory in Syria ...................... 100 6.1. Islamic State Control of Territory in Libya ..................... 112 6.2. Islamic State Attacks in Libya .................................... 118 7.1. Islamic State Control of Territory in Nigeria ................... 125 7.2. Islamic State Attacks in Nigeria .................................. 130 8.1. Islamic State Control of Territory in Egypt .................... 140 8.2. Islamic State Attacks in Egypt ................................... 143 9.1. Islamic State Control of Territory in Afghanistan ............. 160 9.2. Islamic State Attacks in Afghanistan ............................ 167 11.1. U.S. Force Posture in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia ............................................................. 206 vii viii Rolling Back the Islamic State Tables 3.1. A Summary of Strategic Options ................................. 40 A.1. Projected Estimated Cost of U.S. Military Deployment, Per Year.............................................................. 220 A.2. Rising Estimated Per‑Troop Costs in Iraq and Afghanistan ......................................................... 221 A.3. Average Annual Cost Estimates for Selected Military Operations Since 9/11 ............................................. 224 B.1. Cost Ranges for U.S. Security Assistance Options ............ 228 B.2. Cost Ranges for U.S. Economic and Humanitarian Assistance Options ................................................. 230 B.3. Current, High, Low, and Average Annual Security Assistance, by Country, 2001–2014 ............................. 230 B.4. Current, High, Low, and Average Annual Economic and Humanitarian Assistance, by Country, 2001–2014 ...... 232 Summary From its peak in late 2014, the Islamic State has steadily lost territory. As an actual, if unrecognized, state, it is on a path to collapse. In Syria and Iraq, the Islamic State controlled approximately 45,377 km2 and roughly 2.5 million people by early 2017, according to RAND Corpo‑ ration estimates compiled in this report. These numbers represented a 56‑percent decline in population for Syria and an 83‑percent decline in population for Iraq from fall 2014 levels. In Egypt, Libya, Afghanistan, and Nigeria, the Islamic State controlled a combined 7,323 km2 and 497,420 people by early 2017. These estimates represented a 75‑per‑ cent drop in population for Nigeria, nearly 100 percent for Libya, and 87 percent in Afghanistan. In Egypt, the Islamic State operated in only a tiny stretch of the Sinai. Polling data also indicated declining support across the Muslim world for the Islamic State and its ideology. Yet even as its core caliphate contracted, the Islamic States estab‑ lished affiliates in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia while, at the same time, directing and inspiring attacks even further afield. The destruc‑ tion of the Islamic State’s territorial base in Iraq and Syria is likely to diminish the group’s wider appeal. Yet it remains possible that the Islamic State, like al‑Qa’ida before it, will continue to metastasize and spread its influence even once it loses its home base. The group’s global footprint includes eight formal provinces outside Iraq and Syria; more than a dozen informal provinces; and tens of thousands of inspired individuals across the world. A sine qua non of the Islamic State’s strat‑ egy is pan‑Islamic expansion across multiple continents. The

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