Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan SEPTMEBER 2019 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan Executive Summary The U.S. should conduct a military strike in steadily increased sanctions and other economic response to the Iranian attack on the Abqaiq oil pressure, has deployed limited military forces to facility in Saudi Arabia in order to deter the region to bolster its own and its allies’ continued Iranian military escalation. Deterrence defenses, and has formed a maritime defensive requires more than punitive strikes. It requires operation to deter Iranian seizures of oil tankers. credibly holding at risk something the regime is Iran and its allies and proxies have escalated not willing to lose. Beginning an air campaign military attacks, including shooting at (and against Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps shooting down) multiple American drones, firing (IRGC) targets in Syria is one approach; a rockets and mortars at U.S. positions in Iraq, and significant air/missile campaign against targets in repeatedly attacking Saudi oil infrastructure and Iran itself is another. Each option carries its own a desalination plant. It has also escalated its significant risks and opportunities, which must be violations of the nuclear deal. Increasing weighed carefully before choosing a course of American economic pressure has not deterred action. The risks of any retaliatory strike are high, Iranian military or nuclear deal-violation but the risks of failing to respond to the Abqaiq escalation, and American military actions have attack are higher. only changed the precise shape of Iranian military escalation, if that. The U.S. has not therefore The attack on Abqaiq was planned and executed identified a non-violent means of deterring future by Iran and most likely launched from Iranian Iranian escalation. territory. It was part of a pattern of Iranian military escalation in response to the Trump Separating the U.S. from its partners in the Gulf, Administration’s “maximum pressure” particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab campaign. Emirates, was one of Iran’s central objectives in the Abqaiq attack. The Iranians likely chose this The al Houthi claim to have conducted the attack escalation step over others because it hit Saudi was part of a skillful information operation Arabia alone and thereby forced the U.S. to intended to divert the Western discussion away choose explicitly whether or not it would defend from Iran’s role and focus it instead on the war in a front-line state exposed by the “maximum Yemen and on Saudi Arabia’s misdeeds. That pressure” campaign. American inaction, which information operation has succeeded to a includes encouraging the Saudis to conduct a considerable extent as the Western debate has military retaliation of their own, will further this indeed focused excessively on the question of Iranian objective by solidifying the belief in attributing the attack, on Saudi Arabia’s Riyadh and Abu Dhabi that the U.S. will not culpability for the humanitarian situation and its defend front line states even against serious own bombing campaign in Yemen, and on the Iranian military attack. horrific murder and dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi. The U.S. has vital economic interests in the defense of Saudi (and more generally Gulfi) oil The U.S. and Iran are escalating in parallel. The infrastructure even though America imports little U.S. is escalating in sanctions and defensive Gulf oil. Oil is a fungible commodity, and its military deployments and operations. Iran is global price rises and falls depending on global escalating its military aggression and violations supply and demand. Americans will pay higher of the nuclear deal. U.S. escalations have not thus prices for petroleum products if large amounts of far deterred Iranian escalations. The U.S. has Saudi oil remain off the market, regardless of 2 Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan America’s technical “independence” of Saudi oil, the choice of continuing its military escalation or because the global price will rise. America’s seeing its positions in Syria severely degraded is allies, who do depend on Saudi oil, could be the best chance the U.S. has to deter continued economically devastated by a protracted Iranian military action. disruption in Saudi oil exports. Such damage to vital American trading partners would severely The risks of such an attack include Iranian damage the American economy as well. military escalation. Iran could attack Americans in Syria, Iraq, or elsewhere in the Gulf region; it Reducing the “maximum pressure” campaign or could conduct terrorist attacks in the U.S. itself or seeking negotiations with Iran without military in allied states in Europe or Latin America; it retaliation will establish the global precedent that could interfere with the movement of ships America and the West will surrender to military through the Strait of Hormuz; or it could attack attacks, thereby increasing the likelihood of more vital targets in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. future military attacks by Iran or other The U.S. and its allies can mitigate these threats adversaries. The U.S. must first demonstrate a to varying degrees, but never completely. We willingness to respond to unjustified aggression must recognize, however, that Iran is on a and attacks on its allies before considering any military escalation path and may well decide to significant change in its overall policies toward conduct such actions even if the U.S. makes no Iran. response to the Abqaiq attack. On the contrary, trends suggest that inaction may encourage Deterrence requires holding at risk something the further Iranian escalation. adversary is unwilling to lose and that the U.S. might plausibly take away from him. Using American military action against Iran in Syria military force simply to indicate U.S. strength or could also have severe diplomatic repercussions. displeasure will not deter a determined adversary. It could persuade European leaders to support the It is difficult to identify target sets on Iranian Assad government up to and including territory that would reach the threshold necessary recognizing it. Turkey’s response to such an to deter the regime without also moving toward a operation is unclear. The U.S. would have to military regime-change operation, which is work energetically to minimize the likelihood of unwise and likely impracticable. Limited these and other negative diplomatic American military strikes against the positions consequences of any action in Syria, recognizing from which the Abqaiq attack were launched, for that it might not be able to do so fully. example, will not likely meet the necessary The Russians could also use their advanced air deterrence threshold given the existential nature defense systems in Syria against U.S. aircraft and of the threat the “maximum pressure” poses to the missiles attacking Iranian targets. The U.S. could Iranian regime. The U.S. cannot—and should mitigate that risk by deploying the force package not—plausibly aim at overthrowing the Islamic Republic by military means, rendering deterrence necessary to defeat those systems and prevent the by attacking targets in Iran less likely to succeed. Russians from replacing or reinforcing them. A detailed assessment of Vladimir Putin’s Iranian leaders have frequently identified Iran’s objectives and constraints in Syria strongly positions in Syria as vital to the regime’s survival. suggests that he is unlikely to engage in such a Those positions are far more vulnerable to direct conflict, particularly if American strikes American attack than the Iranian regime is at avoid hitting Russian targets. The notion that he home. The threat of American action against would initiate a global thermonuclear war over a IRGC positions in Syria is also more credible local conflict in Syria is absurd. than the threat of a massive military regime- Advice presenting military inaction as the safer change operation in Iran. Presenting Tehran with course may in fact be dangerous. 3 Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W. Kagan The Iranians are on a path to split the Saudis and It harms every American alliance by undermining Emiratis from the U.S. Success in that endeavor the belief of U.S. allies that America will come to would unravel the “maximum pressure” their aid militarily if they are attacked. Rhetorical campaign that relies on those states to adhere to dances around the lack of a formal American financial and other sanctions and provide military security guarantee to Saudi Arabia will not affect support to American objectives in the region. It this fear, nor will reassurances that the U.S. would create opportunities for both Russia and would defend this or that other ally. All such China to gain firm footholds in the Gulf, rhetoric will be undermined by the fact of transforming the regional security challenge American inaction in this case and the much facing the U.S. louder rhetoric from the White House about the need for other states to defend themselves. Inaction will also strengthen the convictions of Iran’s leaders that they can conduct large-scale There is no safe course the U.S. can pursue after devastating attacks against American allies at Abqaiq. Both action and inaction carry great will, particularly if they do not kill Americans. It risks. The balance of risk at the moment lies with will therefore likely accelerate the very escalation inaction—failure to respond militarily to the scenarios frequently offered as arguments against Abqaiq attack is far more likely to harm an American retaliatory strike. American security and vital national interests, including economic interests, than is prudent action. 4 Attribution, Intent, and Response in the Abqaiq Attack Frederick W.