Iraq and the Caucasus: How Will War Affect the Region? Richard Giragosian, ABT Associates, Inc. Jeyhun Mollazade, U.S.-Azerbaijan Business Council Philip Remler, U.S. Department of State Russia and Eurasia Program and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Caucasus Initiative April 1, 2003 In an effort to contribute to the dialogue on the effects of the Iraq war on regions other than the Middle East, the CSIS Russia and Eurasia Program and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (FE/RL) held a seminar on the potential effects of the Iraq war in the South Caucasus. Although the South Caucasus is not geographically close enough to Iraq to be physically affected by the war, it is close enough to feel the war’s potential political ramifications. The South Caucasus nations are bordered by long-time U.S. and NATO ally Turkey, which opposed the war and denied the United States use of its territory for a ground invasion; Iran, which strongly opposed the war and fears an expansion of U.S. power in the region; and Russia, a U.S. ally strongly opposed to the war. Armenia Mr. Giragosian began his talk by observing that the Iraq war has altered the political landscape globally, and that the effects of the war are likely to manifest themselves in the U.S.-Russian relationship and the U.S. Transatlantic relationship. He also noted that the South Caucasus can be considered a subset of the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership and that any fallout between the United States and Russia over the Iraq war is thus likely to manifest itself in the South Caucasus. In addition, the war’s repercussions are likely to impact the South Caucasus countries more on a strategic level than on a physical level. The Caucasus is close enough in proximity to Iraq to be affected by the war in terms of policies, but the risks of military spillover and refugees are marginal. According to Mr. Giragosian, one of this war’s most distressing features is its implications for U.S. foreign policy, particularly the trend toward U.S. unilateralism. The unilateralist tendency demonstrated during this war could lead to a split in the U.S.- Russian strategic partnership, and the Caucasus may emerge as the first arena of conflict as a result of this split. Unlike its neighbors, Armenia has a fairly critical position on U.S. policy toward Iraq. Georgia strongly backs the U.S. position, and Azerbaijan has also expressed support for the United States, albeit in a quieter manner. There are three essential factors to Armenia’s policy toward the war in Iraq. The first is the national imperative, more broadly defined as nationalism. Armenia is the only country in the Caucasus that has significant ties to Iraq through a large Armenian-Iraqi diaspora numbering between 20-25,000. The direct economic ties between Armenia and the Iraqi diaspora are small, but the diaspora is an important element of Armenian foreign policy. The second pillar is strategic. Armenia’s foreign policy closely mirrors Russian foreign policy because of Armenia’s strategic alliance with Russia. Armenia therefore follows Russia’s lead on Iraq. The third pillar—also the most important one—is a combination of Armenia’s national and strategic imperatives. Armenia’s relations and history with Turkey largely direct the country’s foreign policy; Armenian policies are based on national and strategic interests that are the result of a genuine fear of the resurgence of a Turkish threat. From the Armenian perspective, the Turkish threat could reemerge as a result of Turkey occupying northern Iraq, or of Turkey adopting a new and more hostile position on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Generally speaking, Armenia’s Iraq-war related fears are compounded by the experience of the Armenian Genocide and the general distrust of Turkey that resulted from it. The implications of the Iraq war are more profound for Armenia than for Azerbaijan or Georgia because Armenia’s overall foreign policy is strongly linked to Russian foreign policy, and because the “national imperative” is so important in Armenia. Traditionally, Armenian foreign policy has been one of complimentarity between Russia and the West but, recently, Armenia has been moving closer to Moscow. This is a dangerous trend for Armenia because if Russia chooses to reassert itself in the Caucasus, it puts Armenia in a vulnerable position. Furthermore, Armenia has put itself in a poor position vis-à-vis Russia through equity-for-debt deals. Essentially, Armenia exchanged the strategic state enterprises of electricity manufacturing and distribution for the cancellation of its national debt to Russia. This is especially troubling because a key tool for Russia in reasserting its hegemony over the South Caucasus could be Russian control of energy supplies to the region. Mr. Giragosian concluded by observing that public opinion in the three South Caucuses states opposes the war, but the Armenian government is the only government in the region that opposed the war. This, in turn, bodes well for civil society in Armenia. The divide between the Azerbaijani and Georgian government positions on the war and that of the general population may lead to a weakening of civil society in those countries if the populace feels that their opinions are marginalized. These effects would be compounded by general feelings of social discontent and a contracting economy. In conclusion, the Iraq war may be the trigger for the end of the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership, and if so, the Caucasus is likely to be the focal point of the ensuing conflict. Armenia is the most vulnerable in a falling out between the United States and Russia due to Armenia’s strategic orientation toward Russia. Azerbaijan Mr. Mollazade began his talk by reviewing Azerbaijan’s official position toward the war and the U.S. position regarding Azerbaijan’s role in the “coalition of the willing.” Azerbaijan supported the United States after the attacks of September 11 by granting over-flight and refueling rights. Concerning Iraq, Azerbaijan has announced its willingness to participate in peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts once the conflict has ended. The United States needed the support of Azerbaijan more than any other South Caucasus country because Azerbaijan is a majority Muslim country. This is probably the reason why President Heydar Aliyev was the only Caucasus leader to be invited to the White House during the United Nations Security Council debate over Iraq. Azerbaijan has not been as vocal as Georgia in its support of the U.S. position, but nevertheless has supported the United States. This has been made clear through the statements of the Foreign Ministry, U.S. ambassador to Azerbaijan, Ross Wilson, and by the fact that President Aliyev met with George W. Bush in the White House. Mr. Mollazade noted that, although public opinion in Azerbaijan is not in favor of the war, the country’s major opposition leaders have publicly come out in support of the United States. For example, the Popular Front Party has stated that this is not a war against Islam. If public opinion were strongly opposed to this war, the opposition parties would not publicly support the government position. The only opposition parties opposed to the war are the communists and the Islamists. The post-war implications for Azerbaijan are quite interesting. Iran will undoubtedly come under increased scrutiny by the United States, and Azerbaijan will therefore become more strategically important to the United States. There are more than 20 million ethnic Azerbaijanis in Northern Iran and Tehran, and the United States may want to use Azerbaijan as a base for intelligence gathering against Iran. Concerning oil production, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline is unlikely to be affected. The oil companies have given a lot of money and effort to securing the agreements for this pipeline and are unlikely to abandon it when Iraqi oil comes online. Azerbaijan’s strategic importance to the United States increased after September 11, 2001, and will continue to increase after the Iraq war. The elimination of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act has allowed for an increase in strategic and military cooperation between the United States and Azerbaijan, but the continuing Nagorno Karabakh conflict has strained the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship a bit. Georgia Mr. Remler’s remarks, although on the record, do not necessarily reflect official U.S. government opinion. Mr. Remler began by noting that when people try to imagine how the war in Iraq will affect Georgia, the most common observation to make is that Russia may try to use the war as a means to exert additional pressure on Georgia, or even to attack the country outright. To say that relations between Georgia and Russia could be better, however, is hardly news. Since September 11, 2001, tensions between the two neighbors have risen precipitously high and have been calmed both through U.S. intervention and high-level meetings between Georgian and Russian government officials. The best way to measure the effect of the Iraq war on Georgia, therefore, is to measure the current state of Georgian-Russian relations up to this point, and then to measure the change caused by the war. Chechnya is the single issue that most complicates Georgian-Russian relations. Compounding the situation is the fact that there have been a number of expressions of personal animosity by Russians against Georgian president Eduard Shevardnadze, but these often relate to frustrations caused by the war in Chechnya. There are two defining moments in the Georgian-Russian relationship over Chechnya: Georgia’s refusal to allow Russian troops to open a second front against Chechnya from Georgian territory in 1999, and the influx of Chechen refugees and fighters into Georgia in 2001.