RE-THINKING THE COMMON LAW OF DEFAMATION: STRIKING A NEW BALANCE BETWEEN FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND THE PROTECTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S REPUTATION by CAROLIN ANNE BAYER Ref. jur., Johannes Gutenberg Universitat Mainz, 2000 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF LAWS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Faculty of Law) We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 2001 © Carolin Anne Bayer In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. department of jgruOhj ^ The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date DE-6 (2/88) ABSTRACT Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law of defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. An important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light of the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. ii The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ii Table of Contents iv INTRODUCTION 1 CHAPTER 1: The two values in Philosophical Terms A. Philosophical Foundation of Freedom of Expression 6 I. The Argument from Democracy 7 II. Truth Discovery 14 III. Freedom of Expression and Individuality 19 IV. Final Remarks 25 B. The Significance of an Individual's Reputation 25 I. Historical Protection of Reputation 26 II. Value and Importance of Reputation 28 1. Dignitary Value and Privacy 28 2. Economic Value 31 3. Further Values 32 III. Final Remarks 33 CHAPTER 2: The pre-Charter Law of Defamation A. Historical Development of the Law of Defamation 34 B. The Current Law of Defamation 38 I. The General Framework of the Law of Defamation 38 II. The Defamation Action 39 1. A Defamatory Statement 39 2. Reference to the Plaintiff: Identification 42 3. Publication... 43 III. Defences 45 1. Justification 46 2. Privilege 48 a) Absolute Privilege 48 b) Qualified Privilege 51 3. Fair Comment 58 4. Consent, Apology and Retraction 61 iv CHAPTER 3: Freedom of Expression and the Charter A. Introduction of the Charter 63 I. Historical Context 63 II. Application of the Charter 65 B. Structure of s.2(b) Analysis 68 I. The Scope of Freedom of Expression 68 1. Meaning of Expression 68 2. The Violence-Exception 72 II. Limitation of Freedom of Expression 73 III. Justification of the Limit under s.l of the Charter 75 1. 'Prescribed by Law' 78 2. Pressing and Substantial Purpose 79 3. Proportionality Stage 81 a) Rationale Connection 82 b) Minimum Impairment 82 c) Proportionate Effect 85 IV. 'Indirect' Application of the Charter 88 CHAPTER 4: The two Competing Values in the German Jurisdiction A. The Values at Issue 91 I. Freedom of Expression 91 II. The Individual's Reputation 93 B. Constitutional Review with respect to the Violation of Basic Rights 97 I. The Constitutional Complaint 97 II. Horizontal Effect of the Basic Rights 98 III. Article 5 Analysis.. 100 1. General Laws 101 2. Theory of Reciprocal Effect 102 3. Proportionality Analysis 103 C. Freedom of Expression and the Personality Right 105 I. Statements of Opinion 106 II. Factual Assertions 107 III. Conclusion 111 V CHAPTER 5: How do other Common Law Jurisdictions balance the two Competing Values? A. United States: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 113 B. Australia: Theophanous v. Herald and Weekly Times Ltd 117 CHAPTER 6: Re-thinking the Canadian Law of Defamation A. Hill v. Church of Scientology 121 I. The Court's Decision in Hill 122 II. Critical Review of the Decision in Hill 126 1. Defamatory Speech's Weak Claim to Constitutional Protection 127 2. Duty to ascertain the Truth of Allegations 131 3. Sufficiency of the Common Law Defences 132 4. Rejection of the Actual Malice Rule 136 5. Conclusion 137 B. The Application of the Charter to Court Orders and the Common Law 138 C. Critical Look at the Law of Defamation 147 I. Defamatory Nature of the Material 148 II. Presumption of Falsity 149 III. Presumption of Damage 150 IV. Presumption of Malice 151 V. Common Law Defences 153 VI. Chilling Effect of the Common Law of Defamation 154 VII. Conclusion 157 D. Proposals for Change 158 I. Absolute Immunity for all Political Discussion 163 II. Qualified Privilege for the Communication Media 164 III. Extension of the Fault Element 166 1. Defence of Due Diligence 168 2. Actual Malice Rule 170 3. Negligence Standard 174 IV. Presumption of Falsity 176 V. Presumption of Damage 177 VI. Conclusion 177 Bibliography • 179 vi INTRODUCTION Canadian courts have long followed the traditional common law rules for defamation cases, created to vindicate injury to personal reputation. In recent years, the decision was taken by the federal and nine of the provincial governments to entrench freedom of expression as a constitutional guarantee in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, promising that everyone in Canada has the right to freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression. Freedom of expression and the individual's reputation are both generally highly valued in western society and regarded as deserving special protection. At the same time, a certain tension exists between these two interests. In some contexts, notably the law of defamation, they inevitably collide and whatever protections are added to the one must be taken away from the other. This tension in the relationship between free expression and reputational interests is the subject matter of my thesis. Defamation law existed long before the Charter came into force. Until very recently, this law developed without consideration having to be given to constitutionally entrenched values, particularly freedom of expression, and has tended to favour the protection of reputation. The focus of this work, therefore, is the question whether the current law of defamation takes the principles of freedom of expression sufficiently into account, or whether the guarantees of freedom of expression should be interpreted to modify the common law of defamation. I will argue that the balancing of the values in the existing common law regime is no longer reflective of contemporary views as to the significance of freedom of expression and I will submit a proposal to adjust the entire common law in order to bring it into accord with what I contend are the Charter's and society's demands. 1 With respect to both the content and the structure of this thesis, I should point out that I am writing from the vantage point of a law student from a civil law tradition, and for an audience of those from both, civil and common law traditions. In the first five chapters of my thesis I will, therefore, limit myself to simply describing various areas of law and legal theory in order to make this work comprehensible for the whole body of my audience.