Georgia | No 3 | June to July 2007 GEORGIA | Trends in Conflict and Cooperation The period under review was mostly dominated by the up and down of Russian-Georgian relations. After a bilateral meeting between President Putin and President Saakshvili in St. Petersburg on 9 June, a slight stabilization appeared in bilateral relations. Russia – still Georgia’s second largest trading partner – seemed to be easing the pressure on Russian-Georgian relations not only because of the WTO accession plan, but also because of the Olympic Winter Games to be held in Sochi in 2014. But this improvement in Russian-Georgian relations did not suit everyone, especially not separatist parties, which may be one of the reasons why in June “unknown persons” fired several times Country Stability and Conflictive Events in South Ossetia on Georgian and South Ossetian villages. As can be seen on the graph, additional tensions grew in summer paralleling the water shortage problem in the Tskhinvali region, which happens every summer since 2004. As usual, political figures in Russia and in the unrecognized republics immediately expressed concern that the escalation of tensions in the conflict zone signalizes a new Georgian attempt to restore its hegemony over South Ossetia by force of arms. Relations between Georgia and Russia worsened further after the publication of the last UNOMIG report issued on 12 July. The report suggested, but did not explicitly claim, that Russian army helicopters could have been involved in an attack on Tbilisi- controlled upper Kodori Gorge on 11 March 2007. Soon after, the Russian Foreign Source: FAST event data Ministry stated that “it is clear which side has been interested in the incident. And everything points to Georgia, which before and after the incident, purposefully was trying to force tension in the upper Kodori Gorge.” In the meantime, the Georgian National Bank came up with a list of 40 banks which might be using the territory of Abkhazia for ”money laundering.” Kakha Bendukidze, Minister for Reforms Coordination, stated that he would like these (Russian) banks to be included on the ”Black list” of those organizations whose cooperation with the financial structures in the USA and the European Union is restricted. It was no surprise then that the Georgian administration also revealed a black list of Russian Companies illegally operating on the Abkhazian territory. MP of the Russian State Duma, Konstantin Zatulin, said that Georgian statements regarding “black lists” are politically motivated. The Russian media went even further saying Georgia threatens to break up the Olympics in Sochi. The recent accusations from Tbilisi directed at Russia concerning the alleged dropping of an unexploded bomb on Georgian territory close to South Ossetia on 6 August led to a new all time low in bilateral relations. Russian and Georgian mass media were full of versions, guesses and assumptions. As usual propagandists on both sides were trying to maximize gains from this incident. The Georgian response was swift and well coordinated. It was obvious that Tbilisi was trying to profit as much as possible from this “bomb-story” by calling for diplomatic action and political support from the international community against Russia. President Mikheil Saakashvili strode around the landing site and foreign diplomats in Tbilisi were briefed on the incident and shown evidence as proof of Georgia’s claim that Russia was behind the attack. It is still not clear what really happened. One of the more interesting sides of the “bomb-issue” is its resonance in part of civil society in Georgia. When there were similar “accidents revealing Russian aggression,” NGOs and oppositional parties were always united with the government and used to criticize Russia for its actions against Georgia. But now it seems that a part of civil society has become tired of the steady Russia “bashing.” For instance, Salome Zurabishvili, the former Georgian Foreign Minister said that “naturally, Russia has an aggressive attitude towards us but such actions would not suit it given the upcoming Olympic Games [in 2014 in Sochi]” and she would not rule out that “the bombing near Tsitelubani was a spectacle staged by Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili." She is not the only voice of the opposition speaking of possible Georgian involvement in the incident, but their motives and arguments vary. It should be noted that the whole story has helped distract attention from the fact that Georgia has been criticized for its recent actions as well: First, by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon who made an unannounced visit to Tbilisi on 29 June where he met President Saakashvili. He probably delivered a warning that any new military aggression in Abkhazia would risk undercutting Georgia's position at the on-going UN-mediated peace talks and risk severe condemnation from the international community. Secondly, a UN Secretary-General report from 18 July on the situation in Abkhazia mentions several military violations in the lower Kodori Gorge by Georgia and calls on the Georgian government to remove a state-sponsored patriotic youth camp from the Abkhaz conflict zone. Before the “bomb-story” happened, Georgian international relations were dominated by lobbying for a new governmental strategy concerning the Tbilisi-loyal head of temporary administration in South Ossetia, and diplomatic efforts to make EU and Russia recognize Dimitry Sanakoyev’s administration as a party in Georgian-South Ossetian FAST Update | Georgia | No 3 | June to July 2007 negotiations. President Mikheil Saakashvili even appointed a new State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues, Davit Bakradze, who is also chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for Euro-Atlantic Integration Issues. Bakradze is said to have made a precondition for his appointment to the post of state minister by organizing Sanakoyev’s visit to Brussels and he is also known to be one of the closer allies of President Saakashvili. The tie between the restructuring and thoughts about the state goal of internationalizing Georgian policy towards South Ossetia, was confirmed by President Saakashvili when he declared that he would like Davit Bakradze’s new appointment to be seen as a signal of the country’s readiness to engage the EU in the conflict resolution process and to continue more intensive negotiations on these issues with Russia. However, “real” Abkhazian and South Ossetian parties do not think that the new state minister will herald something positive for the conflict resolution process because the main Georgian policy regarding the breakaway regions is not going to change. Tbilisi’s approach to South Ossetia also received a sweeping endorsement from the United States on 27July when U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Mathew Bryza said it was time to move to the final stage of conflict resolution by defining the region’s political status within Georgia. Speaking with journalists in Tbilisi, he said that Tbilisi’s actions towards South Ossetia were fully in line with the three-stage peace plan laid out by Georgian authorities three years ago and that Sanakoyev is gaining more and more support from Ossetians. But in reality, as experts confirm, only Georgian villages of breakaway South Ossetia are under the control of Sanakoyev, and there is only a minimal number of ethnic Ossetian living there. They also stress the fact, that today Kokoity is even more supported by “his” population than three years ago. Concerning the recognition of Sanakoyev’s administration as a party for negotiations within the Joint Control Commission (JCC), Russia's JCC co-chairman Yury Popov told at a briefing in Moscow on 20 July that Sanakoyev could take part in talks, but only as a member of Georgia's delegation. Some days before the JCC meeting in Tbilisi was to take place, it was cancelled by Kokoity because of the absence of security guarantees for the South Ossetian delegation. As for negotiations with Abkhazia, Sokhumi’s condition remains the same; they will not resume talks with Tbilisi unless Georgia withdraws its “puppet government” – the Abkhaz government-in-exile – from upper Kodori Gorge. Despite such tensions between the conflicting sides, the armed assault on Premier Minister of Abkhazia Alexander Ankvab of 9 July was not considered a provocation from the Georgian side. Some of the local experts considered the incident a result of a political fight between the de-facto President Sergei Bagapsh’s group and Ankvab’s one. It is known that the financial structures of the Abkhazian government are under the control of the PM and military bodies are subordinate to the president. Some fear that the assault was in the interest of Alexander Ankvab himself, who does not conceal his presidential ambitions. One of the main themes for political discussions in Georgia in June has been the budgetary amendments, which were criticized by the opposition MPs as non-transparent and they demanded information on the “so-called secret clauses” of the defense budget. Some of the MPs believe that the government extended the Defense Ministry’s budget in order to use it for the 2008 elections and that it is empowered to conceal its ministry expenses. The ruling majority in the parliament and the government refused to consider the request of opposition lawmakers, saying that Georgia’s budget “has been recognized as one of the most transparent among eastern European states by international financial institutions.” Despite the tedious propaganda war between Georgian and Russian media, both sides are still engaged in serious talks and are trying to settle the controversy on different fields. For instance, it was Moscow that made Kokoity change his mind and consider participating at a new JCC meeting in Tbilisi in September. On 8 August, Kokoity even announced that he is ready to meet President Saakashvili and to sign a treaty on the non-use of force.