No. 203 15 May 2017 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html www.laender-analysen.de RUSSIA AND UKRAINE ■■State Duma Elections in Crimea 2 By David Szakonyi, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. ■■STATISTICS Data on the Crimea Elections 5 ■■Russian–Ukrainian Relations: From Friendship of Peoples to War 7 Taras Kuzio, Amsterdam Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Zurich University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 203, 15 May 2017 2 State Duma Elections in Crimea By David Szakonyi, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Abstract: United Russia surprised few by dominating the first Duma elections held in Crimea in over a century. But lingering disaffection with the quality of its leadership in cities such as Sevastopol could undermine its abil- ity to carve out a durable hold over the new Crimean political landscape. Russian Elections in Crimea The Duma elections occurred amidst continuing eco- In 2016, Crimea participated in its first national elec- nomic difficulties for the local population. Since annex- tions in 100 years as a member of the Russian Federation. ation and the imposition of sanctions by the West, pri- Although the vast majority of the international commu- vate investment has fallen dramatically while inflation nity still does not recognize the region’s annexation in has surged. Massive transfers from Moscow have helped 2014, 1.8 million voters were eligible to select politicians cushion some of the impact, but have not completely to represent them in the State Duma in Moscow. These compensated for drops in agricultural production and voters were asked to select among a number of Russian the lack of workable infrastructure. Compounding the political parties that have only recently laid down roots damage has been the slow return of tourism, which still and competed within Crimean politics. has not regained its pre-2014 levels, when Crimean ports However, many Crimean citizens who had hoped for were regularly visited by European cruise ships. a clean break with pre-annexation politics found them- Not all of the major Russian political parties were selves choosing from a small set of elites with long polit- completely unfamiliar with Crimean politics prior to ical histories in the region. United Russia (UR) domi- annexation in 2014. United Russia and Ukraine’s Party nated the elections by successfully co-opting influential of Regions first began building ties in Crimea in the persons from both the Ukrainian Party of Regions 2000s, when the latter ruled locally. Numerous similar- (POR), which ruled Crimea prior to annexation, and ities existed between the two parties, including a big tent the leaders of the “Crimean Spring.” All four UR can- approach to governing that downplayed the importance didates won seats in single-member districts, while the of ideology and focused on building political machines party took over 70% of the proportional representation rather than providing public goods. Top UR politicians vote. UR’s association with former elites however opened promoted cooperation between the parties by organizing it up to strong challenges from new political forces which events in Crimea, even naming Party of Regions their capitalized on public discontent with the way integration “key and only partner in Ukraine” in 2005.2 into Russia is being handled. The fierce political battle These pre-existing ties helped improve United that resulted for the deputy seat from Sevastopol may Russia’s electoral viability following Crimea’s March be indicative of the challenges the ruling party faces 2014 referendum to join Russia. To some onlookers, in the future consolidating its grip over local politics. UR orchestrated a near wholesale takeover of Party of Region’s electoral machinery right after annexation. The Electoral and Party System in Crimea United Russia moved into the Party of Region’s head- The September 2016 Russia State Duma elections util- quarters in Simferopol. Previous administrative staff ized a mixed-member system by which half of the 450 were rehired to work for UR and the ranks of candidates deputies were elected through party lists and the other to regional and federal elections swelled with former half in single-member districts. Four of these single- members of the Party of Regions. member districts are located on the Crimean Peninsula, But not all the old guard were kept on. The massive one in the federal city of Sevastopol and three others cov- membership roll inherited from POR was slashed, and ering the rest of the Republic of Crimea.1 Several Cri- several of the top faces of United Russia now (for exam- mean politicians were also included on national party ple, Prime Minister Sergey Aksenov and First Deputy lists, making the peninsula eligible to receive up to eight Prime Minister Mikhail Sheremet) hail from pro-Rus- deputies in the 7th convocation of the State Duma. sian parties such as Russian Unity and were much less 2 Korrespondent.net. “Members of United Russia Arrived in Crimea to Campaign for the Party of Regions,” October 12, 1 After annexation, Sevastopol became a federal city akin to Mos- 2010. Accessed at: <http://korrespondent.net/ukraine/politics/ cow and St. Petersburg, while the rest of Crimea became the 1125420-chleny-edinoj-rossii-priehali-v-krym-agitirovat- Republic of Crimea. za-partiyu-regionov> RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 203, 15 May 2017 3 prominent pre-annexation. These strategic moves were petition to the Kremlin documenting corruption in Cri- intended to attract many popular leaders from the “Cri- mea forced President Putin to take the unusual step of mean Spring” while capitalizing on the mobilization convening a sit-down between regional big wigs. Since legacy the Party of Regions had achieved in the region. resigning from the Sevastopol City Council in 2015, By the fall of 2014, UR politicians had quickly risen to Chaly has prodded government leaders from the outside, the top of the legislative and executive institutions in even trying to organize a referendum for the people to both Sevastopol and the Republic of Crimea and were decide whether or not to elect their regional governor. beginning to display the normal traits of a ruling party. During the Duma campaign, Chaly threw his hefty The party’s stake in the Duma elections relied heavily popular support behind Party of Growth (PR) candidate on President Putin, whose approval ratings in Crimea Oleg Nikolaev. A successful businessperson from Sevas- after orchestrating the annexation have remained astro- topol, Nikolaev had run the local chapter of Delovaya nomically high.3 Local UR leaders, however, have not Rossiya, the nationwide trade association led by ombuds- fared as well. Concerns arose early on that corrupt local man Boris Titov. When Titov entered politics by estab- networks were siphoning federal money intended for lishing the PR party, Nikolaev was viewed as one of its infrastructure and co-opting real estate sales for pri- candidates with the best change of winning a seat in vate interests. Politicians such as regional legislature the Duma. Chaly’s widespread popularity breathed life chair and UR regional party head Vladimir Konstan- into Nikolaev’s campaign for Sevastopol’s Duma seat tinov are closely connected to large construction com- and helped galvanize many locals disappointed with panies and use their authority to carve out a piece of the the extent of reforms since annexation. action.4 To some, annexation had ushered in the same The other outstanding question in the run-up to the set of rapacious, power-hungry elites that had plagued Duma election concerned the Crimean Tatar minor- the region before. ity. At roughly 13% of the population, the Crimean Systemic opposition parties from Russia have largely Tatars have faced significant political repression since failed to capitalize on any societal discontent towards 2014. Prominent leaders opposed annexation and then the new UR authorities. Without pre-annexation party found themselves exiled for five years. Authorities have structures to work with, the Liberal-Democratic Party also banned the Tatars’ representative body, the Mejlis, of Russia (LDPR) and Just Russia have struggled to from operating, while deputies have seen their access build cadres and attract capable leaders. Each has tried and opportunities to appear in mass media, organize to capitalize on splits within the United Russia elite to public demonstrations, and raise funds severely curbed. attract candidates. The Communist Party tried import- Leading activists declared their intention to boycott the ing candidates from the Russian mainland, only to see State Duma election, citing maltreatment at the hands local voters turn away from carpetbaggers in the regional of the government. elections of 2014. The bench of Crimean politicians is Those Crimean Tatars looking for representatives admittedly short, which further undermines political who share their opposition towards the annexation had recruitment. few options in the Duma elections to choose from. Non- Other actors in Crimea have tried to pick up the systemic opposition parties like PARNAS and Yabloko slack in challenging United Russia, most visibly Alexei basically boycotted the campaign in Crimea. With Chaly, the self-anointed “People’s Mayor” of Sevastopol leaders on record calling for the return of the region to who helped spearhead secession from Ukraine. Since Ukraine, these parties faced an uphill if not impossible then, Chaly has been a thorn in the side of local author- climb to win over the average voter still enamored with ities, especially United Russia politicians who he views annexation. If there was one commonality across can- as having let down the dreams of the “revolution.” 5 His didates from all parties, it was a steadfast commitment towards the integration of the peninsula with Russia 3 Sofiya Samohina and Vadim Nikiforov.