Culture & Psychology http://cap.sagepub.com Locating the Dialogical Self in the Age of Transnational Migrations, Border Crossings and Diasporas Sunil Bhatia and Anjali Ram Culture Psychology 2001; 7; 297 DOI: 10.1177/1354067X0173003 The online version of this article can be found at: http://cap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/7/3/297 Published by: http://www.sagepublications.com Additional services and information for Culture & Psychology can be found at: Email Alerts: http://cap.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts Subscriptions: http://cap.sagepub.com/subscriptions Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav Permissions: http://www.sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav Citations http://cap.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/7/3/297 Downloaded from http://cap.sagepub.com at CONNECTICUT COLLEGE on September 8, 2009 03 Bhatia (dm/d) 31/7/01 2:06 pm Page 297 Commentary Abstract We begin by outlining that the dialogical self may be conceived from the point of view of the self-ful and the self-less perspectives. Both these perspectives of self-work involve different assumptions about what should be the starting point of the I-position of the dialogical self. These assumptions need to be made explicit because they provide the key to explaining how I- positions get transformed in the process of entering into a dialogical relationship with the other. Furthermore, we argue that in order to explain how dialogue occurs, and how the I-positions are organized and reorganized by the individual, a developmental framework may be necessary. We believe that the dialogical model is extremely relevant in the age of transnational migration and diasporic cultures. However, the challenge, for the theory of a dialogical self, is to explain how individuals living with hybridized and hyphenated identities in borderland cultures and diasporic communities coordinate their incompatible and often conflicting cultural and personal positions. Key Words acculturation, cultural identity, dialogical self, diaspora, South Asian Sunil Bhatia Connecticut College, USA Anjali Ram Roger Williams University, USA Locating the Dialogical Self in the Age of Transnational Migrations, Border Crossings and Diasporas We live in an age where transnational immigration, border crossings and global media are proliferating at an increasing rate. Further inten- sified by the issues of race, gender, class, sexuality, ethnicity and nationality, discussions about the self challenge the grand narratives of the stable, bounded, contained, Cartesian self. Hubert Hermans’ previous work and his present essay (2001) have important impli- cations in a world where migrants, refugees, exiles and expatriates are redrawing the cartographies of the self. Hermans’ (2001) paper is, in many ways, a grand crystallization of his many decades of work on the concept of dialogical self. Generally Culture & Psychology Copyright © 2001 SAGE Publications (London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) Vol. 7(3): 297–309 [1354–067X(200109) 7:3; 297–309; 018668] Downloaded from http://cap.sagepub.com at CONNECTICUT COLLEGE on September 8, 2009 03 Bhatia (dm/d) 31/7/01 2:06 pm Page 298 Culture & Psychology 7(3) speaking, his work attempts to study how culture is embedded in self, and vice versa. One major emphasis of his theory of the dialogical self is that neither can the concept of self be treated as atomic, bounded and self-contained, nor can culture be analyzed as an abstract, reified entity. In keeping with the goals of the special issue of Culture & Psy- chology, Hermans paints the broad and subtle theoretical strokes of the dialogical self from an interdisciplinary palette. In fact, Hermans’ paper lives and breathes the concept of dialogicality from beginning to end. He has fashioned a theory of the dialogical self by carefully and thoughtfully juxtaposing the voices of theorists from psychology (social, clinical, developmental), brain sciences, anthropology, soci- ology and literature. A primary concern of Hermans’ paper is how one should go about the business of theorizing about the dialogical self in a global, trans- national culture. One cannot, according to Hermans, speak of a static, core, unchanging self when there is so much dynamic movement, shifting and mixing around its cultural boundaries. The challenge for the theory of a dialogical self, then, is to explain how individuals coordinate their incompatible and often conflicting cultural and personal positions in the wake of transnational immigration, cultural dislocation and the hybridization of identity. Let us begin with the central concept of the paper—the dialogical self. Hermans puts together the pieces of the dialogical self by drawing on James and Bakhtin. By integrating Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony, multivoiced- ness, with James’ notion of the self as continuous, distinct and pos- sessing volition, Hermans attempts to bridge together two distinct epistemological perspectives on self—perspectives that have been recently described by Valsiner (2000) as self-ful and self-less. Making Meaning in a Self-ful and Self-less World The self-ful perspective maintains a clear opposition and demarcation between the self and the other, whereas in the self-less perspective, the person is essentially fused or merged with the social world. To an extent, James’ concept of the volitional, intentional I represents the self- ful perspective. The self-ful I is the glue that holds together Bakhtin’s multiplicity of selves that are discontinuous and fused with the other. This does not mean that James did not emphasize the multiplicity of selves, but rather he ensured that the I (self-as-knower) retained its continuity and distinctiveness. Valsiner (2000) argues that the two notions of self—the self-ful and self-less perspectives—point to differ- ent processes of meaning making about the self and other. 298 Downloaded from http://cap.sagepub.com at CONNECTICUT COLLEGE on September 8, 2009 03 Bhatia (dm/d) 31/7/01 2:06 pm Page 299 Bhatia & Ram Locating the Dialogical Self The self-ful perspective emphasizes the social and cultural em- beddedness of the person, but at the same time finds it necessary to retain the notion of the self as a distinct ‘open system’. The self-less perspective, on the other hand, emphasizes the mutual constitution of the self and culture, but coalesces the self with the cultural artifacts and discourses that surround it. Hermans skillfully generates a theory of a dialogical self by working with both these perspectives of self. However, one point that Valsiner (2000) has drawn our attention to is that these two different perspectives of self work with different assumptions about what constitutes the starting point of the I-positions in the dialogical relations between self and other. If we take the epistemological viewpoint of the self-ful perspective, then the person becomes the ‘axiomatic’ starting point of the dialogi- cal process. Valsiner (2000) notes that without the ‘obligatory’ under- standing of one’s own life space or I-position, it would not be possible to take the perspective of the other. He clarifies this point by suggest- ing that: The notion of I-position entails a core ‘I’ that is needed to assume an I- position. In any activity, there is an agent whose active role makes the activity possible. No matter how extensively socially embedded is an activity, or discourse—the stage for that is set by the existence of the person(s). The person—who constructs I-positions—does that from the starting point of some specific location within one’s psychological field. (p. 6) One implication of such a claim is that the minimal starting point needed for the creation of a meaningful dialogical relationship between two individuals (e.g. I and You) is their distinct sense of personhood or their unique I-positions. An ‘arena for dialogue’ can only be created when one approaches the arena from one’s ‘ego-centered base’. The result of entering into a dialogue from such an I-position is that it allows for the creation of a new whole that incorporates both these positions into a third position. Valsiner (2000) explains: Two positions—A and B[—]enter (state 1) into a dialogic relationship from their ego-centered bases. By entering into that relationship, they set up the arena of their dialogue (State 2). The result of such relation may be a new whole that incorporates the previous two positions/persons (State 3A, or phenomenologically—’I and you together as We’), or one that creates a new center eliminating the previous positions (State 3B, or phenomenologically— ’We that supercedes You and I’). (p. 7) The above quotes clearly spell out the minimal starting point of the I- position from a self-ful perspective. By yoking the Jamesian notion of I with Bakhtin’s notion of the polyphonous Me, Hermans works with two radically different selves. However, if one were to take Bakhtin’s 299 Downloaded from http://cap.sagepub.com at CONNECTICUT COLLEGE on September 8, 2009 03 Bhatia (dm/d) 31/7/01 2:06 pm Page 300 Culture & Psychology 7(3) notion of the self as discontinuous, seamless and embodying the self- less perspective, it would be necessary to specify the minimal starting point of the I-positions of the self. An explicit description of the I- positions of the self is absolutely necessary for explaining how the dialogue occurs between two persons. The self-less perspective of dialogicality does not allow us to identify or mark the boundaries between the self and other. If the self is seamless and one with the other, and if there is no description of the unique subjectivities or I-positions of the self, then how would one know how the I-positions underwent transformations? The mutual interdependence between the self and other prevents us from knowing what exactly happened in the dialogical process. What kind of a dia- logical relationship is created when the I-positions are, in a sense, already fused with the I-positions of the other? For Hermans, the Jamesian I (self-as-knower) seems compatible with the Bakhtinian self as multiple because the latter acts as an ‘other’ to the former self, and vice versa.