EXPLAINING CHINA’S ACTIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1971-2012 by CHRISTOPHER B. PRIMIANO A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-Newark Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in Global Affairs written under the direction of Jun Xiang and approved by Jun Xiang, Chair Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia Yale Ferguson Elizabeth Wishnick Newark, New Jersey May 2016 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Explaining China’s Actions on Human Rights in the United Nations General Assembly, 1971-2012 By CHRISTOPHER B. PRIMIANO Dissertation Director: Jun Xiang The main puzzle in this dissertation is that China has one of the worst domestic human rights practices in the world, but it has a very active voting record in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on human rights resolutions and is active in general internationally on human rights. Using rational choice’s emphasis on actors acting to advance their preferences, I argue that domestic factors explain this puzzle. More specifically, it is the perceived domestic threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule that determines the way the Chinese government acts on the human rights issues explored in this dissertation. Each main chapter in this dissertation documents this pattern of the relationship between the Chinese government’s perceived threat to CCP rule and the Chinese government’s reaction. The findings in this dissertation have policy implications for INGOs and states seeking to influence China’s human rights policies. To answer my central question (what accounts for China’s actions on human rights in the UNGA?), I focus on multiple forms of action by the Chinese government in the UNGA. ii Acknowledgements and Dedication I would like to thank my four committee members—Jun Xiang, Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia, Yale Ferguson, and Liz Wishnick—for all of their help with this dissertation. I have benefited significantly from all of the talks that I have had with them. Ariane Chebel d’Appollonia’s Global Ethics course inspired me to write my dissertation on China’s actions regarding human rights. Liz Wishnick read numerous drafts of this dissertation and provided me with excellent suggestions. Given that Liz was an external committee member, I could not have asked for any additional support from her. I was fortunate to have Jun Xiang as my committee chair. In addition to writing my dissertation under Jun’s guidance, I have benefited from working with Jun on two coauthored publications and presenting our research at various conferences. The countless hours that Jun and I spent talking in his office have been very beneficial. Despite being far away geographically, Yale Ferguson always made himself very accessible to me, as we frequently corresponded via email and Skype. I have benefited greatly from all of the talks and emails with Yale. This past year, Jun, Yale, and Liz all worked with me regarding my job search and provided me with excellent advice and support regarding the job search. I would also like to thank both my wife and my mother for all of their support. This dissertation is dedicated to the memory of my father. iii Introduction: 1-18 Chapter 1: Explanatory dimensions and alternative explanation: 19-35 Chapter 2: Methodology and research design: 36-62 Chapter 3: Literature review on IR theories and explanatory dimensions: 63-112 Chapter 4: Historical context and human rights in China: 113-170 Chapter 5: China’s voting behavior on human rights in the UNGA: 171-193 Chapter 6: China on UNGA country specific human rights resolutions: willing to call out Western countries but not developing countries on human rights: 194-210 Chapter 7: Concern about the domestic threat: Four cases revealing the pattern: 211-235 Conclusion: 236-247 References: 248-262 iv 1 Introduction The puzzle: poor domestic human rights, but active in international human rights diplomacy The main puzzle in this dissertation is that China has one of the worst domestic human rights practices in the world, according to data sets that measure government-led human rights abuses, but it has a very active voting record in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on human rights resolutions and is active in general internationally on human rights. China’s active role in voting in the affirmative for UNGA human rights resolutions is at odds with its increasing repression of such rights at home. The Chinese government is very concerned about potential threats to its rule and modifies its voting and statements in the UNGA based on such perceived threats. My dissertation is largely exploratory research, as this topic has neither been researched before nor is it clearly defined. As such, my dissertation fills the gap that currently exists in the literature on this topic. The main argument in this dissertation, which largely draws upon rational choice’s emphasis on state actors acting based on their preferences and making calculations for such actions, is that the perceived domestic threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) determines the way the Chinese government reacts to human rights issues in the UNGA. Using rational choice in this dissertation, I follow the distinction posited by rational choice theorists1 that acting rationally means that the person is acting in a manner to advance his interests. Rational choice thus employs a different meaning of the term 1 See Quackenbush 2004: 95. 2 “rational” than is commonly used in daily life or the denotation. For example, with the Chinese government’s actions in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Chinese government is acting in precisely the way stated above, that is, the Chinese government is acting according to its preferences: keeping Tibet and Xinjiang under PRC control. If the Chinese government were to allow more freedom in Tibet and Xinjiang, then that could potentially result in those two provinces becoming independent, which is anathema to the Chinese government. Thus, even though the CCP does not allow for genuine autonomy in Tibet and Xinjiang, it is acting according to its preferences and thus operating in an “instrumentally rational”2 manner based on such preferences. Therefore, I use rational choice to explain China’s actions with its: (1) voting in the UNGA on human rights resolutions, (2) its statements at the UN on human rights, and (3) the cases of Tibet, Xinjiang, Liu Xiaobo,3 and Darfur. The Chinese human rights puzzle has been addressed before by focusing on four main explanations: (1) Asian values; (2) sovereignty; (3) modernization theory; and (4) international pressure: A) economic sanctions and B) naming and shaming. However, I argue that we need to look beyond such explanations in order to have a more complete understanding of China’s actions on human rights in the UNGA. In order to test my argument that it is the perceived domestic threat to CCP rule that determines the way the Chinese government acts on human rights, I suggest an examination of China’s voting in the UNGA on human rights resolutions from the 2 Quackenbush, 2004: 95. 3 Liu Xiaobo is a pro-democracy activist who has been serving a prison term due to his involvement with a document (Charter O8, which will be explained in greater detail) that called for various freedoms in China. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010. 3 year that China joined the UN (1971) to 20124 and an examination of Chinese statements at the UN on human rights. Using rational choice, I study the relationship between the perceived threat to Chinese Communist Party rule and China’s actions on human rights issues by examining China’s voting behavior on human rights resolutions and the statements it has offered on human rights at the UN. I combine different dimensions of research methodology (both quantitative and qualitative) for a mixed methods approach to create a new understanding to fully address this puzzle. This pattern of the Chinese government acting according to the perceived domestic threat to CCP rule is revealed in all of my main chapters in this dissertation—on voting in the UNGA and its statements offered in the UNGA (chapters 5 and 6), and with case studies that deal with what the CCP regards as core interests (chapter 7). Regarding the chapters on China’s voting behavior in the UNGA from 1971 to 2012 on human rights resolutions (chapters 5 and 6), I demonstrate a stark contrast to China’s domestic human rights practice. In my examination of China’s voting in the UNGA, it is important to state that I do not equate a vote in the UNGA in favor of a human rights resolution with support for human rights in general; instead, it is the voting behavior that is the focus. Nonetheless, this focus on China’s voting behavior demonstrates a significant discrepancy in China’s approach to human rights. On the one hand, China represses domestically, and on the other hand, China has a consistent voting record in the UNGA regarding voting in the affirmative on human rights resolutions. Thus, this dissertation distinguishes between China’s voting 4 The data set that I use for UNGA roll call votes ends in 2012. 4 behavior in the UNGA on such human rights resolutions and supporting human rights. On a related topic, I recognize that Beijing has been able to prevent resolutions criticizing its human rights practices from coming to a vote in the UNGA and in the international human rights regime, as China has the support for this by Russia and developing countries in Asia and Africa. In the previous United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR), China often successfully advanced motions to prevent votes that were critical of China on human rights.