PHYSICALISM, DUALISM AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Notre Dame in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Dolores G. Morris _____________________________________ Alvin Plantinga, Director Graduate Program in Philosophy Notre Dame, Indiana December 2010 PHYSICALISM, DUALISM AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM Abstract by Dolores G. Morris In this dissertation, I examine the implications of the problem of mental causation and what David Chalmers has dubbed the “hard problem of consciousness” for competing accounts of the mind. I begin, in Chapter One, with a critical analysis of Jaegwon Kim’s Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. (2005) There, I maintain that Kim’s ontology cannot adequately address both the problem of mental causation and the “hard problem of consciousness.” In Chapter Two, I examine the causal pairing problem for substance dualism. I demonstrate both that the substance dualist can respond to the argument at no great cost, and that the pairing problem applies, with equal force, to the irreducible qualia posited on Kim’s account. Chapters Three and Four are devoted to what I take to be the central argument against any kind of dualism: the causal exclusion argument. In Chapter Three, I examine dualistic responses to the exclusion argument that grant the causal closure of the physical world. I note that these responses, though technically adequate, are nevertheless theoretically unpalatable. In addition to requiring the dualist to adopt unconventional Dolores G. Morris attitudes towards causation, responses of this variety also have the unfortunate result of rendering libertarian freedom impossible. Finally, in Chapter Four, I turn my attention to the question of causal closure. I maintain that the causal closure of the physical world, though widely affirmed, is nevertheless extraordinarily difficult to support. In light of Hempel’s Dilemma, causal closure is either false, compatible with dualistic interaction, or unacceptably stipulative. There is, I maintain no causal closure principle up to the tasks required by the causal exclusion argument. For that reason, I conclude that the dualist ought not to worry about causal closure. CONTENTS Chapter One: Physicalism and the Mind-Body Problem: A Critical Analysis of Jaegwon Kim’s Functional Reduction………………………………….……1 §1. The Mind Body Problem(s)……………………………………………....2 §2. The Failures of Alternative Physicalist Accounts……………..………….6 §2.1 Nonreductive Physicalism…………….……………...……….…6 §2.2 Identity Theories………………………..……….………….…..10 §2.3 Reduction via Bridge Laws…………………..…….…………..15 §3.1 Reduction via Functional Definitions…………………………..………19 §3.2 Functional Definitions: The Qualia Problem…………...………………25 §4. Kim’s Functional Reductions: Tying up the Loose Ends………………..27 §5. The Question of Qualia Supervenience…...……………………………..33 §6. The Causal Exclusion Problem for Functionally Reduced Mental Properties….………………………………………………………....40 §7. The Problem of (Irreducible) Consciousness…………...……………….46 Conclusion…………………………………………...………………………50 Chapter Two: Substance Dualism and the Pairing Problem………………………....52 §1. Causal Pairing and Humean Causation…………………………………..55 §2. The Pairing Problem Stated……………….……………………………..60 §3. Responding to the Pairing Problem……………..……………………….65 §3.1 Finding, or Not Finding, a Pairing Relationship….…………….66 §3.2 Causation and Intentionality…………………………………….69 §3.3 Abandoning Cartesian Dualism……………………...…………76 §4. The Qualia Pairing Problem…………………….………………………..83 §4.1 The Problem Stated…………………………..………………….84 §4.2 Objections and Responses………………………..……………...88 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………94 Chapter Three: Substance Dualism and the Causal Exclusion Argument…...………95 §1. Background Considerations………………………………………….…...96 §1.2 The Causal Exclusion Argument Against Substance Dualism.....98 §2. Embracing Overdetermination: Eugene Mills…………………………..102 §2.2 Objections to Mills’s Overdeterminism………………………..108 ii §2.3 Final Reflections on Mills: An Analogy……………………….116 §3. Against Exclusion…………………………………………………….....118 §3.2 E.J. Lowe on Simultaneous Causation……………....…………122 §3.3 Objections to Lowe’s Simultaneity Account…………………..124 §3.4 Closure: Causal vs. Explanatory…….…………………………129 §4. Some Thoughts on Freedom………………………………...…………..131 §4.2 Freedom, Closure and Completeness…………………………..134 §5. A Third Alternative: E.J. Lowe on Fact Causation……………………...137 §5.2 Objections to Lowe’s Second Approach……………………….141 §5.3 Reflections on Lowe’s Second Alternative: Explanatory and Causal Closure Revisited…...………………………………145 Concluding Thoughts………………...……………………………………..146 Chapter Four: Choosing Not to Worry About Closure……………………………..148 §1. Closure and the Causal Exclusion Argument…………………………..149 §2. On Scientific Respectability…………………………………..………...151 §2.2 Evidence of Causal Closure: From Completeness to Closure…152 §2.3 Closure and Completeness Revisited………………………….155 §3. Hempel’s Dilemma……………………………………………………..157 §3.2 The Dilemma Applied………………………………………....160 §4. The First Horn: Andrew Melnyk’s Physicalism………………………..163 §4.2 The First Horn: Relevant Rivals………………………………166 §4.3 The First Horn: A More Relevant Rival………………………170 §5. The Second Horn……………………………………………………….173 §5.2 Giving Content to “Future Physics”………………………......175 §5.3 The First Horn Revisited………………………………………178 §5.4 The Second Horn: Innapropriate Extension………………...…179 §6. Taking Stock of Closure………………………………………………..182 §6.2 The Causal Closure of the PhysicalM………………………….184 §6.3 The Causal Closure of the PhysicalD………………………….186 §6.4 The Causal Closure of the PhysicalW…………………………191 §6.5 Final Thoughts on Closure……………………………………193 Conclusion………………………………………………………………….195 Works Cited…………………………………………….…………………………..196 iii CHAPTER ONE: PHYSICALISM AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF JAEGWON KIM’S FUNCTIONAL REDUCTION In Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, Jaegwon Kim presents an account of the mind according to which most, but not all, mental properties can be reduced to physical ones via functional definitions.1 While the position at which he arrives fails, ultimately, to be a wholly physicalist account, he nevertheless maintains that it is the physicalist’s best bet when it come to resolving the mind-body problem. Furthermore, because Kim also argues for a rejection of substance dualism, he maintains that this position is really anyone’s best chance at resolving the mind body problem. In what follows, I wish to examine the first of these claims. I will begin in §1 with a statement of the mind-body problem, though as we shall see the “problem” turns out to be, instead, a collection of related problems. In §2, I will present Kim’s treatment and eventual rejection of a series of physicalist responses to the mind-body problem(s). I will offer a reconstruction of Kim’s positive account, physicalist reduction via functional definitions, in §3. The remainder of this chapter, §4-8, will 1 Jaegwon Kim Physicalism or Something Near Enough. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) 1 consist of a critical analysis of Kim’s position. In §4 I will consider a series of questions that are, as of yet, unanswered on Kim’s account. I suggest that the answers to these questions will be critically important to an overall assessment of Kim’s position. In §5 I pose one additional question: namely, whether or not irreducible qualia can be said to supervene on physical properties given Kim’s ontology. §6 and §7 will be devoted to assessing the success of Kim’s account in treating both aspects of the mind-body problem for physicalism: the problem of mental causation, and the problem of consciousness. I will conclude in §8. Physicalism, or Something Near Enough presents a carefully articulated and boldly argued account of the mind. The arguments are impressive, both in scope and in clarity, and ought not to be treated lightly. Nevertheless, I wish to dispute Kim’s claim that functional reductions are the key to resolving the mind-body problem. I will argue, instead, that both the problem of mental causation and the problem of consciousness remain problematic given a functionally reductive account. Ultimately, I will suggest that a person—physicalist or otherwise—who is interested in responding to the mind-body problem ought to seek alternative means. §1. The Mind Body Problem(s) Kim begins the first chapter of Physicalism, or Something Near Enough by noting that, strictly speaking, there is no single “mind-body problem.” Instead, the so-called “mind-body problem” is best understood as: A cluster of connected problems about the relationship between mind and matter. What these problems are depends on a broader framework of philosophical and 2 scientific assumptions and presumptions within which the questions are posed and possible answer are formulated. (7) A substance dualist, for example, affirms the immateriality of the mind. Most substance dualists are also interactionist dualists, which is to say they affirm two-way causal interaction between the mind and the body. For an interactionist dualist, then, the principle mind-body problem is the problem of accounting for causal interaction between an immaterial substance and a material one. Absent some account of how an immaterial substance could act causally upon a material one, the substance dualist will face difficulties in attempting to explain mental causation. For a contemporary physicalist, however, there is no such problem. A physicalist need not explain the possibility