This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ War planning and strategic development in the Royal Navy, 1887-1918 Grimes, Shawn The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 30. Sep. 2021 War Planning and Strategic Development in the Royal Navy, 1887-1918 Shawn T ~rimes King's College University of London D Phil. Dissertation ABSTRACT This dissertation examines the Royal Navy's war planning and strategic evolution from the late Victorian era into the First World War. It demonstrates that a definitive planning trend existed throughout the period which was consistently legitimised by several factors: the study of naval history. manoeuvres, European power politics, procurement, and individual talent. The technological/strategic challenges posed by a perceived Franco-Russian naval threat during the late nineteenth century led to the evolution of a strategy entailing the observational blockade of an enemy's ports and offensive operations between 1888-1905. Based in the Naval Intell igence Department (NID), planning was influenced by the historical revitalisation of Britain's naval past and its application to contemporary technical/strategic dilemmas. As de facto planning staff until 1909, the NID modified this dual observational/offensive strategy for war against Wilhelmine Germany. Under Admiral Sir John Fisher, planning aimed at Germany's naval and commercial assets in the Baltic intensified and was utilised as a deterrent to counter aggressive German foreign policy after 1904. Conversely, the Scandinavian neutrality dilemma, 1905-1908, exerted a strong influence on the Admiralty'S strategic policy. Responding to the potential closure ofthe Baltic entrances, Fisher initiated the Admiralty's first "official" war plans in 1907-08. The primary contingencies involved a distant/observational blockade or an offensive Baltic descent which ensured the Navy could still pursue a direct campaign against Germany's economic and naval assets. Despite internal dissension, external probes into Admiralty policy, and increased centralisation in strategic matters after 1908. this dual strategy remained in place into the First World War. During the war, operational realities associated with the North Sea stalemate and German submarine depredations, ironically, rejuvenated offensive designs from the 1904-1908 period alongside the stable economic pressure exerted by the distant blockade until 1918. CONTENTS Acknowledgments Ill. Abbreviations V. Maps VII. Introduction 1 Chapter One The Naval Intelligence Department, Naval History. and 6 Admiralty War Planning, 1887-1904 Chapter Two Early Planning Against Gennany. 1902-1906 49 Chapter Three The Scandinavian Dimension and War Planning, 1906-1907 88 Chapter Four War Planning, 1908-1 909 126 Chapter Five Probes into Admiralty Planning, 1908-1909 166 Chapter Six The Solidification of a Dual Strategy, 1911-1914 192 Chapter Seven Offensive Planning and Operational Realities, 1914-1918 230 Conclusion 272 Appendices 285 Archival Sources, Government Publications, and Papers 287 Published Sources and Articles 292 Ill. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This interpretation of the Royal Navy's late Victorian-Edwardian strategic and intellectual development would have not been possible without the support. encouragement, and insight of my supervisor Professor Andrew Lambert, to whom I am deeply indebted. A large portion of the work on this dissertation was completed over distance and at inconvenience to us both. I thank Andrew for his patience. Great appreciation must also be extended to my former MA supervisor, the late Professor Ivo N. Lambi, from the University of Saskatchewan. The latter helped start me on this journey while the former abetted its completion. A special thank you is also extended to my viva examiners Professors David French and Thomas Otte for their insights, suggestions, and advice. Without the assistance and advise of many archivists and archival staffs, the research for this foray into British naval planning would not have occurred. I therefore extend my appreciation to the following: the directors, archivists, and staff ofthe Public Record Office, Kew Gardens; the archival and library staff of the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, with a special thanks to Clive Powell, Allen Giddings, and Ms. Jenny Hill; the staff of the Brass Foundry, Woolwich for their aid with the Admiralty Ship Covers; Ms. Jenny Wraight and the staff of the Naval Library Ministry of Defense; the Keepers and staff of the Churchill College Archives Centre. Cambridge for their earlier assistance during my first research trip to England in 1995; the staff of the British Library Manuscripts Division; the archivists and staff of the Imperial War Museum, Manuscripts Department; the librarians and staff of the Royal United Service Institution; and last, but not least, the archivists and staff of the Liddell­ Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College London. For even being given the privilege to work on this dissertation, I am very appreciative to the War Studies Department, King's College, and the University of London, especially sponsoring me for the Overseas Research Studentship which made my study in England possible. I IV. hope this dissertation, to some degree, compensates for their generosity. Since no one working on so personal a project ever really does so alone, the feedback and support of colleagues and friends is of inestimable value. I would thus like to extend a heartfelt thank you to the following who assisted me in so many different ways: Georgia Arena; Drew Bell; Warwick Brown; Professor Christopher Dandeker; Professor Michael Dockrill; Claudia Fernandez; Howard Fuller; Tony and Selena Goliath; Lieutenant Peter Halverson, USN; Hanif Hemani; Geraint "Taff' Hughes; Professor Man Kam Leung; Walter Leis; Lisa Kowalsky; Ilias Kremedas; Scott and Eva McIntyre; James McKay; Farrell Meszaros; Garnet Michayluk; Trent Mitchell; Jason "Cosmo" Sharp; Blair Sloan; Professor Johanna Spear; Maria Vlahou; and Alex Woolridge. A special thank you must also be extended to Mr. Peter Unger of Digital Planimetrics for the map of the English ChannellFrench northern bases. Personally, showing appreciation for the support and love of my parents, sister, "Duke", and "Mick", can never adequately expressed in words. I hope that all they endured with me over the years this dissertation was being formulated is somehow compensated for in its completion and indicative of how much they are truly owed. I alone am responsible for any errors or omissions in this work. v. ABBREVIATIONS ADOD Assistant Director Operations (Admiralty WarS taff, 191 1-18) ADNI Assistant Director Naval Intelligence Department BD G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley (eds.), British Documents on the Origins of the War. BEF British Expeditionary Force BS Battle Squadron C-in-C Commander in Chief Channel Channel Fleet CID Committee of Imperial Defence CIGS Chief of the Imperial General Staff Commodore (D) Officer Commanding Destroyer Flotillas Commodore (S) Officer Commanding Submarine Flotillas Commodore (T) Officer Commanding Torpedo (Boat) Flotillas COS Chief of the Admiralty War Staff, 1912-17 DID Director Intelligence Division (Admiralty War Staff, 1911-18) DMO Director of Military Operations (Imperial General Staff) DNB Dictionary ofNational Biography DNC Director of Naval Construction DNI Director of Naval Intelligence DNM Director of Naval Mobilisation (Navy War Council, 1909-1911) DNO Director of Naval Ordnance DOD Director Operations Division (Admiralty War Staff, 1911-18) FDSF Arthur 1. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 5 Volumes FGDN Arthur 1. Marder (ed) Fear God and Dreadnought, 3 Volumes FIC Foreign Intelligence Committee, 1885-1887 VI. ABBREVIATIONS cont. HMS HislHer Majesty's Ship HMSO HislHer Majesty's Stationary Office Home Home Fleet IWM Imperial War Museum JRUSI Journal of the Royal United Service Institution Naval Staff Naval Staff Monograph (Historical), The Naval Staffa/the Admiralty, 1929, Naval Library Ministry of Defense. NID Naval Intelligence Department NLMD Naval Library, Ministry of Defense NMM National Maritime Museum NRS Navy Records Society PRO Public Records Office RM Royal Marines RMA Royal Marine Artillery RUSI Royal United Service Institution INTRODUCTION Surveys of late Victorian and Edwardian naval policy have examined Britain's rivalry