Pathway(s) to Inclusive Development in Ghana: Oil, Subnational-National Power Relations and Ideas A thesis submitted to the University of Manchester for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Faculty of Humanities 2016 Emmanuel Pumpuni Asante School of Environment, Education and Development Table of Contents List of Tables 7 List of Figures 7 List of Diagrams 7 List of Appendices 7 List of Abbreviations 8 Abstract 10 Declaration 11 Copyright Statement 12 Acknowledgements and Dedication 13 Contents Chapter 1: Introduction and Background 14 1.1 Introduction 14 1.2 Dominant Explanations of the Resource Curse Phenomenon and its Critique 18 1.3 Going Beyond Institutions Matter: The Emerging Political Settlements Literature 20 1.3.1 Gaps in the Political Settlements Approach 23 1.3.2 Beyond Politics Matters for Institutions: The Role of Subnational Politics in Shaping Natural Resource Governance 24 1.4 Research Aims and Questions 26 1.5 The Case of Ghana 27 1.5.1 Ghana: A Brief Profile 27 1.5.2 Ghana as a Good Case Study 29 1.5.3 Ghana: The Emerging Governance of the Oil and Gas Sector 31 1.6 Towards a Conceptual Framework for Analysing the Relationship between Natural Resource Extraction, Subnational-National Power Relations, Ideas and Inclusive Development 36 1.7 Thesis Structure 37 Chapter 2: Constructing Pathway(s) to Natural Resource-Led Inclusive Development: The Role of Subnational-National Political Dynamics and Ideas 41 2.1 Introduction 41 2 2.2 The Evolution of the Resource Curse Thesis and its Policy Implications 42 2.2.1 Institutionalist and State-Centred Approaches to the Resource Curse and the Impact on Mitigation Strategies 43 2.3 Going Beyond ‘Institutions Matter’: The Converging Literature on the Importance of Politics 49 2.3.1 Power Relations and the Politics of Inclusive Development 55 2.4 The Importance of Subnational-National Power Relations and Ideas in Explaining Institutional and Development Outcomes 56 2.4.1 Subnational – National Power Relations and Elite Decision-Making 57 2.4.2 Subnational-National Power Relations in the Context of the Resource Curse 59 2.5 Problematising Interests: The Role of Ideas 60 2.5.1 Ideas and Resource Curse Explanations 63 2.6 A Conceptual Framework for Analysing the Relationship between Natural Resource Extraction, Subnational-National Power Relations, Ideas and Inclusive Development 65 2.6.1 Constituting and Reproducing Power and Power Relations at Subnational Level 68 2.6.2 Incorporating Ideas 73 2.6.3 The Mediating Role of Institutions 74 2.6.4 Pathway from Subnational Politics to National Politics to Inclusive Development at the Discovery of Oil 75 2.7 Research Design and Methodology 79 2.7.1 Philosophical Foundation of the Research Study 80 2.7.2 Methods 81 2.7.3 Data Collection 82 2.7.4 Analysis 84 2.8 Conclusion 85 Chapter 3: The Evolution of Ghana’s Competitive Clientelist Political Settlement before Oil 86 3.1 Introduction 86 3.2 Ghana: A Predominant Authoritarian Political Settlement (1902-1981) 88 3.2.1 An Authoritarian Coalition under Colonial Rule 88 3.2.2 Competitive Clientelism in the Shadow of Colonial Rule 92 3.2.3 A Vulnerable Authoritarian Coalition under Nkrumah and the CPP 97 .3.2.4 The Military Years: In Search of a Stable Political Settlement 100 3.3 The Contemporary Political Settlement of Ghana: From Authoritarian to Competitive Clientelism 109 3.3.1 Authoritarian Rule under the PNDC (1982-1992) 110 3.3.2 Competitive Clientelism before Oil: 1993-2007 115 3 3.4 Conclusion 123 Chapter 4: Western Chiefs Demand Ten Percent (10%) of Oil Revenues 125 4.1 Introduction 125 4.1.1 The Political Configuration of the Western Region at the Discovery of Oil 126 4.2 The Ten Percent Case: Background 131 4.3 Tracing the Subnational Political Determinants of Institutions 140 4.4 Accounting for Ideas in the ‘Ten Percent’ Case 152 4.5 Ruling Elite Responses and Implications for the Politics of Inclusive Development 164 Chapter 5: Tussle over the Location of Ghana’s Gas Processing Plant 167 5.1 Introduction 167 5.2 Jomoro Past and Present 169 5.3 Background: An ‘Osagyefo Barge’ Deja Vu 171 5.4 The Political and Ideational Underpinnings of the Successful Enforcement of the Relocation Decision 178 5.4.1 Bargaining as ‘Moderate Opponents’: The Political Configuration of Jomoro 179 5.4.2 Disciplining Lower-level Factions: Convergence of Incentives 186 5.4.3 The Counterintuitive Preference for Formal Institutions amongst Elites 189 5.5 Reimagining Apollonia: The Contradictory Ideas of a ‘United Nzema’ 191 5.6 Implications for Inclusive Development 198 5.7 Conclusion 200 Chapter 6: Oil Revenues and the Politics of Redistribution in Ghana 201 6.1 Introduction 201 6.2 The Legal and Institutional Framework for Allocating Oil Revenues in Ghana 203 6.2.1 The Legal Framework for Petroleum Revenue Management in Ghana 203 6.2.2 The Budgetary Process and Oil Revenue Allocation in Ghana 205 6.3 Patterns of Oil Revenue Distribution 2011-2013 207 4 6.4 Understanding Patterns of Oil Revenues Allocation: The Limits of Alternative Explanations 213 6.4.1 Technical Argument 214 6.4.2 Political Arguments 216 6.4.2.1 The Core/Swing Voter Argument 216 6.4.2.2 Allocation Decisions and the Ethno-Regional Representation of Elites in the Ruling Coalition 218 6.4.3 Chasing ‘Poor’ Voters and Wooing the Opposition: Explaining Patterns of Oil Revenue Distribution under the NDC 222 6.5 Oil Revenue Allocations and the Early Implications for Poverty Reduction and Inequality in Ghana 230 6.6 Conclusion 235 Chapter 7: Conclusions: Subnational-National Politics, Ideas and the Emerging Governance of the Oil and Gas Sector in Ghana 237 7.1 Introduction 237 7.2 Empirical Conclusions 238 7.2.1 The Limited Holding Power of Subnational Elites in the Oil Region and the Effect on Political Bargaining Outcomes 238 7.2.2 Political Bargaining Over Oil has Deepened the Use of Formal Institutions 242 7.2.3 Changing Coalition Dynamics within Ghana’s Political Settlement Re-Shaping Political Incentives for Governing Oil 244 7.3 Theoretical Implications 246 7.3.1 Implications for the Resource Curse Thesis 246 7.3.2 Implications for Political Settlement 247 7.3.4 The Political Settlement-Based Framework Revisited 251 Chapter 8: Policy Implications 254 8.1 Introduction 254 8.2 Implications for Hydrocarbon Resource Policy in New Resource-Rich Countries 254 8.2.1 Managing Claims of the Oil Producing Region 255 8.2.2 Transformation versus Redistribution Development Agenda 256 8.3 Implications for the Governance of Hydrocarbons and Inclusive Development in Ghana 258 8.3.1 Managing Claims of the Western Region and other Resource Producing Regions in Ghana 258 8.3.2 The Politics of Oil Revenue Allocation in Ghana 261 5 8.4 Further Research 263 References 266 Appendices 281 Final word count (including footnotes and abstract): 80,662. 6 List of Tables Table 1: Comparison between the Subnational Political Configuration of the Western Region and Jomoro District Table 2: Captured Timeline for Budget Preparation for the 2012 Budget Table 3: Distribution of Power Relative to Population Share and the Representation Index 2011-2013 Table 4: Electoral Importance of Regions to NDC and NPP in Ghana List of Figures Figure 1: A Schematic Representation of the Oil Revenue Disbursement Formula in Ghana Figure 2: Distribution of ABFA to Priority Areas 2011-2013 Figure 3: Regional Breakdown of ABFA-Funded Projects w/o Gas Project Figure 4: Representation Index for the NDC Coalition 2011-2013 Figure 5: Representation Index and Oil Allocation 2011-2013 Figure 6: NDC 2012 Presidential Election Vote Share in Oil Revenue Beneficiary Constituencies Figure 7: Poverty Incidence and Oil Allocations List of Diagrams Diagram A: Framework for Analysing Natural Resources, Subnational-National Power Relations, Ideas and the Implications for Inclusive Development Diagram B: Revised Framework for Analysing Natural Resources, Subnational-National Power Relations, Ideas and the Implications for Inclusive Development List of Appendices Appendix 1: List of Interviewees Appendix 2: Interview Guide Appendix 3: Oil Revenue Allocation to Roads Sector in Ashanti Region Appendix 4: List of Political Office Holders 2011-2013 7 List of Abbreviations ABFA Annual Budget Funding Amount ACEP African Centre for Energy Policy AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council APRS Aborigines Rights Protection Society BBC British Broadcasting Corporation CCPS Competitive Clientelist Political Settlement CDB China Development Bank CDR Committees for the Defence of the Revolution CDS Chief of Defence Staff CEPA Centre for Economic Policy Analysis CMB Cocoa Marketing Board CPC Cocoa Purchasing Company CPP Convention Peoples Party CSO Civil Society Organisation CYO Committee of Youth Organisations DACF District Assembly Common Fund DCE District Chief Executive DFID Department for International Development DFP Democratic Freedom Party ECG Electoral Commission of Ghana EITI Extractives Industry Transparency Initiative EMT Economic Management Team ERP Economic Recovery Programme EU European Union FAR Financial Administration Regulations GACC Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition GCP Ghana Congress Party GDP Gross Domestic Product GLSS Ghana Living Standards Survey GNA Ghana News Agency GNPC Ghana National Petroleum Corporation GoG Government of Ghana GSGDA Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda GSS Ghana Statistical Service HDI Human Development Index IMF International Monetary Fund IOC International Oil Company ISODEC Integrated Social Development Center LAO Limited Access Orders LOGODEP Local