Intertheoretic Relations in Context: Details, Purpose, and Practice Joseph T. Ricci A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Washington 2015 Reading Committee: Andrea Woody, Chair Arthur Fine John Manchak Alison Wylie Program Authorized to Offer Degree: Philosophy © Copyright 2015 Joseph T. Ricci Abstract Intertheoretic Relations in Context: Details, Purpose, and Practice Joseph T. Ricci Chair of the Supervisory Committee: Andrea Woody, Associate Professor Philosophy An intertheory comparison should be assessed with regards to what goals it seeks to accomplish. Traditionally reductions have sought to establish ontological primacy, and also to have the reducing theory explain features of the reduced. From a functionalist perspective, this dissertation assesses three major results: a reduction of general relativistic spacetimes to a Newtonian gravitational structure, a theory comparison that employs both wave and ray optics, and a reduction that limits the momentum equation of special relativity to the classical momentum equation. These case-studies reveal evidence of types of goals given little discussion in existing literature on theory reduction. I find that successional reductions can (i) provide an explanation of (aspects of) the succeeded theory by the successor; (ii) provide an explanation of the theories’ successes/failures, as well as explaining details of the progress, both historical and conceptual, from the succeeded theory to the successor; (iii) transfer confidence to the successor from the succeeded theory; and (iv) delimit a range of applicability for the succeeded theory. Recognizing these new goals provides insight for analysis of the intertheoretic activity of scientists, as well as the work of philosophers that assess how scientific theories relate to one another. Table of Contents Acknowledgements................................................................................................................ i Dedication............................................................................................................................. iii General Introduction............................................................................................................. 1 Chapter 1 - Capturing Reduction by Models: Early Attempts to Compare Theories 1.0 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Three Historical Models of Reduction............................................................................ 6 1.1.1 Nagel’s Deductive Model................................................................................. 7 1.1.2 Kemeny and Oppenheim’s Disjoint-Explanation Model................................. 15 1.1.3 Suppes’s Semantic-Isomorphism Model.......................................................... 26 1.2 Goals and Aims of Philosophical Models of Reduction................................................. 32 1.2.1 Two Traditional Goals of Reduction................................................................ 32 1.2.2 Relata and Intention.......................................................................................... 34 1.3 Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 36 Chapter 2 - Analogous Theories: General Relativity and Newtonian Mechanics 2.0 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 37 2.1 The Schaffner Model....................................................................................................... 38 2.1.1 The New Wave Model...................................................................................... 42 2.2 Trautman’s Reduction..................................................................................................... 48 2.2.1 Traditional Epistemic Goals: Theory Explaining Theory................................. 55 2.2.2 Differing Epistemic Goals: Reduction Explaining Scientific Progress............ 57 2.3 Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 60 Chapter 3 - Limits and Approximations: Special Relativity and Classical Mechanics 3.0 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 62 3.1 Nickles’s Two Models for Reduction............................................................................. 63 3.2 The Problem of Limiting c.............................................................................................. 66 3.2.1 Explaining Scientific Progress.......................................................................... 72 3.3 The Problem of Limiting v.............................................................................................. 73 3.3.1 Success and Context......................................................................................... 76 3.3.2 Transference of Confidence............................................................................. 81 3.4 The Problem of Limiting (v/c)2....................................................................................... 83 3.4.1 Establishing Past Theories and Applicability................................................... 89 3.4.2 Recasting Prior Successes................................................................................. 92 3.5 Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 95 Chapter 4 - Intra-level Relations: Wave Optics and Ray Optics 4.0 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 96 4.1 Batterman and Limiting................................................................................................... 97 4.2 Catastrophe Optics........................................................................................................... 99 4.3 Belot’s Ab Initio Objection.............................................................................................. 107 4.4 Batterman’s Contextual Response................................................................................... 111 4.5 Redhead’s Accusation of Reification.............................................................................. 113 4.5.1 Intertheory Comparisons as Scientific Activity................................................ 118 4.6 Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 120 Chapter 5 - Reductive Models, Ordering, and Scientific Structure 5.0 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 123 5.1 Models of Reduction and Three Ordering Relations....................................................... 124 5.1.1 Nagel’s Deductive Model................................................................................. 126 5.1.2 Kemeny and Oppenheim’s Disjoint-Explanation Model................................. 133 5.1.3 Suppes’s Semantic-Isomorphism Model.......................................................... 136 5.1.4 Schaffner’s Model............................................................................................ 138 5.1.5 The New Wave Model...................................................................................... 142 5.2 Orderings of Science........................................................................................................ 147 5.2.1 Reflexivity and Triviality.................................................................................. 148 5.2.2 Symmetry and Equivalence.............................................................................. 151 5.2.3 Transitivity and Succession.............................................................................. 155 5.2.4 Ranking Theories to Make a Structure for Science.......................................... 157 5.3 Conclusion....................................................................................................................... 161 Chapter 6 - Functionalism and Goals 6.0 Introduction..................................................................................................................... 163 6.1 Reasons for Comparing Theories.....................................................................................163 6.1.1 Pluralism and Fundamentalism......................................................................... 168 6.1.2 Aristotelian Dynamics and Newtonian Mechanics........................................... 169 6.2 Scerri’s Assessment of Quantum Chemistry................................................................... 173 6.2.1 The Functionalist Therapy................................................................................ 178 6.3 Contributions and Conclusions........................................................................................ 181 Appendix G Glossary............................................................................................................................. 183 Bibliography B Bibliography....................................................................................................................... 185 Acknowledgements Let