JOURNAL FOR IRANIAN STUDIES Specialized Studies A Peer-Reviewed Quarterly Periodical Journal Year 2, Issue8 , September 2018 ISSUED BY TURKEY’S APPROACH TO IRAN’S SHIA CRESCENT Alberto Gasparetto Ph.D. in Sociology and Political Science, University of Turin, Italy Teaching Assistant in Political Science at the University of Padua, Italy ABSTRACT he Middle East has experienced several critical junctures since King Abdullah of Jordan first warned his Arab Tcounterparts in 2004 about Iran’s design to project abroad its political, religious and military influence. Due to bitter domestic factionalism between President Ahmadinejad and the Rahbar Khamenei, the emergence of a “Shia crescent” was relatively kept under control by rival Arab countries as long as Iran was isolated from international politics. However, the outburst of the Arab Spring in 2011, the ensuing human tragedy in Syria and the sealing of a historical deal on the nuclear issue between Iran and Western powers all signalled that such a prospect would become a major existential threat for them. Journal for Iranian Studies 69 This paper will analyze Turkey’s perceptions and attitudes about Iran’s project to emerge as a dominant player in the Middle East. Drawing on a cognitive model developed within foreign policy analysis (FPA) by Michael Brecher, back in the late 1960s to study Israel’s foreign policy, I argue that Turkey tried to take advantage of Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shia divides to play an active role in Syria and look for “strategic autonomy”. Put it more specifically, Turkey has not been so much disturbed by the widely perceived threat of what has been dubbed as the “Shia crescent”, but rather has learnt how to coexist with it in order to pursue its own national goals. In doing this, I will try to address the long-standing question about which drivers underpin Iran’s foreign policy (whether strategic and pragmatic or religious and ideological), investigate the unclear responses Western powers have delivered to Iran’s moves in the region, and find out which strategic tools Tehran has adopted to achieve its goal, especially benefitting from the Syrian quagmire. Introduction to the FPA model and to the main tenets of Turkey’s foreign policy The value of Michael Brecher’s contribution to FPA is in that it sketches out a very structured model to analyze the foreign policy decision-making of any country by relying on Gabriel Almond and Bingham Powell,(1) David Easton(2) and James Rosenau’s insights(3) about the idea of ”system”. So conceived, a country’s foreign policy can be examined as ”a flow into and out of a network of structures or institutions which perform certain functions and thereby produce decisions. These, in turn, feedback into the system as inputs in a continuous flow of demands on policy.”(4) Decision-makers generally operate within the so-called ”operational environment” that comprises the setting of ten factors or structural conditions which may potentially influence a country’s external behaviour. Such an operational environment can be divided into external and internal and is made up of the following ten variables: global system, subordinate (regional) system, subordinate other, dominant bilateral relation, other bilateral relations, military capability, economic capability, political structure, interest groups, and competing elites. However, Brecher suggests that decision-makers are influenced by a ”psychological environment” too, which comprises of attitudinal prisms and elite images. The former refers to the lenses through which any individual sees and interprets the outside world; it depends on the latter which is constituted by the set of beliefs or perceptions any human being keeps in mind about the outside reality. Not only such beliefs or world visions affect how decision- makers interpret the world but they also have an influence on how decision-makers make decisions. A researcher is tasked with analyzing the specific context in which the decision is taken. By reviewing a lot of speeches, interviews and declarations taken from official websites or newspapers, his job consists in understanding what decision-makers think and why they take a specific decision rather than another one. The purpose is to catch what are the main factors affecting a country’s decision-making processes – whether material, psychological or a combination of them both. That’s exactly what we intend to do in the below-presented study. Due to reasons of simplicity and space, the focus here will chiefly be on the main Turkish decision-makers of the past years, i.e., Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current President, and Mevlut Cavusoglu, the current (2014-) Minister of Foreign Affairs. Particularly, investigating the main tenets of Turkey’s foreign policy over the years by drawing on Brecher’s model. First, the operational environment. Historically speaking, the most important of them is Turkey’s NATO membership. In 1952 Ankara joined the Western camp in response to the Soviet threat coming from the north.(5) A second one is represented by the European Union when Turkey officially applied for full membership in the late 1980s. The military is another important material factor shaping not only Turkey’s foreign policy but also its domestic one, as a consequence of its self-appointed role as constitutional-guarantor and custodian of Turkey’s Republican ”Kemalist” values from any threat (whether internal or external).(6) A fourth one 70 Journal for Iranian Studies º Year 2, Issue 8, September 2018 Turkey’s Approach to Iran’s Shia Crescent is the economy, especially based on the assumption that Turkey is an energy-thirsty country that heavily relies on hydrocarbon imports.(7) This driver, has become the most important one under Erdogan’s rule. It first explains the rise of a conservative bourgeois middle class and then the increasing legitimacy of Erdogan’s AK Party itself.(8) It also entails a huge element of discontinuity with reference to the pre-coup (1980) era, when Turkey was committed to an ISI (import substitution industrialization) economic model based on replacing trading relations with huge domestic production.(9) Moreover, such an economic philosophy mirrored Turkey’s official foreign policy line as late as the 1970s to avoid interference in regional affairs as much as possible. Secondly, the psychological environment. The main element which has been affecting the Turkish establishment can be summed up in the concept of ”Sèvres syndrome”. Dating back to the perceived European treason after WWI, when the Ottoman Empire was carved up, it specifically ”refers to those individuals, groups or institutions in Turkey who interpret all public interactions – domestic and foreign – through a framework of fear and anxiety over the possible annihilation, abandonment or betrayal of the Turkish state by the West”(10). Such a fear of dismemberment has overwhelmingly come under light in the wake of the Syrian uprising, as a Pavlovian conditioning due to the reactivation of the Kurdish guerrilla’s along the Turkish- Syrian border. Historical patterns of Turkey-Iran bilateral relations Historically speaking, Turkey-Iran relations have been characterized by both a strong geopolitical rivalry and a high level of economic cooperation especially in the energy sector, at least considering the past decades.(11) Upon a closer examination, increasing economic cooperation, especially on energy, and strengthened commercial ties have helped soften their political, ideological and even military competition on the regional system alike. This, in turn, has helped in improving bilateral relations, or at least finding strategic compromises, especially against the background of the Syrian war. From a realist perspective, Turkey and Iran can be considered as regional middle powers seeking regional hegemony and are prone to engage in reciprocal skirmishes as far as their respective power projections could collide with each other’s strategic interests. According to Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, who adopted a realist perspective to define the Syria-Iran alliance, regional middle powers can be defined as states which may rank as no more than middle powers in the global system but which are key actors in their regional systems. While the goals and geographical range of regional powers are more modest than those of great powers and centre on regional politics, their regional behaviour, determined by similar systemic rules, is likely to approximate that of larger powers in playing the “realist” game. They are distinguishable from lesser regional powers by their assertion of regional leadership in the name of more general regional interests, by their centrality to the regional power balance, their regional spheres of influence and by their ability, from a credible deterrent capacity, to resist a coalition of other regional states against them. Finally, such powers generally have leaders enjoying more than local stature and some extra-regional influence”(12). Based, among others, on Eduard Jordaan distinction between established middle powers and emerging middle powers,(13) Onis and Kutlay specifically include Turkey in the latter group(14). Indeed only recently Turkey has experienced a process of transition to liberal democracy and integration into the international political economy, but is still struggling to become a consolidated and successful “role model” for its regional system. Emerging middle powers in fact ”face the dilemma that they are both critical of the existing liberal order dominated by the established Western powers and, at the same time, have an incentive to be part of an international order based on liberal norms.”(15) Such a dichotomy properly mirrors the case of a country like Turkey which has been anchored to a Journal for Iranian Studies 71 Western military alliance, while belonging to a culturally different regional system. The basic ambiguity of such a case strongly emerged after the end of the Cold War, when Turkey’s leeway on the global scene was significantly augmented as a consequence of the relative decline in US hegemony.