Physicalism Cartesian dualism chimes with lots of our intuitions about our minds. In particular, the view that our minds are importantly But what if there is only one Cartesian Dualism different from our bodies forms a substance—that is, physical central tenet in many world substance? This view has come religions, and the thought that to be known as physicalism, and Cartesian dualism is the view we are meat through and one interesting formulation of it that minds are made of a through is, for many, an is the identity theory. According substance which is completely unsettling one. The mind, that to the identity theory, our mental different from the stuff that our part of us which thinks, loves states are identical with physical bodies are made of. This view and creates, seems so different states. The example most loved has come to be known as from anything else in the world by philosophers is that the Cartesian dualism (or ‘substance that it is not unreasonable to mental state of pain is identical dualism’) after its most famous think that this is because it is with the activity of C-fibers in the proponent, the French made of something entirely brain. philosopher René Descartes different. (1596-1650). It is dualistic because it posits two kinds of Here is one of Descartes’ Functionalism substances: material substances arguments for his dualism: occupy a certain amount of space (and our bodies and everything else in the world are Premise 1: I can doubt the composed of them), while existence of my body. immaterial substances do not Premise 2: I cannot doubt the occupy any space. According to existence of my thoughts. Cartesian dualism, minds are Conclusion: Therefore my mind made of an immaterial ‘thinking must be made from something substance which does not fundamentally different from occupy space. As a consequence, anything else around me. But now imagine that we the part of me that thinks exists discovered some Martians, independently of my body. whose brains are made up a completely different substance, say silicon. The identity theory Machines may have minds... INTRODUCTION TO would claim that those Martians cannot feel pain even if every PHILOSOPHY MOOC time they undergo some physical harm they behave in the exact same way we behave when we are in pain. To solve this problem, if it is a problem, we must admit that mental states, just as many other From a functionalist point of view our things in the world, are multiply minds are information processing realizable. Think about chairs; machines just like computers are: they they may be green, red, black take information provided by our senses and so on; they may be made out and other mental states which we have, of wood or metal; and they may What is it to have process it, and produce new behaviors have one or many legs. Still, a mind? however, even if chairs may be and mental states. realized in several ways, all of them count as chairs. What do all these things have in common? What is it to have a The answer is simple: They share Which of the three views about the mind? I am certain a common function, which is that they facilitate sitting in an mind do you find most intuitive and that I have a mind, upright position, while why? and I am certain that supporting one’s back. Accordingly, functionalists How plausible is Descartes’ argument tennis balls do not about the mind claim that trying for substance dualism? have minds, but what to give an account of mental If our minds are immaterial, how do states in terms of what they are marks the difference? made of is like trying to explain they interact with our material bodies Is it possible for robots what a chair is in terms of what to produce action? it is made of. In other words, we to have minds? should not identify mental states Do only humans have minds? What by what they are made of, but about animals, or possibly Martians? rather by what they do. If we accept that minds are computing If we go this way, however, an machines, then how complex does an interesting possibility opens up: information-processing system need to be for it to count as a mind? .