The Penobscot Expedition: A Tale of Two Indicted Patriots Louis Arthur Norton La plus grande opération amphibie américaine pendant la guerre révolutionnaire était l'expédition de Penobscot de 1779 qui a souffert une défaite éblouissante aux mains des forces britaniques. Le capitaine Dudley Saltonstall de la marine continentale, commandant de l'expédition, et le lieutenant colonel Paul Revere, qui a commandé l'artillerie de la milice du Massachusetts, étaient traduits en conseil de guerre par une articulation de faits de mauvaise conduite . Bien que la renommée de Revere n'est guère associée avec son service militaire, cet incident a souillé sa carrière légendaire. Cet article évalue les capacités de commande des deux hommes, la composition des forces américaines, les problèmes de maniment des navires pendant la bataille, et les implications politiques des conséquences de la bataille. Enfin, il compare l'application de la justice militaire pendant la guerre révolutionnaire aux normes actuelles. In the fall of 1779 Captain Dudley Saltonstall of the Continental Navy and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Revere of the Massachusetts militia were court-martialled because of their alleged misconduct during the Penobscot Expedition, the largest American amphibious operation of the Revolutionary War and a dismal defeat. Although Revere’s fame did not come from his military service, this incident stained his legendary career. The following essay attempts to assess the leadership abilities of both men, the composition of the American forces, the problems of ship handling at the battle, and the political implications of the battle’s aftermath. Finally it compares the application of military justice during the Revolutionary War to present-day standards. The Penobscot River is a major waterway, into which empty nearly 300 lakes and streams of central Maine (the colonial Eastern Province of Massachusetts). Near the river’s mouth, a peninsula shaped like an inverted claw hammer borders its eastern bank. Only about a mile-and-a-half wide and about three-quarters of a mile in length, this headland is connected to the main peninsula to the north by a narrow salt-marsh neck. The peninsula’s terrain slopes sharply upward from a small harbour on its southern edge. According to a current contour survey chart from the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Association, from the “hammerhead” western shore, a steep bluff rises to a height of 220 feet forming a dog-bone shaped knob that descends to about 180 feet to the east. Most The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord, XVI No. 4, (October 2006), 1-28 1 2 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord historians called this place Bagaduce (now Castine).1 Bagaduce would change hands among the French, British, Dutch, and Americans six times following its charting by Samuel de Champlain in 1612. The tiny and isolated Bagaduce peninsula became an important maritime plait of economic and political advantages. The Continental Congress gambled that the British navy could not significantly affect the relatively healthy American economy. The Congress also understood that a revolution could not successfully challenge the British without an American naval or privateer presence, but this presence could exact a heavy price. The King did not recognize the independence of the United Colonies; thus an attack on a British ship by a non-belligerent community was, by admiralty law, an act of piracy. By early 1779, New England privateers were beginning to take a toll on British shipping sailing the New York – Halifax route. This harassment disrupted military supply lines and particularly commerce, driving up insurance rates. As a defensive move, the British were forced to utilize a convoy system to protect their vessels. In London, Undersecretary of State for the Colonies Henry Knox also noted that the eastern province of Massachusetts Bay had a relatively small isolated population who were not as ardently rebellious as the Boston revolutionaries. Some might assist the British in establishing a suitable naval base for support of these convoys. A naval installation in Maine would command the Bay of Fundy and prevent any American excursions into what is now New Brunswick. Of immediate military strategic value was the need to command the northern Maine coast and deny the rebels access to forests that furnished naval timber, building lumber, fuel, and a river-highway into the lands of north-central Maine. In the longer term, this territory could serve as a nucleus for a new province for Tories fleeing the colonies and other refugees. The British contemplated splitting a portion of the Massachusetts Bay Colony into a Crown Province called "New Ireland" that would cover north-eastern Maine stretching from the Penobscot to the St. Croix Rivers. The establishment of a fort at the mouth of the Penobscot would give them a strategic advantage.2 As a counter-response to this localized British hegemony, the General Court of Massachusetts ordered the formation of the Penobscot Expedition, the largest American amphibious operation undertaken during the Revolutionary War. Until the summer of 1779 the defence of the Massachusetts coast was left to the seacoast merchant 1 There are many spelling variations in the historical record of this peninsula such as Pentagöet, Magabagaduce, Majabigwaduce, Majorbagwayduce, Majibagquiaduce, Maja Biguyduce, Maj Bigueduce, Machebiggaduce, and Bagadoose. 2Chester B. Kevitt, General Solomon Lovell and the Penobscot Expedition, 1779 (Weymouth, MA: Weymouth Historical Commission and C.B. Kevitt, 1976), 174-5. In July 1780 Dr. John Calef went to England as agent for the Loyalists in Penobscot with a memorial to the King requesting that this district be severed from the Province of Massachusetts Bay. Calef actively supported the formation of New Ireland, extolling the virtues of a tract of land much like a modern developer selling a project. The petition plan was drawn up and approved by the Cabinet in August 1780 and was then signed by the King. In spite of Cabinet approval, the King's signature, and Calef's efforts, the project failed because of the economic pressures brought about by the Revolution. The Penobscot Expedition 3 establishment, coastal traders and fishermen, and coastal militia artillery batteries. The policy of the Massachusetts Board of War was to furnish vessels to interdict British warships and merchantmen and to provide letters-of-marque. Sending armed vessels to capture prizes was advantageous and profitable to the state and, indeed, a sensible enterprise for the small Revolutionary fleets. The policy of the Massachusetts Board of War was initially successful, but unfortunately the American vessels cruising near the Massachusetts coast were also vulnerable and increasingly fell to the better-armed ships of the enemy. In April 1779 the Board of War changed their policy concluding that the fleet might also be employed to defend the harbours and seacoasts "which have been left in such an unguarded and defenceless Situation that where we have taken one Vessel of the Enemy their small privateers out of New York have taken ten from us."3 During the first half of 1779 British vessels were particularly destructive to New England trade and shipping. On 9 June the Admiralty’s representative at Halifax ordered the occupation of Bagaduce.4 On 12 June 1779, the British landed the 74th and 82nd regiments, in total 640 men under the command of Brigadier General Francis McLean, at the peninsula to build a fort and gain the trust of any nearby loyalists. Captain Henry Mowat, who knew the coast of Maine well, was placed in command of the Albany (14 guns), North (14 guns), and Nautilus (16 guns). This naval contingent was stationed to protect the fort during the battlement’s construction. The citizens of Boston learned about the British landings in a letter dated 18 June from the Reverend John Murray of Georgetown in Lincoln County, Maine. Other letters from concerned Maine citizens followed, confirming that the British had landed a substantial force,. The General Court of Massachusetts saw this incursion as a threat to the colony’s (state’s) agriculture, fisheries, coastal trade, and particularly the vital source of tall pines essential for masts for shipbuilding. Without consultation of Continental authorities, in late June the General Court ordered the Board of War to engage as many armed vessels as could be procured on short notice. The vessel owners that complied were asked to make preparations to sail against the British at Bagaduce as soon as possible. In addition, the General Court authorized the Board of War to impress both vessels and sailors if need be, promising fair compensation for all losses of whatever kind. The seamen were guaranteed the same pay and allowances as those under Continental service. Sensing the inadequacy of leadership in the state’s navy or as a calculated hedge to shift blame in the case of failure, the usually independent General Court of Massachusetts appealed directly to the Eastern Department of the Continental Navy Board for assistance. The Navy Board responded by placing three Continental ships, the frigate Warren (32 guns), sloop Providence (12 guns), and brig Diligent (14 guns) at the disposal of the state. Captain Dudley Saltonstall, on duty in nearby Connecticut and second in seniority on the list of Continental navy captains, would fly the broad pennant of commodore of the newly assembled fleet. 3 Journals of Massachusetts House of Representatives, 7 April 1779. 4 James Sullivan to John Sullivan, 30 August 1779 in Amory, Thomas Coffin, Life of James Sullivan: with selections from his writings, Vol. 2 (Boston: Phillips, Sampson and company, 1859), 376-78, James Sullivan stated that, the British occupation of Bagaduce greatly alarmed Boston and neighbouring seaports because of the prospect of a scarcity of timber. 4 The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord Figure 1: The map of the Penobscot Bay used by Saltonstall for the start of the expedition.