Knowledge and Social Imagery Knowledge and Social Imagery Second Edition David Bloor ~ ~ The University of Chicago Press Chicago and London DAVID BLOOR, one of the founders of the "strong programme" at the University of Edinburgh Science Studies Unit, is the author of Wittgrnstei?l and Social Scirnce. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637 The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London © 1976, 1991 by David Bloor All rights reserved Published 1991 Printed in the United States of America 999897969594939291 654321 ISBN 0-226-06096-9 (cloth) ISBN 0-226-06097-7 (pbk.) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bloor, David Knowledge and social imagery I David Bloor. - 2nd ed. p. em. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Knowledge, Sociology of. 2. Science­ Philosophy 3. Mathematics-Philosophy. I. Title. BD175.B57 1991 91-9141 306. 4'2-dclO CIP @The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences-Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984 For Max Bloor Contents Preface to the Second Edition ( 1991) ix Acknowledgments xi The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge 3 The Strong Programme 5 The Autonomy of Knowledge 8 The Argument from Empiricism 13 The Argument from Self-Refutation 17 The Argument from Future Knowledge 18 2 Sense Experience, Materialism and Truth 24 The Reliability of Sense Experience 25 Experience and Belief 31 Materialism and Sociological Explanation 33 Truth, Correspondence and Convention 37 3 Sources of Resistance to the Strong Programme 46 A Durkheimean Approach to Science 47 Society and Knowledge 50 4 Knowledge and Sociallmagery: A Case Study 55 The Popper-Kuhn Debate 55 Enlightenment Versus Romantic Ideologies 62 The Historical Location of the Ideologies 65 The Link between Epistemological and Ideological Debates 75 vii viii Contents Another Variable, Knowledge under Threat 76 The Lesson to Be Learned 79 5 A Naturalistic Approach to Mathematics 84 The Standard Experience of Mathematics 85 ]. S. Mill's Theory of Mathematics 87 Frege's Criticisms of Mill 92 Frege's Definition of Objectivity Accepted, But What Satisfies This Definition? 97 Mill's Theory Modified by Sociological Factors 99 Summary and Conclusion 104 6 Can There Be an Alternative Mathematics? 107 What Would an Alternative Mathematics Look Like? 108 Is 'One' a Number? 110 Pythagorean and Platonic Number 118 The Metaphysics of Root Two 122 lnfinitesimals 125 Conclusion 129 7 Negotiation in Logical and Mathematical Thought 131 Lord Mansfield's Advice 132 Paradoxes of the Infinite 135 Azande Logic and Western Science 138 The Negotiation of a Proof in Mathematics 146 8 Conclusion: Where Do We Stand? 157 Afterword: Attacks on the Strong Programme 163 How Not to Attack the Strong Programme 163 Covariance, Causality and Cognitive Science 165 The Ultimate Refutation of Interest Explanations 170 The Charge of Idealism 173 Symmetry Lost and Symmetry Regained 175 Mathematics and the Realm of Necessity 179 Conclusion: Science and Heresy 183 Bibliography 187 Index 197 Preface to the Second Edition ( 1991) The second edition of 'Knowledge and Social Imagery' has two parts: the text of the first edition plus a new and substantial Afterword in which I reply to critics. I have resisted the temptation to alter the original presentation of the case for the sociology of knowl­ edge, though I have taken the opportunity to correct minor mistakes such as spelling errors. I have also made a few stylistic alterations where the language of the book has become dated. Otherwise the first part is unchanged. As for the second part: attacks by critics have not convinced me of the need to give ground on any matter of sub­ stance. Indeed, their failure to make inroads has reinforced my belief in the value of a naturalistic understanding of knowledge in which. sociology plays a central role. I hope that the arguments I offer in the Afterword show this to be a reasoned and justified response. Because of the volume of the criticism I could not allow myself to follow every twist and turn in the argument. I have therefore restricted the discus­ sion to essentials, and avoided repeating replies that I have given elsewhere. Nevertheless, the topics covered in the Afterword repre­ sent the main areas of dispute in the field. The only exception is that I have left aside the standard objection that a relativist sociology of knowledge is self-refuting. This is discussed in the main body of the text, and the further points that need making seem to me to be cogently expressed in Hesse ( 1980). If I were beginning the book today, I would be able to call on a substantially larger body of empirical work in the historical sociology of knowledge. The main proof of the possibility of the sociology of knowledge is its actuality Shapin's admirable bibliographical essay, History of Science and Its Sociological Reconstructions ( 1982), has ix X Preface established itself as a vital resource and guide for marshalling the em­ pirical basis of the subject. Since that publication the field has be­ come even richer. We now have such impressive scholarly achieve­ ments as Desmond's 'The Politics of Evolution' ( 1989); Rudwick's The Great Devonian Controversy' ( 1985); and Shapin & Schaffer's 'Levia­ than and the Air-Pump' ( 1985). Added to these there have been impor­ tant empirical contributions from sociologists of science themselves, such as: Collins's work on the replication of gravity wave detections ( 1985); Pickering's sociological analysis of elementary particle physics ( 1984); and Pinch's account of the measurement of solar-neutrino flux ( 1986). In the intriguing field of the sociology of mathematics I could now call on Kitcher's powerful historico-philosophical analysis The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge' ( 1984 ); MacKenzie's 'Statistics in Britain, 1865-1930' ( 1981 ); and Richards's 'Mathematical Visions' ( 1988). The cumulative effect of these, and many similar works, has been to alter the terms of the debate. It has tipped it in favour of the strong programme. This is despite inevitable and healthy differences of opinion as well as many unsolved problems. Of course, historical and empirical data alone will never win the day. The complete argument must be developed both empirically and theoretically. This is fully acknowledged by the above authors and is, in various ways, built into their work. I draw attention to this fact in order to justify the treat­ ment offered here. I cannot pretend to offer new case studies, only a determined advocacy of some important theoretical arguments. That there is still the need to do a job of this kind will be apparent to any­ one who studies the philosophical criticisms addressed in the After­ word. Not all independent philosophical assessments of the sociology of knowledge reach negative conclusions. Just occasionally, and in vary­ ing degrees, the opposite is the case, e. g. Gellatly ( 1980); Hesse (1980); Jennings (1984); and Manicas and Rosenberg (1985). Al­ though I am sensible of a debt to all the critics whose attacks have helped draw attention to this work, I am of course particularly grate­ ful to these allies. I must also thank the staff of the University of Chicago Press and their referees for supporting the idea of a second edition, and for their help in preparing it. David Bloor Science Studies Unit Edinburgh Acknowledgments I am anxious to express my gratitude to a number of people who kindly read drafts and parts of the book while it was in preparation. These are Barry Barnes, Celia Bloor, David Edge, Don­ ald MacKenzie, Martin Rudwick and Steven Shapin. In all cases I have greatly benefited from their comments and criticisms. My help­ ful critics have not always agreed with what I have said and so I must stress that they are in no way responsible for the final outcome. Per­ haps I would have been wise to make more extensive alterations in the light of their comments than I sometimes did. It is only right that I single out of this list one of my colleagues at the Science Studies Unit, Barry Barnes. This is in order to express the very special debt that I owe to his thinking and work. This is too per­ vasive to be conveyed in footnotes, but is nevertheless keenly felt. Similarly, rather than make repeated references to his book 'Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory' ( 1974) I hope that a general ac­ knowledgment wifl suffice. Certainly, anyone interested in the standpoint to be developed in the present book will find its discus­ sions of first-rate importance. Nevertheless, although our two books share a number of important premises they develop quite different themes and press the argument into quite different areas. · I am grateful to the Hutchinson Publishing Group Ltd for permis­ sion to use a diagram from p. 13 of Z. P Dienes's The Power of Mathematics' ( 1964). I must also record my appreciation to the histo­ rians of science whose scholarship I have pillaged to provide myself with examples and illustrations. Frequently I must be using th~ir work in a manner of which they would not approve. xi Knowledge and Social Imagery Chapter One The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Knowledge Can the sociology of knowledge investigate and explain the very content and nature of scientific knowledge? Many sociologists believe that it cannot. They say that knowledge as such, as distinct from the circumstances surrounding its production, is beyond their grasp. They voluntarily limit the scope of their own enquiries. I shall argue that this is a betrayal of their disciplinary standpoint. All knowl­ edge, whether it be in the empirical sciences or even in mathematics, should be treated, through and through, as material for investigation.