University of North Dakota UND Scholarly Commons Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects January 2013 Informal Alliance: Royal Navy And U.s. Navy Co- Operation Against Republican France During The Quasi-War And Wars Of The rF ench Revolution Jon Paul Eclov Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses Recommended Citation Eclov, Jon Paul, "Informal Alliance: Royal Navy And U.s. Navy Co-Operation Against Republican France During The Quasi-War And Wars Of The rF ench Revolution" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. 1417. https://commons.und.edu/theses/1417 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. INFORMAL ALLIANCE: ROYAL NAVY AND U.S. NAVY CO-OPERATION AGAINST REPUBLICAN FRANCE DURING THE QUASI-WAR AND WARS OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION by Jon Paul Eclov Bachelor of Arts, Macalester College, 1979 Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, 1986 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of North Dakota In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Grand Forks, North Dakota August 2013 Copyright 2013 Jon Paul Eclov ii iii PERMISSION Title Informal Alliance: Royal Navy and U.S. Navy Co-operation Against Republican France During The Quasi-War and Wars of The French Revolution Department History Degree Master of Arts In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or in his absence, by the chairperson of the department or the dean of the Graduate School. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis. Jon Paul Eclov July 16, 2013 iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................................................. vi ABSTRACT ...................................................................................................................... vii CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................1 II. BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS ..................................................17 III. TO FOUND A FLEET...............................................................................60 IV. OPERATIONS .........................................................................................105 V. THE RELATIONSHIP TESTED ............................................................139 VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................218 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................229 v ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The author wishes to thank my advisor, Dr. James Mochoruk, for his help, guidance, and patience in seeing this work through to completion. I also wish to thank my committee members, Dr. Ty Reese, and Dr. Eric Burin. I also must acknowledge the huge support provided by my wife and family. vi For Theresa, who was patient ABSTRACT The Quasi-War was an undeclared conflict fought between the young United States of America and the French Republic at sea during the years 1798-1801. It began when the French mounted a guerre de course against the significant American blue-water merchant marine in response to America concluding Jay’s Treaty with Great Britain. At the time, the U.S. had no navy whatsoever with which to combat these French corsairs primarily operating from bases in the West Indies. Seeing there was little hope of immediately ending the matter diplomatically after the infamous XYZ Affair, President John Adams convinced a normally divided Congress to build a small but effective navy. However, the Americans were lacking in needed resources and ordnance to construct and arm a fleet which could keep the sea in the distant Caribbean, which became the primary theatre of war. Fortunately, Great Britain, America’s great trading partner, and ironically her former enemy in the Revolutionary War, was also at war with France in the Wars of the French Revolution. This thesis examines the informal naval alliance which formed between the two former enemies during the Quasi-War. It argues that the British were instrumental in providing the material aid which allowed John Adams to build his new navy, and that the U.S. Navy was in many ways modeled after Britain’s venerable Royal Navy. It also examines the informal naval cooperation which developed between serving units of the two fleets in the West Indies. This impromptu relationship would be tested by ongoing disputes between the United States, namely vii impressment of American seamen, and British seizure of technically neutral, American merchantmen trading to England’s non-French enemies in the islands. Despite these stressors, it would last to the end of the Quasi-War. The work also examines U.S./British naval involvement with Toussaint l’Ouverture on St. Domingue, now known as Haiti. viii CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION In 1798 the United States went to war with France. There was no declaration of war by either side. The war, lasting until 1801, was fought nearly entirely at sea and in the Caribbean. Stranger yet, the U.S. fought against France, its ally in the American Revolutionary War, and alongside Great Britain, its enemy in that same war. This conflict, known to history as the Quasi-War, or Undeclared War, was one of the side shows of the French Revolutionary Wars (1792-1802) which erupted as the crowned heads of Europe reacted to events of the French Revolution, especially, the 1792 deposition and then 1793 regicide of King Louis XVI of France and subsequent execution of his Queen, Marie Antoinette. Although Prussia and Austria had actually gone to war against Revolutionary France in 1792, it was only following the execution of the French royal couple that England prepared for war by issuing the necessary orders to bring the Royal Navy to wartime strength. But the French had not waited for a British declaration of war; they had declared war upon their old foe first. As the years of war ground on, Great Britain and France would remain the only two constant belligerents, splitting Europe into two camps. Even across the Atlantic, the United States reluctantly found itself stuck between the two of them. In 1778, during the darkest days of the American Revolutionary War, France had befriended the infant nation, offering military and financial aid given with the quid pro quo of binding itself to that country in a 1 perpetual treaty of mutual amity and alliance. As to Great Britain, after the Peace of Paris she had resumed her role as America’s greatest trading partner. The Washington Administration sought to steer a neutral course between the French and British Scylla and Charybdis , but the course became ever more treacherous. Finally, friction caused by British commerce restrictions and the consequent seizures of neutral American merchantmen trading to the French, remaining border disputes over British North America, and British sponsored Indian trouble in the western Ohio Territory forced the Administration to treat with the British whatever the consequences. The result was Jay’s Treaty of 1794 ratified in 1796, which left the French feeling betrayed by their “perfidious” ally. The Gallic response was to attack American shipping throughout the world and so teach the Americans the cost of spurning former friends. The Yankee merchant marine was especially vulnerable to such a guerre de course . It was already the second largest in the world after that of Great Britain. It had grown fat carrying the cargoes of both the British and French during the war. And most significantly, U.S. merchantmen sailed unarmed and unprotected by any navy whatsoever. Even a minor sea power, let alone one like France, possessed of the world’s second largest navy and numerous privateers, could menace it. While the French battle fleet, courtesy of the Royal Navy, remained primarily bottled up in its bases at Brest, Rochefort and Toulon, French corsairs operated in ports throughout the globe, preying on Britain’s world-wide commerce. Now the attention of these corsairs turned to American merchantmen as well. Worse, one of the French privateer fleet’s chief theaters of operations was also one of the primary American trading zones, the West Indies. Operating out of Guadeloupe and St. Domingue, these private warriors jumped upon the 2 rich, unarmed American cargo ships plying those waters. The Windward Passage, the primary highway out of the Caribbean, leading between St. Domingue and Cuba, proved especially dangerous for American bottoms. But this danger of French spoliation did not end as ships left the tropics. Corsairs also operated off the U.S. coast with Americans utterly unable to cope with the threat directly outside their harbors. Britain