Thoughts Animals Can TU. Attributhg Beliefs and Describing Content Kewi J. Krein A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Q Copyright by Kevin J. Krein 2001 National Library Bibliothèque nationale 1*1 ofCam& du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et BEbliographic Servicw services bibliographiques YarrY Yom- &?& Namdnmrr The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accordé une licence non exciusive licence allowing the exclusive permettant à la National Library of Canada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or seli reproduire, prêter, dishri'buer ou copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qpi protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts fkom it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission, autorisation. Thoughts AnimaIs Cm Think: Attributhg Beliefs and Describing Content Doctor of Philosophy 200 1 Kevin J. Krein Graduate Department of Philosophy University of Toronto Abstract One of the problems that arises in attempts to attribute thoughts to non-human animals is that is difficult to hdsentences of human language that accurately express the content of those thoughts. 1argue that semantic theories that do not depend on an understanding of propositiond content as being linguistic in nature can provide a helpful perspective fiom which to approach questions about the content of the beliefs of non-Ianguage-using animais, In particular, 1consider Robert Stalnaker's possible worlds semantics and the situation semantics of Jon Barwise and John Peny. I argue that both of these theories provide ways of understanding the content of beIiefs on which it is far more plausible that non-human animals have beliefs than theories that take propositions to be linguistically structureci. I Merargue, however, that Barwise and Peny's account is dtimateIy more he1pfiil than Stainaker's and avoids some significant problems faced by possible worids theories. In my approach to these topics, 1consider the plausibiIity, on various influentid theories of mind, of the idea that animds have beliefs and 1provide an exposition of Jonathan Bennett's account of what types of animal behavior justify the attribution of beliefs. 1conclude by arguing that the combined work of Bennett, Stalnaker, and Barwise and Perry can be used to address a line of reasoning 1refer to as the specificity argument. According to the specificity argument, if an animai cannot express its beliefs in language, it is impossible to attnbute content to any belief one might attrihte to it with enough precision to make sense of claims that the animal has one beIief rather than another. It is then concluded that non-language-using animals do not have beliek 1use the work discussed above to show that the specificity argument does not, by itselc show that non-human animals do not have beliefs. As well, the approach to understanding content that 1consider will be heIpfiiI in considerations of the content of non- language users in general, and is a promishg htstep in the assessrnent of many arguments against the daim that animais have beliefs. Acknowledgements Completing this thesis required slightly more time than most of the people who are close to me expected. in addition, completing it required much of my energy and ôttention. 1 owe much to many people who çupported and encouraged me. 1 could not have finished without their patience and help. 1 would like to thank my supervisor, Ronald de Sousa, who devoted his time, energy and expertise to helping me finish. Professor Bernard Katz offered encouragement at times when 1 needed it. 1 doubt that either one of them know the extent to which they have inspired me as philosophers. 1owe a great debt to Abigail Levin for al1 of her help. Over the past few years, she generously read many cirafts of every part of this thesis and spent hours discussing the philosophical ideas it contains. She ofien had more confidence in me, and the work 1was dohg, than 1 did; 1cannot thank her enough for that. The help and emotional support she provided were invaluable. As well, 1 would like to thank Tony Kostroman and Lucia Dow. The tbree of us began graduate school together and the two of them continue to deeply influence my thinking and approach to philosophical issues. Finally, 1 wish 1 could express the gratitude I feel for the unwavering support, encouragement, and love my parents have provided. Without these things, it is unlikely that 1would have begun graduate work at ail and it is certainiy true that 1 would not have been able to finish it. Table of Contents Chapter One: Might Animals Have Beliefs? Chapter Two: Teleological Explanations and the Attribution of Beliefs 32 Chapter Three: Stalnaker on Possible Worlds and Beliefs Chapter Four: Problems With Possible Worlds Chapter Five: Situation Semantics Chapter Six: The Specificity Problem Works Cited Chapter One Might Animals Bave Beliefs? The question of whether thought depends on language is, and has been, a key issue in the philosophy of mind. This thesis contributes to that debate by providing a close examination of issues relating to problems concerning the accuracy of attributions of beliefs, and more generaIIy thoughts, to non-language-using animals. The bulk of the thesis is a defense of the claim that the content of the beliefs of non- language-users can be accurately known and represented. It is Merargued that once the content of the beliefs of non-language uses is accurately represented, some of the philosophical problems that arise with the atternpt to amibute thoughts to animals can be dealt with. This assumes that we find it at least possible that there are beings that thrnk, but do not have language. Following these inwductory remarks and a short explanation of my terminology, 1 wilI, in the first two chapters, provide an explanation of why one rnight think that animals have thoughts. To this end, 1begin by arguing that some of the theories of mind that are cunently the most well received among philosophes are consistent with the idea that anirnals think f have chosen three infiuentiai conternporary philosophers of mind: John Searle, Jerry Fodor, and Daniel Dennett, whose positions 1will desmie bnefly. 1 point to some criticisms of these positions, but do so in the spirit of clarifying the issues they confiont. My purpose is not to provide in depth cornparisons and criticisms of their theories of mind, but instead, to present their positions in enough detail to illustrate that the 1 hdamental ideas of each present no reasons not to attn'bute thoughs to non-hurnan animais. 1will not attempt to argue for one theory of mind over another in this thesis. That is, I will not attempt to determine what the nature of thought is. Instead, 1 will argue that the claims that 1 make conceming the attribution and content of the beliefs of animals are consistent with generally accepted theories of mind. As well, I will not attempt to incorporate theocies of consciousness in this thesis. Consciousness, it seems to many philosophers, is, to some degree at least, separable fiom intentionality.' If so, then it is possible that some animals are conscious - can experience pain, pleasure and other sensations -but neither think nor have beliefs. I will not attempt to address the question of whether it is possible that one tias beliefs but is not conscious. In Chapter Two 1 will discuss Jonathan Bennett's work on the question of what types of behavior of a non-language-using animal justifies the attribution of belief to it Chapters One and Two establish a starting point for discussion of the difficulties in accurately attributing contenthl beliefs to non-laquage-users. This discussion occupies the rest of the thesis. Chapters Three and Four focus on Robert Stalnaker's theory of propositional content and how it can be used to represent the beliefs of non-hurnan animais. In Chapter Three 1 will begin to expIore the question of how the contents of the beliefs of non-language-using animais can be represented by introducing Stainaker's possible L~yuse of 'consciousness' shouId be understood to foUow Nagel's position that, if a king is conscious then there is something that it is (ike to be that bemg, as presented in "What is it Like to Be a Bat?" The Philosophical Revïew LMCXm,4 (0ctober 1974): 435-50. worlds semantics. 1 argue further that such an account cm be combined with Bennett's work in order to determine if any non-human animals have beliefk. In Chapter Four 1 address some comrnon cnticisms of possible worlds accounts of content. While 1attempt to address criticisms of possible worlds accounts of content in Chaptcr Four, there are, 1 argue, problems with Stalnaker's account that are dealt with better by the situation semantics of Jon Barwise and John Perry. In Chapter Five, 1 discuss these problems and argue that situation semantics will provide the same benefits as possible worlds semantics in representing animal beliefs and wilI avoid many of the theoretical dificulties faced by possible worlds semantics. In Chapter Six, 1 argue that the adoption of either of the non-linguistic theories of content, possible worlds semantics or situation semantics, will help in dealing with what 1refer to as the specificity argument.