© 2011 Robert B. Brandom 6/20/2011 Chapter in The Cambridge Handbook of Linguistic Anthropology Intentionality and Language: A Normative, Pragmatist, Inferentialist Approach Robert B. Brandom I. Intentionality In this essay I present a battery of concepts, distinctions, terminology, and questions that are common currency among philosophers of mind and language who think about intentionality. Together, they define a space of possible explanatory priorities and strategies. In addition, I sketch a systematic, interlocking set of commitments regarding the relations among these concepts and distinctions, which underwrites a distinctive set of answers to some of the most important of those questions. This normative, pragmatist, inferentialist approach to intentionality and language is much more controversial. I have developed and expounded it in a number of books over the past two decades. In the present context its exposition can serve at least to illustrate how one might assemble a framework within which to think about the relations among these important issues. The contemporary philosophical use of the medieval scholastic term “intentionality” was introduced by Franz Brentano [1838-1917]. His student Edmund Husserl [1859-1938] recognized it as apt to characterize a phenomenon that Immanuel Kant [1724-1804] had put at the center of our thought about mindedness, as part of what we would now call his semantic transformation of René Descartes’s [1596-1650] epistemological turn in the philosophy of mind. This is the idea of a kind of contentfulness that is distinctive of at least some of our psychological states and linguistic utterances. Brentano characterized intentionality in terms of “reference to a 1 © 2011 Robert B. Brandom content, a direction upon an object.”1 John Searle [b. 1932] offers this pre-theoretical summary of the subject-matter of his book Intentionality: ...if a state S is Intentional then there must be an answer to such questions as: What is S about? What is S of? What is it an S that?2 We can specify the content of someone’s belief by saying, for instance, that she believes that Kant’s servant was named ‘Lampl’. In that case, it is a belief of or about Kant’s servant, representing him as being so-named. Brentano was impressed by the thought that while things can only stand in physical or causal relations to actually existing facts, events, and objects, intentional states can “refer to contents” that are not true (do not express actual facts) and be “directed upon objects” that do not exist.3 I can only kick the can if it exists, but I can think about unicorns even if they do not. We should distinguish intentionality in this sense from consciousness. These phenomena only overlap. For, on the one hand, pain is a paradigmatically conscious phenomenon. But pains are not in the sense relevant to intentionality contentful states or episodes. They do not have contents that could be expressed by sentential ‘that’ clauses. And they are not (at least not always) about anything. On the other hand, there is nothing incoherent about the concept of unconscious beliefs—which do have intentional contents specifiable both in terms of ‘that’ and ‘of’. Attributions of belief answer to two kinds of norms of evidence, which in some cases diverge. Evidence derived from sincere avowals by the believer license the attributions of beliefs of which the believer is conscious. But beliefs, desires, and other intentional states can also be attributed on the basis of what relatively stable beliefs and desires provide premises for bits of practical reasoning that make the most sense of what the believer actually does, even in the absence of dispositions sincerely to avow the intentional states in question. Where such intentional explanations are good explanations, the attributed intentional states are unconscious. The need to make this distinction is a manifestation of a deeper distinction between two sorts of mindedness: sentience and sapience. Sentience is awareness in the sense of being 1 Franz Brentano, “Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint,” trans. D.B.Terrell, quoted on pp. 119-20 in H. Morick (ed.) Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind: Readings from Descartes to Strawson [Scott, Foresman; Glenview, Ill. 1970]. 2 John Searle, Intentionality [Cambridge University Press, 1983]. 3 Notice that it is at least not obvious that the first part of this claim is true. Reinforcing the dam might have averted a possible disaster. If so, the nonexistence of the disaster was presumably an effect caused by the reinforcement. 2 © 2011 Robert B. Brandom awake. Anything that can feel pain is sentient. Sapience is having intentionally contentful states such as beliefs, desires, and intentions: believing, desiring, or intending of the dog that it is sitting, will sit, or should sit. An essential element of Descartes’s invention of a distinctively modern conception of the mind was his assimilation of sensations (for instance, pain) and thoughts (for instance, that foxes are nocturnal ominivores). His predecessors had not been tempted by such an assimilation of sentience and sapience. His innovation, and the rationale for the assimilation, was an epistemic criterion of demarcation of the mental. Both sensations and thoughts, he took it, were transparent and incorrigible to their subject: they could not occur without the subject knowing that they occurred, and if the subject took it that they occurred, then they did. Apart from growing appreciation (beginning already with Gottfried Leibniz [1646- 1714]) of the potential explanatory significance of unconscious mental states, concerning which subjects do not have the sort of privileged epistemic access Descartes focused on, we have come to appreciate the importance of not prejudging issues concerning the relations between sentience and sapience. In particular, we have come to see that some of the most important issues concerning the plausibility, and even the intelligibility, of artificial intelligence as classically conceived, turn on the question of whether sapience presupposes sentience (which is, as far as our understanding so far reaches, an exclusively biological phenomenon). II. Representational and Propositional Dimensions of Practical and Discursive Intentionality Within the general area marked out by the term ‘intentionality’, there are two distinctions it is important to keep in mind: the distinction between practical and discursive intentionality, and the distinction between propositional and representational intentionality. Practical intentionality is the sort of directedness at objects that animals exhibit when they deal skillfully with their world: the way a predator is directed at the prey it stalks, or the prey at the predator it flees. It is a phenomenon of sentience, with the role objects, events, and situations play in the lived life of an animal providing the practical significances (food, threat…) that can be perceptually afforded. At the most abstract level of description, however, biological practical intentionality is an 3 © 2011 Robert B. Brandom instance of a kind of broadly teleological directedness at objects that also has non-sentient examples. For any process that has a Test-Operate-Test-Exit feedback-loop structure, where operations on an object are controlled by information about the results of previous operations on it that are repeated until a standard is satisfied, can be seen as in a distinctive way “directed at” the objects the system both operates on and is informed about. This genus includes both finite- state automata executing conditional branched-schedule algorithms, for instance, in a radar- guided tracking anti-aircraft missile, and the fly-wheel governors that regulated the boiler- pressure of the earliest steam engines. Discursive intentionality is that exhibited by concept- users in the richest sense: those that can make judgments or claims that are about objects in the semantic sense. The paradigm of the sort of sapience I am calling “discursive intentionality” is exhibited by language users: ones who can say what they are thinking and talking about. The distinction between representational and propositional intentionality is that between two dimensions of content intentional states can exhibit, corresponding to two of Searle’s questions, quoted above: “What is S of? What is it an S that?”. The answer to the first sort of question is the specification of an object represented by the state (“It is a belief of or about ships, shoes, sealing-wax…”), while the answer to the second sort of question is the specification of what is believed or thought (“It is the belief that ships should be sea-worthy, that shoes are useful, that sealing-wax is archaic…”). The first expresses what we are thinking or talking about, and the second what we are thinking or saying (about it). This distinction of two dimensions of contentfulness applies both to the practical and to the discursive species of intentionality. The dog believes that his master is home, and he believes that of Ben, his master. The principled difficulties we have with using the terms appropriate to discursive intentionality to specify precisely the propositional contents exhibited in practical intentionality (the dog does not really have the concepts specified by “master” and “home”—since it does not grasp most of the contrasts and implications essential to those concepts) do not belie the fact there is some content to his beliefs about that human, Ben, in virtue of which his belief that his master is about to feed him differs from his belief that his master is home, or that someone else will feed him. Two opposed orders of explanation concerning the relations between practical and discursive intentionality are pragmatism and platonism. Pragmatism is the view that discursive 4 © 2011 Robert B. Brandom intentionality is a species of practical intentionality: that knowing-that (things are thus-and-so) is a kind of knowing-how (to do something). What is explicit in the form of a principle is intelligible only against a background of implicit practices.