Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies (C.S.S) October 12, 2005 The Israel Security Agency exposed Hamas terrorist infrastructures in the regions of Hebron and Ramallah that perpetrated severe terrorist attacks prior to and during the lull in the fighting (including a suicide bombing attack in Beersheba and the abduction and murder of Israeli civilian Sasson Nuriel). The uncovering of the infrastructures prevented numerous additional terrorist attacks planned to be perpetrated during the lull.1 Overview ⌧ During the past several weeks, the Israel Security Agency has exposed several operative terrorist cells belonging to the Hamas movement in the regions of Hebron and Ramallah. In recent years, these cells perpetrated severe terrorist attacks in which six Israelis were killed and more than 70 were wounded. ⌧ The succession of terrorist attacks perpetrated by these cells continued throughout the lull in the fighting, in complete contradiction to public 1 The present document is based on an Israel Security Agency report. The terrorists’ photographs featured herein are used courtesy of the Israel Security Agency. 2 statements made by senior Hamas figures claiming that the movement was willing to uphold the lull. Hamas did not publicly claim responsibility for most terrorist attacks perpetrated by these cells (such as the suicide bombing attack in Beersheba), which allowed the movement to enjoy the best of two worlds: it continued terrorist activity in the West Bank during the lull in the fighting while presenting the Palestinian Authority and Palestinian public opinion with a façade of compliance with the lull, thus evading the spotlight of the Israeli security forces’ counter-activities and anti-terrorism operations.2 ⌧ What follows are several prominent characteristics of the exposed terrorist infrastructures. Noticeably, the terrorist elements in the West Bank are guided by Hamas from the Gaza Strip, while making special efforts, during and after the disengagement, to move the focus of terrorism to the West Bank. Once again, it has been proven that the terrorist elements in the West Bank enjoy a convenient passage to Israel in those areas where the construction of the Security Fence has yet to be completed. There is an obvious connection between Hamas’ civilian infrastructure (da’wah) and its terrorist operative infrastructure. This comes into play, for instance, in terrorist operations being funded by the da’wah infrastructure The Palestinian Authority’s security apparatuses have done nothing to expose Hamas’ terrorist infrastructures and 2 The Israeli security forces’ counter-activities in the West Bank were up until recently aimed primarily against the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which was perceived as the main organization striving to derail the lull in the fighting. 3 prevent the continuation of terrorist activity, in order to avoid a confrontation with the movement (and with the other terrorist organizations). ⌧ What follows is an analysis of activity characteristics of Hamas’ terrorist infrastructures exposed in the Hebron region and in Ramallah. Members of those cells were involved, among other things, in severe terrorist attacks perpetrated during the lull in the fighting, including a suicide bombing attack in Beersheba and the abduction and murder of Sasson Nuriel. Furthermore, Israeli security forces arrested (October 12) Ibrahim Ghanimat, a wanted terrorist who remained at large for eight years and was the last member of the cell based in Surif (a village north of Hebron), which perpetrated a series of deadly terrorist attacks in the years 1995-1997. The exposure of a Hamas operative infrastructure in the village of Shuyukh (north of Hebron) ⌧ In recent months, Israeli security forces exposed a Hamas terrorist infrastructure in the village of Shuyukh, operating in the Hebron region during the past several years. The scope of the infrastructure was exceptionally broad: some sixty terrorist operatives were arrested in the wake of its exposure; they were trained in the use of arms and explosive charges. The cell members were handled by the Hamas operative headquarters in the Hebron region, which provided them with arms, ammunition, and directions. ⌧ The key operative within the infrastructure is Moussa Muhammad Abdallah Halaiqa, a 37-year-old resident of Shuyukh, married and father of nine, employed in a quarry. Moussa Halaiqa was the one who had formed the operative infrastructure, having as well recruited and trained most of its members. 4 ⌧ What follows are terrorist attacks perpetrated by the Shuyukh operatives up to the lull in the fighting. Two shooting attacks on vehicles (July, September 2003) on the Halhul detour road east of Hebron, with no casualties. Setting an explosive charge against an Israeli bus (August 2004) in the vicinity of the village of Al-Aroub north of Hebron, with no casualties. Setting an explosive charge against an Israeli vehicle at the entrance to the settlement of Meitzad in the Hebron region (November 2004). Two Israeli women were lightly injured. ⌧ What follows are terrorist attacks planned to be perpetrated during the lull in the fighting, whose execution was thwarted thanks to the exposure of the infrastructure and owing to a “work accident”. Attack against a helicopter at an Air Force training facility in the Judean Desert using an explosive charge weighing some 40 lbs. Shooting attack against a military jeep on patrol duty in the vicinity of the village of Shuyukh. The plan also included abducting the soldiers’ bodies and weapons for purposes of bargaining. Abduction of Israeli hikers in the Judean Desert region. A “work accident” occurred at Moussa Halaiqa’s house during the lull in the fighting, in the course of an attempt to manufacture explosives for use in terrorist attacks. 5 The structure of Hamas’ operative-terrorist infrastructure in the village of Shuyukh (all arrested by the Israel Security Agency) A total of 59 operatives were exposed and arrested during the interrogations . Muhammad Zaytoun Halaiqa Hamas leader in Shuyukh Instructors in the use of explosives Nadim Sabarneh Head of the civilian infrastructure (da’wah) in Shuyukh• Rizaq Muhammad •Hamas spokesman in the region and coordinator Halaiqa between the operative apparatus and the civilian infrastructure (da’wah) Moussa Muhammad Training in explosives Ghassan Ayaide Khalil Ya’qoub Marwan Abdallah Halaiqa Halaiqa Abu Farah •In charge of the operative apparatus in Shuyukh Operative cells Operative recruits Explosive charge operations Recruits for sacrifice operation Execution of Gathering information for and shooting attacks shooting attacks other terrorist attacks Issa Halaiqa Ghassan Nasri Halaiqa Ghassan Faez Jadallah Ayaide Asaifan •Resides in the village of Anta • Recruited to the operative wing Perpetrated the shooting: to help perpetrate terrorist Naef Mashni Naef Mshani Ashraf Mshani attacks in Jerusalem. Naef Mshani •In charge of the shooting squad agreed to perpetrate a ‘Eid Halaiqa suicide bombing attack Tareq Halaiqa Hamza Halaiqa Surrendered arms and ammunition: •Hamza and Ahmed expressed their Perpetrated shooting attack M-16 rifle consent to perpetrate a terrorist attack s and requested to perpetrate Khail Yawqoub against hikers on their way to the Dead 2 Carbin rifles a suicide bombing attack Mshani Sea FN gun, revolver, Bullets. Contents of laboratory Ahmed 1 Afif Halaiqa for manufacturing explosives 6 The exposure of a Hamas operative infrastructure in Al-Thahiriya (south of Hebron) ⌧ During the past several weeks, an operative Hamas infrastructure has been exposed in Al-Thahiriya. Its members, operating in the region since 2002, perpetrated several deadly terrorist attacks in the Negev and in the Hebron region, as a result of which four Israelis were killed and several dozens were wounded. ⌧ The cell’s leader and founder is Hussam Qaisiya, a 27-year-old resident of Al-Thahiriya, locksmith, married and father of two. In the years 1999-2000 he was held in an Israeli prison due to his activity in Hamas. After his release, he formed an operative cell to which he recruited some of his friends. The cell members were handled by the Hamas operative headquarters in the Hebron region, which provided them with arms, ammunition, and directions. Hussam Qaisiya, head of the Al- Thahiriya cell that stood behind the suicide bombing attack in Beersheba ⌧ Terrorist attacks perpetrated by the cell up to the lull in the fighting: 7 February 10, 2002: two of the cell’s members, Khaled Tal and Muhammad Batat, open fire on IDF soldiers near the Southern Command Headquarters in Beersheba, killing two female soldiers. The two terrorists are killed by IDF forces. The cell members Khaled Tal Muhammad Batat May 22, 2003: shooting attack on an Israeli vehicle near Nevatim. An IDF soldier is lightly injured. June 17, 2003: attempt to perpetrate a shooting attack on an Israeli vehicle near the settlement of Tene on Mount Hebron. No casualties are incurred. February 27, 2004: a terrorist cell ambushes an Israeli vehicle at the Sensana junction inside Israeli territory, north of Beersheba (an area hitherto remaining unprotected by the Security Fence). An Israeli couple traveling in the vehicle is killed. After the shooting, the cell charges on the vehicle to confirm the kill. 8 August 22, 2004: a terrorist cell opens fire on a vehicle near the settlement of Tene and attempts to abduct the vehicle’s female driver. The driver, in a state of shock, proceeds on her way. February 3, 2005: a terrorist cell opens fire on a military jeep near the settlement of Eshkolot on Mount Hebron. Four soldiers are wounded as a result. Sensana Rahat Lehavim The Al-Thahiriya terrorist cell’s activity zone (source: www.negev-net.org.il) August 28, 2005: a suicide bombing attack is perpetrated at Beersheba’s central bus station (during the lull in the fighting) by Abd Al-Rahman Qaisiya, who was employed as a construction worker in Beersheba and recruited by the cell members. The suicide bomber arrives at Beersheba’s central bus station where he is identified by two security guards, who prevent him from perpetrating 9 the terrorist attack amidst the crowd.