Just like Nature: Habit and the Art of Life Daniel Manfred del Nido Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 2017 © 2017 Daniel Manfred del Nido All rights reserved Abstract Just like Nature: Habit and the Art of Life Daniel Manfred del Nido In this dissertation, I will examine the conceptions of philosophy of the 19th and 20th Century thinkers Félix Ravaisson, Henri Bergson, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and their implications for contemporary theories of religious ethics and philosophical practice, especially that of Pierre Hadot. In doing so, I will elucidate their understanding of both the goals of philosophical practice and the means by which they are achieved, focusing in particular on the importance of the body in their respective theories of philosophical practice. Specifically, I argue that Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of philosophical practice are grounded in an understanding of habit as a dynamic process of producing and transforming bodily dispositions that problematizes distinctions between self and world and limits attempts to achieve conscious self-mastery. As a result, their work calls into question the extent to which self-conscious cultivation of intellectual and bodily habits that conform to an ideal self-conception is either possible or desirable, and instead affirms a conception of philosophical practice as what I term “indefinite self-cultivation.” In chapter one, I examine Félix Ravaisson’s conception of philosophical practice in relationship to his theory of habit, which he claims originates as a principle of desire that gives rise to bodily spontaneity. This theory of habit underlies a conception of philosophical practice as imitation of models of ideal conduct through which habits of inventive conduct that outstrip capacities for rational deliberation are produced. In chapter two, I contrast Ravaisson’s conception of habit with Henri Bergson’s, who regards habit as a form of bodily memory that produces automaticity. Philosophical practice for Bergson resists the effects of habit on thought and action by engaging in philosophical intuition, an application of mental effort to processes of change and movement that generates new ideas and new forms of life. In chapter three, I examine Merleau- Ponty’s intermediate position between these theories of habit, and his argument that the fluid nature of habituation as a process of social interaction makes living according to a determinate way of life possible only at the risk of doing violence to oneself. For Merleau-Ponty, philosophy entails critical practice of interrogating and expressing affects and immediate responses to events that serves as a way to question consciously-held values and uncover new personal and social possibilities. Finally, in chapter four, I conceptualize Ravaisson, Bergson, and Merleau-Ponty’s theories of philosophical practice as forms of indefinite self-transformation by putting their work in critical conversation with Pierre Hadot’s theory of philosophy as a way of life. Table of Contents Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................................ ii Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 1. Philosophical Practice as Indefinite Self-Cultivation ....................................................................... 4 2. Habit and Self-Cultivation .............................................................................................................. 15 3. Chapter Outline ............................................................................................................................... 27 Chapter 1: The Necessity of Desire: Habit and the Art of Life in Félix Ravaisson .............. 31 1. Tendency and Desire: Ravaisson on the Double Law of Habit ...................................................... 36 2. From Intelligence to Inclination ...................................................................................................... 48 3. Ravaisson on Moral Pedagogy: Virtue and the Art of Life ............................................................ 61 4. Conclusion: Ravaisson’s Virtues .................................................................................................... 80 Chapter 2: The Fossilized Residue of a Spiritual Activity: Intuition and Philosophical Therapy in Henri Bergson ......................................................................................................... 88 1. The Logic of the Body: Ravaisson and Bergson ............................................................................. 92 2. Habit, Duration, and Conscious Freedom ..................................................................................... 106 3. Intuition, Self-Creation, and the Art of Life ................................................................................. 119 4. Conclusion: Homo Faber .............................................................................................................. 134 Chapter 3: Knowledge in the Hands: Maurice Merleau-Ponty on Habit, Freedom, and Self- Experimentation ........................................................................................................................ 143 1. The World of Habit: Ravaisson, Bergson, Merleau-Ponty ........................................................... 148 2. Beyond Second Nature: The Open Self and the Social World ..................................................... 162 3. Merleau-Ponty, Philosopher of Freedom ...................................................................................... 173 4. Conclusion: Merleau-Ponty and the Examined Life ..................................................................... 191 Chapter 4: The Feeling for Ambiguity: Indefinite Self-Cultivation and Philosophical Practice as Self-Unfolding ........................................................................................................ 201 1. Indefinite Self-Cultivation ............................................................................................................ 203 2. Indefinite Philosophical Practice: The Problem of the Passions ................................................... 221 A. Pierre Hadot on the Passions ..................................................................................................... 222 B. Beyond the Passions: Stasis, Attention to Oneself, and Self-Unfolding ................................... 237 3. General Conclusion: Habit and the Art of life .............................................................................. 251 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 259 i Acknowledgments Throughout the process of writing this dissertation, I have been extremely fortunate to have received the support of so many mentors, colleagues, friends, and family. In listing my benefactors, I must begin with my two advisors, Mark C. Taylor and Wayne Proudfoot, who have helped me in crucial ways throughout my graduate studies. Mark has constantly challenged me in the best possible way to expand the horizons of my thinking, and to take risks in my work by making connections between my work and the broader philosophical tradition and the larger world. Through stimulating conversation and patient commentary on my work, major and minor, Mark has made me a clearer thinker and a better writer, with a richer sense of what academic work can be. Wayne’s generosity with his time, his feedback, and his encouragement, has aided my intellectual development immensely over the past seven years. This dissertation owes much to our fascinating discussions of the history of philosophy and the philosophy of religion, along with his incisive comments on my work. I would also like to thank the other members of my dissertation committee, Clémence Boulouque, Megan Laverty, and John Thatamanil. Their expertise on the figures examined in this dissertation, along with their ability to see straight to the heart of the issues it raises, made for an excellent conversation about its project, and their suggestions will be invaluable as I continue to pursue it. Portions of this dissertation benefited from comments from other individuals who deserve mention as well. Jan Rehmann provided valuable substantive feedback on Chapter Three, and I would also like to thank the members of the Religion graduate students’ reading group, Joe Fisher, Krista Dalton, Zachary Ugolnik, and Elizabeth Dolfi, for their assistance in both mechanical and substantive issues in that chapter. Chapter Three was also presented in front of Columbia’s Religion department as part of its ongoing “Religion Unwound” series. Conversation with graduate ii students and faculty of the Religion department, particularly with the two respondents Jay Ramesh and Rachel McDermott, helped me think through and improve the ways I have framed this project, and refined my discussion of the study of religious ethics in Chapter Four. Versions of Chapter One were also presented at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meetings of 2014 and 2016, and the feedback I received from my audiences was extremely valuable in helping me expand my view of the contemporary relevance of my work. The late-night conversations I had