POLICY BRIEFING June 2012 SHEIKHS AND POLITICIANS: INSIDE THE NEW EGYPTIAN SALAFISM STÉPHANE LACROIX SHEIKHS AND POLITICIANS: INSIDE THE NEW EGYPTIAN SALAFISM INTRODUCTION Construction and Development Party and the Asala Party left the Muslim Brotherhood’s “Democratic The major surprise of Egypt’s recent parliamentary Coalition,” allegedly because the Brotherhood was elections was not that Islamists won a large majori- not willing to include enough of their candidates ty of the votes. Any keen observer of Egyptian soci- on its lists.3 The Nour Party had also, at one point, ety could have guessed that religious parties would been close to the “Democratic Coalition,” although dominate. What was much less expected was that conflicting stories circulated on whether the party almost 40 percent of those who voted for Islamists was actually thinking of joining, or if it only partic- did not pick the well-established Muslim Brother- ipated in some meetings as an observer.4 hood, the oldest and largest opposition movement in the country. Instead, they backed a coalition of In the elections, the Salafis benefited from the natu- three recently created Salafi parties whose figures ral appeal of Islamist parties among Muslim voters. were unknown to most Egyptians before the rev- There are several reasons for this attraction. First, olution. The Salafis were also (with a few excep- the last few decades have witnessed a “quiet revo- tions) initially opposed to the revolution and for- lution” in Egyptian society marked by the increas- mally declared their support for Tahrir Square only ing hegemony of conservative Islamic discourse.5 days before Hosni Mubarak’s resignation.2 Despite To many Egyptian Muslims today, it seems obvi- all of this, the Salafi coalition received 28 percent ous that, as one interviewee put it, “we should of of votes for the People’s Assembly, the lower house course vote for a party with an Islamic reference. of parliament, securing 127 of 508 seats. The same We’re Muslims, after all!” Interestingly, many of trend was later confirmed in the elections of the those interviewed did not seem aware of (or overly Shura Council, the upper house, where Salafis took concerned by) the differences between the Muslim 45 of 180 seats. How should we make sense of the Brotherhood’s conception of Islam, and that of the Salafi breakthrough? And now that they represent Salafis.6 Another reason for the Islamists’ elector- the second strongest force in parliament, what lies al success is that Islamist groups formed the main ahead for their movement? opposition and prime target of regime repression under Mubarak. Consequently, they are widely seen as having “deserved” power. Because of their proclaimed religious ethics, they are also perceived MAKING SENSE OF THE SALAFI BREAK- as less corrupt. THROUGH This, however, does not explain why voters would The Salafi coalition was made up of three unequal favor the Salafi coalition over the Muslim Brother- partners: a senior partner, Hizb al-Nour (“the party hood’s lists. Here again there are several reasons. of light,” whose candidates obtained 111 seats) and To begin with, proponents of Salafism as an ide- two junior partners, al-Bina wa al-Tanmiya (“con- ology have existed in Egypt for almost a century. struction and development,” 13 seats) and Hizb al- The first Salafi association, Ansar al-Sunna al-Mu- Asala (“the party of authenticity,” three seats). As hammadiyya (“the supporters of the Prophet’s tra- a result, all election material bore the symbols of dition”), came into being in 1926, two years before the Nour Party, and the coalition was sometimes the Brotherhood. While this association remained presented as the “Nour Party coalition.” Its forma- largely confined to scholarly circles and never tried tion was announced on October 22, 2011, after the Stéphane Lacroix is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Sciences Po-Paris School of International Affairs and a visiting researcher at the Centre d’Etudes et de Documentation Economiques, Juridiques et Sociales (“Centre for Economic, Judicial, and Social Study and Documentation”).1 SHEIKHS AND POLITICIANS: INSIDE THE NEW EGYPTIAN SALAFISM to foster a mass movement, it did publish and dis- gained an audience far beyond the original circles tribute the main Salafi works, making them avail- of the Salafi Da‘wa. Some of those preachers, in- able to the Egyptian public. Those works would cluding Muhammad Hassan and Muhammad Hus- start attracting growing interest in the 1970s, par- sein Yaqub, soon became household names across ticularly among students. It was at this point that the country. Salafism transformed into a broader social phe- nomenon. The three parties that took part in the The two other Salafi parties in the coalition also Salafi coalition all stem from social-religious net- drew their strength from previously existing net- works that have existed and developed since that works and organizations, although their relation- period. ship with the authorities had been much more fraught. The Asala Party was created by a group The Nour Party was founded by an informal reli- of Salafis based in Cairo and was led by a number gious organization called the “Salafi Da‘wa” (al- of sheikhs with a strong local following, the most Da‘wa al-Salafiyya), whose leadership is based in prominent of whom is Muhammad Abdel Maq- Alexandria. The origins of the Salafi Da‘wa date soud (known to his disciples as “faqih al-Qahira,” back to the late 1970s, when its founders – stu- the jurist of Cairo). Unlike the Alexandria sheikhs, dents at the faculty of medicine at Alexandria Uni- Abdel Maqsoud never hesitated to openly ques- versity – broke away from the Islamist student tion the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime.10 He groups known as al-Gama‘at al-Islamiyya (“Islam- was imprisoned for his views on several occasions ic groups”). Among them was Yasir Burhami, cur- and also spent time under house arrest. He gained rently the dominant figure in the organization. The further prestige by becoming the first Salafi sheikh Salafi Da‘wa’s stance against violence and refus- to endorse the revolution on January 28, 2011.11 al to engage in formal politics made it relatively Given the strong foothold al-Asala enjoys in Cairo, acceptable to the Mubarak regime. To be sure, the its candidates ran mainly on the Salafi coalition’s group did at times endure repression; its leaders lists in the capital. were kept under close surveillance and were for- bidden from traveling outside Alexandria. Howev- The Construction and Development Party was er, the Salafi Da‘wa often benefited from the covert created by al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya (“The Islamic support of the regime apparatus, which tried to use Group”), a formerly radical Islamist group founded Salafis to undermine the Muslim Brotherhood’s in- in the late 1970s, which waged war on the Mubarak fluence.7 regime for more than 15 years before its leaders – most of whom were in jail – officially renounced In this context, the group’s networks expanded violence in 1997. Al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya’s ide- beyond Alexandria via students who came to re- ology combined Salafi and jihadist ideas. When ceive the sheikhs’ teachings before going back to the latter were abandoned, the group’s discourse their home towns. Soon, the Salafi Da‘wa devel- became quite close to that of the Salafi Da‘wa.12 oped a basic form of organization comprising vari- At the same time, al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya remains ous sections and branches under an administrative a tighly-knit group of several tens of thousands of council.8 It also provided an array of social servic- activists, bound by common experiences of violent es in neighborhoods, thereby mirroring the activ- confrontation with the state. Unlike al-Jihad, the ities of the Brotherhood. This allowed the group other main Egyptian radical Islamist group, which to establish strong ties with ordinary Egyptians, had pursued a strategy focused on decapitating the although most of its activities remained under- state (which it tried in 1981 by assassinating Pres- ground.9 In the 2000s, the regime allowed sever- ident Anwar al-Sadat), al-Gama‘a al-Islamiyya al Salafi preachers, some of them connected to the had always been keen to develop a real social base Salafi Da‘wa, to launch Salafi television channels through day-to-day social and religious activities. broadcasted on Egyptian national satellites. Salafi The group has historically enjoyed a strong foot- discourse was now made available to all, and it hold in Middle Egypt, the area in which most Con- 2 SHEIKHS AND POLITICIANS: INSIDE THE NEW EGYPTIAN SALAFISM struction and Development Party candidates ran. expand the party’s structure. An interesting illustra- tion of this was the selection of the party’s spokes- What came as a surprise to many observers through- men, which was conducted through an open com- out 2011 was how efficient the Nour Party was in petition. Numerous candidates were interviewed, getting organized, producing a political platform, several of whom were finally chosen.17 While all campaigning, and dealing with the media. Emad of them are relatively young – a significant differ- Abdel Ghaffour is recognized as the first person in ence from the Muslim Brotherhood – the young- the Salafi Da‘wa to have suggested creating a polit- est of all is 27-year-old Nadir Bakkar.18 The choice ical party. Though he was one of the group’s orig- of Bakkar, a bright and elegant young man with a inal founders in the late 1970s, Abdel Ghaffour’s degree in management and strong rhetorical skills, profile differed from that of other Da‘wa figures be- indicates the kind of image that the party seeks to cause of the influences to which he had been ex- project.