THE LAWS. Translated by George Burges Plato ************* Introduction There is considerable debate regarding whether or not Plato's Republic is a work in political philosophy. Such is not the case with the Laws. Much of the reason that Plato's Republic is mistakenly assumed to be a work in political philosophy is that Plato spends nearly half of the ten books of the work developing Kallipolis [The theoretical ideal city developed as a thought experiment in the Republic.] (the ideal city). In constructing this city, Plato identifies the various component parts that must be a part of the city, from those who do the farming to those who do the protecting to those who do the ruling. Each of these classes is completely separate and is separated on the basis of the kind of soul each person who is a member of the relevant class has. However, despite this, there is also considerable agreement that the Republic is actually not a work in political philosophy. The first reason for this is that the Republic is framed by a single question - what is justice in the individual soul. The analogy that Plato uses is the structure of the soul to the structure of the ideal city. By imagining the city (something large) he says that perhaps we can isolate justice in the individual (something much smaller). Thus, it appears that in context, the construction of the "ideal" city in the Republic is a thought experiment designed to illuminate the question of justice in the individual soul. The second reason to suppose that the Republic is not a political work, or at least not essentially one, is that it bears little or no resemblance to the clearly political work that is the Laws. In the Laws, several constitutions are examined, both ideal ones and actual ones. Each is explored for its strengths and its weaknesses. The role of law itself is turned over and over again and the argument that the laws of a city are properly so insofar as they participate in the Form of Law is at the very least a tacit feature of the dialogue. In this way, that is, in its substance, the Laws is strikingly similar to Plato's early dialogue, the Crito. There, Socrates engages in a long discussion with the Laws who convince him that it would be an unjust action to escape from Athens, even though he has been unjustly convicted and faces execution at the hand of the Athenian democrats. Given that the Crito (an early dialogue) and the Laws (a late, and likely the final of Plato's works) develop views that are very much in common with one another and very different indeed from the authoritarian ideal city in the Republic, it is perhaps best to read them as the central works (along with the Sophist [ A teacher for hire in ancient Greece and the primary competitors and foils of Plato.] and the Statesman) in Plato's political philosophy. Within the Laws, we encounter the interpretive difficulty that sometimes plagues the late dialogues of Plato. Unlike the early ones where it is reasonably clear that Socrates speaks for Plato, here Socrates does not appear at all. Instead, three interlocutors [ A participant in a dialogue.], Cleinias, Megillus, and an Athenian stranger meet and engage in discussion about government and proper rule as they journey along the road in the Grecian countryside. The Laws is a long and winding work, with long excurses. At times, it is difficult to identify who, precisely, has Plato's view. It is generally accepted that the Athenian Stranger is playing the role of Plato, for the most part. Ultimately, the view that is hit upon as the proper construction of government is something of a modified aristocratic democracy in which the Laws constrain the rule of potential despots and restrain the often impetuous impulses of the masses. Reading BOOK I. PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE. AN ATHENIAN GUEST, CLINIAS OF CRETE, AND MEGILLUS OF LACEDAEMON. Athenian. HAS a god, or some man, obtained from you, O guests, (the fame of being) the cause of the laying down of laws? Clinias. A god, O guest, a god, to say what is most just; with us indeed, Zeus; but amongst the Lacedaemonians, from whose country is this person here, I think, they mention Apollo. Is it not so? Megillus. It is. Athen. Say you then, according to Homer, that Minos did constantly on the ninth year go to a conference with his father, and according to the oracular responses given by him, lay down the laws found in your states? Clin. It is so said by us; and, likewise, that his brother Rhadamanthus for you have heard the name was the most just [of men]. Now we Cretans would say that he obtained this praise from his distributing at that time things pertaining to justice in an upright manner. Athen. And honourable is the renown, and very becoming to the son of Zeus. But since both you and this person here have been brought up in legal institutions of this kind, I expect it will not be unpleasant for us at present to have a dissertation, by speaking and hearing respecting a form of government and laws, and at the same time to be taking a walk. Now the way from Cnossus to the cavern and temple of Jupiter is, as we hear, altogether sufficient, and the resting places along the road are, as is proper, during the present sultry weather, shady amongst lofty trees; and it will be suited to our age to rest in them frequently, and by relieving each other during the conversation, to go in this way through the whole walk with ease. Clin. There are indeed, guest, to a person as he goes on, in the groves cypress-trees of wondrous height and beauty, and meadows, in which while we rest, we may discourse. Athen. Speak you correctly? Clin. Entirely so; and we shall say so more, on seeing them. But let us go with a good fortune. Athen. Be it so. But tell me, why has the law ordained for your joint-feasts gymnastic exercises and the handling of arms? Clin. I conceive, O guest, that it is easy even for every one to apprehend these customs of ours. For you see that the nature of the whole country of Crete is not a plain, like that of Thessaly. On this account, they make use of horses more; but we of running. Now as this irregular [ground] is more adapted to the exercise of foot-races, it is necessary for a person in such a case to have light arms, and not to run holding what has a weight. Now the lightness of bows and arrows seems to be fitted (for this). All these therefore have been adopted by us in war; and all this has the legislator, as it appears to me, looking to this point, ordained; especially since he nearly seems to have instituted the joint feasts, through perceiving how all persons, when engaged in war, are then compelled by the thing itself, for the sake of their own defense, to feast l at that time together. In truth, he appears to me to have condemned the multitude of stupidity, for their not learning that there is constantly through life a war to all with all states. Now if during the time of war it was necessary to feast in common for the sake of defense, and for certain persons, both rulers and ruled, to be drawn up as their defenders, this should be done in the time of peace likewise. For that, which most men call peace, is only a name; but in reality there is a war, not proclaimed by a herald, according to nature, to all against all states. For by thus considering, you will almost discover, that the Cretan legislator has, looking to war, ordained for us all institutions both public and private, and ordered us to guard the laws in such a manner, as if nothing else were useful, either of possessions or pursuits, unless one became victorious in war, and all the goods of the vanquished became the property of the victors. Athen. You appear to me, O guest, to have been well practiced in seeing through the laws of Crete. But tell me still more clearly this. For by the definition you have laid down of a well-regulated state, you seem to me to say that one ought to administer it, so arranged in order, as to be victorious over the rest of states in war. Is it not so? Clin. Just so; and I think it will seem so to this person here. Megil. For how can any Lacedaemonian whatever, O thou divine man, answer otherwise? Athen. Whether, then, is this right in the case of states towards states, but otherwise in the case of one village towards another? Clin. By no means otherwise. Athen. But it is the same? Clin. Yes. Athen. What then, is it the same in the case of one family towards another family, and in the case of one man towards another? Clin. The same. Athen, But in the case of a person towards himself, shall we consider him in that of an enemy towards an enemy? Or, how shall we say? Clin. Athenian guest, for I am not willing to call you Attic, because you appear to me rather to deserve to be called after the name of the goddess Minerva, you have, by correctly carrying back the reasoning to its principle, made it clearer; so that you will more easily discover that it has just now been rightly said, that all persons are enemies to all, both publicly and privately, and each individual to himself.