Lewis, A 2013 Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines of Conflict and Terrorism.Stability: stability International Journal of Security & Development, 2(1): 13, pp. 1-22, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.az ARTICLE Violence in Yemen: Thinking About Violence in Fragile States Beyond the Confines of Conflict and Terrorism Dr Alexandra Lewis* This article examines the different forms of criminal violence that affect fragile states, with special reference to Yemen. The article is particularly interested in analysing the relationship between violent offending with no clear political motive, underdevelopment and conflict. It does so by conducting an in-depth evaluation of conflict and crime in Yemen, using publically accessible data to suggest new ways of understanding violent criminal behaviour in Yemen and elsewhere. This article is written in response to a prioritisation of political violence, insurgency and terrorism in international development and stabilisation strategies, which has emerged along- side the broad securitisation of international aid. Common forms of criminal violence have been overlooked in a number of fragile contexts, as they have been in Yemen. In light of rising levels of insecurity, resulting from poor relationships between the state and its citizens, there is a need to re-evaluate this unstated omission if the new Yemeni Government is to gain increased legitimacy by being seen to prioritise the protection of its citizens. Introduction suited to ‘21st century violence’. Due to ‘suc- It is argued in the 2011 World Development cesses in reducing interstate war, the remain- Report that the ‘global system’ of interna- ing forms of conflict and violence do not fit tional aid is centred on a ‘paradigm of con- neatly either into “war” or “peace,” or into flict’, whereby both national and interna- “criminal violence” or “political violence”’ tional actors – in development, diplomacy (World Bank 2011: 2). In particular, a prior- and humanitarianism – have become chiefly itisation of political violence, insurgency and concerned with providing states with the terrorism in international development and means and capabilities to overcome civil war stabilisation strategies has meant that more through increased prosperity and dispute common forms of criminal violence have resolution (World Bank 2011: 2). This view, been overlooked in a number of fragile con- writes the World Bank, prioritises violence texts, as they have been in Yemen. and conflict as an inherent cause of under- In light of Yemen’s on-going political cri- development, but does not take into account ses, the prioritisation of counter-terrorism the reality that such an approach is no longer and counter-insurgency programming is not surprising. Yemen is a fragile state, in accord- ance with Graziella Bertocchi and Andrea * Research Fellow, Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, University of York, UK Guerzoni’s definition of the term (2011: 2), [email protected] where fragile states are categorised by an Art. 13, page 2 of 22 Lewis: Violence in Yemen ‘inability to provide basic services and meet and to trace their connections to conflict and vital needs, unstable and weak governance, insecurity. The article also aims to improve persistent and extreme poverty, lack of terri- the public availability of information on torial control, and high propensity to conflict crime patterns in Yemen in order to encour- and civil war’. Without effective peace-build- age a debate on international engagement in ing policies and an effective peace-keeping fragile states that looks beyond the confines system, Yemen, in the aftermath of the Arab of conflict and terrorism. Spring, will be at heightened risk of state Due to the pervasive nature of violence in failure. This could have potentially dras- fragile states2 (which are often war-affected), tic repercussions for the region, keeping there is a tendency amongst analysts not to in mind that the country is now home to a delve too deeply into criminological analy- resurgent Al Qaeda in the Arab Penninsula ses in contexts where crime is viewed as a (AQAP) movement. ‘natural’ side-effect of underdevelopment. The 2011 Arab Spring and the 2012 Rev- The relationship between crime and conflict olution of Institutions have pushed the appears, superficially, to be straightforward, Yemeni Government and the international with crime emerging as a bi-product of the community to begin planning for a severe social chaos generated by political instabil- restructuring of military, police and judicial ity. However, the logical extension of this services in the country. However, there is argument – that the international commu- a danger that a lack of understanding of – nity needs therefore to intervene to restore and information about – more mainstream political stability in order to solve the prob- criminal violence in Yemen could lead to the lem of crime – is fundamentally flawed. One side-lining of spending on conventional law has only to look at cases like Iraq, El Salva- enforcement needs. The British Government dor, Tajikistan and Nicaragua to see that – which is taking the lead in police train- serious offending patterns not dealt with ing in Yemen as part of a broader European at peak points of conflict will continue to Union commitment to post-2013 security have a costly impact upon public safety long sector reform – asserts that restructured after peace-building strategies have been police services in the country will likely take initiated, with crime (especially organised on a ‘paramilitary’ identity and that Yemeni crime) often overtaking conflict as a lead- police will be tasked with reinstating terri- ing cause of insecurity. A lack of compara- torial control of their state.1 They will likely tive and case-by-case investigations means remain a highly politicised institution, oper- that the challenge of violent crime in fragile ating according to a ‘statist’ or ‘state-centric’, states remains poorly understood, leading to rather than a ‘protectionist’ or ‘rights-based’, increased difficulties for policy-makers work- narrative of security, in which criminality is ing in security sector reform: law enforce- secondary to other strategic concerns. It is ment is side-lined by militarised policing unclear what the implications of this are for strategies, and the impact of crime on secu- the potential escalation of criminal violence, rity is overlooked. or how resulting criminality might feed back Meanwhile, low rates of crime detection in into political insecurity. fragile states indicate that the inflated per- In light of Yemen’s current transition pro- centages of violent offending made visible cess and upcoming national dialogue, this by official records3 are likely to be masking paper’s primary purpose is to highlight the an even greater volume of undetected vio- importance of crime in security by analysing lent offences. While this is often also true the relationship between criminal violence of stable countries, low rates of birth regis- and political violence. The article’s main tration, lack of access to basic services, low function is to point readers towards forms school attendance, high unemployment and of violence that are commonly overlooked mass displacement further impact the abil- Lewis: Violence in Yemen Art. 13, page 3 of 22 ity of fragile states to monitor their citizens. Conflict and Security in Yemen This leads to a lack of detection of murders Yemen is currently experiencing no less than and disappearances, not to mention other four distinct security crises, meaning that crimes. Thus, the Organisation for Economic the Yemeni Government has little effective Co-operation and Development (OECD) control over the vast majority of its territory. notes that ‘homicidal violence and violent The main political challenges that the state crime’ as well as ‘armed violence dispropor- faces today are: an on-going conflict against tionately [affect] low … income countries’ localised combatant groups in the far North; (2009: 28–9). This is a reality that needs to rising separatist sentiment in the South; a be seen to be addressed, if fragile states are growing terrorist insurgency from within to be perceived by constituents as demon- Yemen’s borders; and threats to the state’s strating concern for the safety and welfare very survival in the wake of the 2011 Arab of their citizens: but a tendency by fragile Spring. War and conflict are products and states and donors to neglect criminality in causes of continuing fragility. They contrib- favour of stabilisation has failed to lead to ute to Yemen’s patterns of criminality by: increased legitimacy in many contexts, par- disrupting the rule of law; increasing social ticularly in Yemen where the state’s security chaos; and, diverting security services into priorities are not seen as relevant to the counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism needs of communities4. strategies. Due to the reciprocal relationship The biggest challenge in studying these between crime and conflict, it is likely that issues is definitional: it is extremely diffi- this side-lining of law enforcement in Yemen cult, even in countries that are not affected is unhelpful to restoring security and stabil- by significant obstacles preventing effective ity in the country. data collection, to separate out incidents Hostilities in the far north of Yemen can of criminality from incidents of conflict- be traced to economic competition between related violence. North and South Yemen before and after the The definitional issue is addressed here in formal unification of the country in 1990 part through the selection of a fragile state (which culminated in the 1994 Civil War case study in which administrative processes and was followed immediately by a need to are already in place within the existing judi- consolidate a new government leadership). cial system to sort violent actors according For a prolonged space in Yemen’s history, to criminal or politically motivated offences. peripheral governorates were marginalised Yemeni courts disaggregate criminal, politi- by state development programmes in favour cal and morality offences in statistical data5.