The London School of Economics and Political Science “Machiavelli of Peace”: Dag Hammarskjöld and the Political Role of the Secretary-General of the United Nations Per-Axel Frielingsdorf A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics and Political Science for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, March 2016 Declaration I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it). The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent. I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party. I declare that my thesis consists of 98,326 words. 2 Abstract The thesis analyses Dag Hammarskjöld’s political role as UN Secretary-General and the efforts he made to justify such a role. It is the first attempt to give a comprehensive account of the political role Hammarskjöld played from “both sides”, based on the now available sources from both national and UN archives. The thesis also deals with the problems of a political role for the UN Secretary-General. The conventional picture of Hammarskjöld as a “neutral and impartial” international civil servant is challenged and the figure that emerges is the one of an astute politician – a ”Machiavelli of Peace”. As a civil servant in Sweden, Hammarskjöld played a political role although he viewed himself as an expert and civil servant and not a politician. He argued that he could play a political role based on ”neutrality and impartiality” and he transferred this concept to the international arena as Secretary-General. Hammarskjöld managed to play an important political role because he offered a solution to the American dilemma of how to deal with the Cold War in the Third- World without choosing between their Western European allies and the newly independent countries. This at the precise time when the Americans were losing control of the General Assembly due to the influx of newly independent countries that put decolonisation on the agenda. In the Congo Crisis the political role of the Secretary-General reached its zenith during the initial period where Hammarskjöld played an interventionist role. Hammarskjöld’s policies were based on clearly defined Cold War objectives – shared by the Western permanent members of the Security Council – and on a wish to enlarge the political role of the Secretary-General. The weak base for Hammarskjöld’s political role forced him to radically change his policies in the Congo to shore up his position when he was criticised for his interventionist policies. 3 Table of Contents Acknowledgements p. 7 Introduction p. 8 A Note on the Primary Sources and Literature review p. 13 Outline p. 18 Part I: Finding a Role p. 21 Chapter 1: “Hammarskjöld as a way of life” p. 22 A. “The Great Technocrat” p. 22 A.1 Dag Hammarskjöld’s Upbringing and Education p. 22 A.2 The Civil Servant p. 26 A.3 Criticism of Hammarskjöld’s Double Role p. 30 B. “The most friendly and western-minded” p. 32 B.1 Sweden’s Man in the West p. 32 B.2 Flexible Neutrality or the Strange Case of Dr Undén and Mr Hammarskjöld p. 36 B.3 Minister Hammarskjöld p. 40 C. The Ideal Civil Servant p. 44 C.1 Hammarskjöld’s Theory of the Ideal Civil Servant p. 44 C.2 The Heritage of Hjalmar Hammarskjöld p. 46 C.3 The Religious Ideal of Servitude p. 48 Chapter 2: “The most difficult job in the world” p. 52 A. “A veto-ridden-failure of an ideal”: The UN in 1953 p. 53 A.1 The Security Council: “An Alliance of Great Powers embedded in a universal organization p. 53 A.2 The General Assembly: “The Monkey House” p. 53 A.3 The Potential of the Secretary-General: “A virgin field of influence” p. 55 B. The Secretariat under Hammarskjöld p. 57 B.1 Hammarskjöld’s Reorganisation of the Secretariat: Centralising Power in the Hands of the Secretary-General p. 57 B2. Hammarskjöld and his Team p. 61 C. The Political Role of the Secretary-General p. 68 C.1 “Dangerous implications” p. 68 4 C.2 Hammarskjöld’s Method p. 71 C.3 The “Ideology of the Charter” and Hammarskjöld’s “Secular Church” p. 75 Chapter 3: Hammarskjöld’s First Attempts to Expand his Role p. 79 A. The “Peking Formula” p. 79 A.1 Hammarskjöld’s Mission to Peking p. 79 A.2 Secretary-General in Search of a Role p. 83 A.3 “Volunteer operations on a freewheeling basis” p. 87 B. The Hammarskjöld Mission to the Middle East in 1956 p. 92 B.1 From “Agent General” to Secretary-General p. 92 B.2 Negotiating Between Different Mandates p. 97 B.3 “Continued good offices” p. 102 Part II: Finding a Role p. 105 Chapter 4: The Secretary-General as “a force” p. 106 A. The Suez Crisis as a Catalyst for a New Role for Hammarskjöld p. 106 A.1 Hammarskjöld and the Americans at Suez: Cold War Priorities and Colonial Problems p. 106 A.2 Hammarskjöld and Dulles Tame the General Assembly p. 110 A.3 “He had become a force” p. 115 B. Hammarskjöld’s Development of an Independent Political Role p. 118 B.1 The “Vacuum Theory” p. 118 B.2 “Mr. Hammarsköld’s prestige and influence” p. 120 B.3 “Spiking one of the heaviest guns in the Communist armoury: Economic and Political Assistance to the Third-World p. 122 C. The “Hammarskjöld doctrine for Black Africa” p. 130 Part III. The Problems with the Role p. 140 Chapter 5: “Gamesmanship”: The Congo Crisis until September 1960 p. 141 A. “The most advanced and sophisticated experiment in international cooperation ever attempted” p. 141 A.1 UN Action to “keep bears out of Congo caviar” p. 141 A.2 ONUC and the “Congo Club” p. 148 B. Hammarskjöld against Lumumba p. 151 5 B.1 “Guarantees of Western Interests” p. 151 B.2 Exclusive Multilateral Assistance or a UN trusteeship? p. 153 B.3 “Showdown” with Lumumba over Katanga p. 160 C. The Conspirators p. 169 C.1 Kasavubu’s Coup: The UN Tries to Topple Lumumba p. 169 C.2 “A Lumumba Victory” and a New Coup p. 174 Chapter 6: “A completely do nothing impartiality”: The Congo Crisis from September 1960 until January 1961 p. 180 A. The Congo Crisis in the General Assembly p. 180 A.1 The Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly p. 180 A.2 Khrushchev v. Hammarskjöld in the General Assembly p. 183 B. “The search for legality” p. 189 B.1 The Change in Hammarskjöld’s Congo Policy p. 189 B.2 “Who is the UN neutral against?” p. 193 C. Democracy and its Limits p. 196 C.1 Winning Elections in Leopoldville and New York p. 196 C.2 “Things Fall Apart” p. 199 Chapter 7: “Il faut faire de la politique”: The Congo Crisis from January to September 1961 p. 204 A. An Old Policy with a New Mandate p. 204 A.1 Hammarskjöld and the Kennedy Administration: A New Start with Old Friends p. 204 A.2 Selling the New US-UN Policy p. 207 A.3 Lumumba’s Death and Resolution 161 p. 209 B. Creating a Victory in the Congo p. 214 B.1 “The International Civil Servant in Law and Fact” p. 214 B.2 Getting Rid of Dayal p. 223 B.3 “Throwing all semblance of non-intervention to the winds” p. 225 C. Intervening in Katanga p. 228 C.1 Operation Rumpunch p. 228 C.2 Operation Morthor p. 231 C.3 The Americans Say No p. 237 Conclusion p. 242 Bibliography p. 255 6 Acknowledgements Foremost I would like to thank John Kent, my doctoral supervisor at the International Relations Department at the London School of Economics, who has supported me throughout the work on the thesis. I would also like to thank Anders Stephanson, who was my designated advisor at the History Department at Columbia University. I am also very grateful to Maurice Vaïsse, who was my supervisor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences Po) de Paris, under whose wings I wrote my master thesis on the relations between Dag Hammarskjöld and France. At the London School of Economics and Columbia University I have also benefitted much from discussions with Toby Dodge (member of my upgrade panel), Jens Meierhenrich, Fawas Gerges, Michael Cox, Mark Mazower and Volker Berghahn. In Paris, I would also like to thank Jennifer Merchant and Colette Barbier. In Stockholm, I would in particular like to thank Jack Zawistowski, who was responsible for the Hammarskjöld Papers at the National Library until his retirement. A special note of thanks is due to Sverker Åström, the grand old man of Swedish diplomacy; Wilhelm Wachtmeister, who ended a long and successful diplomatic career as doyen of the diplomatic corps in Washington; and Knut Hammarskjöld, head of IATA and Dag Hammarskjöld’s nephew. It was a great privilege to meet and interview these three who have sadly passed away since. I am very grateful for the funds that have enabled me to pursue my doctoral studies.