w . c e p a o r g FRONTLINE ALLIES: WAR AND CHANGE IN CENTRAL EUROPE U.S.-Central Europe Strategic Assessment Group Report November 2015 Table of Contents Introduction 1 Frontline Diplomacy Europe’s New Frontier 15 Poland: The Challenges of Middle Power Diplomacy 25 How Strategically Unified is Central Europe? 33 Frontline War Planning Is the Nordic-Baltic Region Defensible? 43 Competitive Strategies for Small States 57 Can Poland Deter Russia? 65 Building a Baltic Security Pillar 77 U.S. Strategy in Europe’s Frontline Countering Russian Nuclear Strategy in Central Europe 87 U.S. Policy and Central European Strategic Diversification103 Why Frontline States Need Offensive Weapons 111 A Deterrence by Denial Strategy for the Baltic 119 Recommendations and Conclusions 129 FRONTLINE ALLIES War and Change in Change in Central Europe The war in Ukraine is changing the behavior of U.S. allies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). After years of tranquility, geopolitics has returned, bringing new forms of warfare that could threaten the vital interests or even existence of the small- to medium-sized democracies between the Baltic and Black Seas. American allies find themselves in a jittery and diplomatically fluid landscape where NATO still reigns but fears of Russia and doubts about Western reliability are growing. Though still nascent, changes are stirring that could reshape Central Europe for years to come. Old assumptions about the strength of Western institutions and the acquiescence of Russia are being re-thought. New alliances are being formed and new military doctrines contemplated while some seek to strike pragmatic deals with Vladimir Putin. The United States has not been closely attuned to these shifts, viewing CEE through the prism of early post-Cold War experience and reserving high-level strategy for the Middle East and Asia. To address this gap, the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) conducted a yearlong exercise led by senior military and political experts to assess geopolitical change in frontline Europe. The aim was twofold: to examine how CEE foreign and security policies are adapting to the conditions created by the Ukraine war and to identify what these changes mean for U.S. strategy. The project found that, in virtually every CEE member state of NATO, the Ukraine War has been a catalyst for potentially far-reaching changes across a wide spectrum of military and diplomatic behaviors. Whether these changes lead to positive or negative outcomes for U.S. national security depends in large part on how they are channeled—a fact that Russia has been quicker to grasp than the West. The new strategic landscape of CEE offers an opportunity for a reinvigorated and specialized set of frontline alliances capable of stabilizing Europe’s eastern flank. But reaching this goal will require the United States to be as active a participant in shaping outcomes as it was in earlier phases of the CEE transition. FRONTLINE ALLIES 2 3 FRONTLINE ALLIES Introduction War alters the behavior of states. If geopolitics is the quest for the survival of the state, then war is the tutorial that teaches states what tools they must acquire in order to survive. War rearranges the priorities of states, casting a harsh light on the utility of arrangements developed during the preceding peace. Old diplomatic alignments may suddenly seem inadequate or misbegotten; new or deeper alliances may seem urgently needful. More dramatically, the return of war to a theater that was blessed by peace for a prolonged period of time clarifies and crystallizes the military needs of the state – in two ways. First, the belligerent state, Russia in this case, reveals itself as a military threat, challenging the desire of the targeted states to underinvest in instruments of war. Thus, states that justified small public expenditures on defense before a war may find themselves requiring larger and more capable militaries. Second, war clarifies the utility of existing military instruments. It may show that long-cherished ideas about the character of a future war were mistaken, and point to a need for altogether different weapons or doctrines to cope with the threat. The change that war brings to the calculations of states constitutes perhaps the oldest rhythm of geopolitics. For most of history, it has been the norm; seasons of peace are interrupted by conflict and the preparation that it requires. Exceptions to this cycle are rare. The “long peace” in European diplomacy that began with the Congress of Vienna and ended with the First World War is one; the peace brought by the close of the Cold War is another. Through the eastern expansion of NATO and the European Union (EU), the West formed a zone of stability stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the eastern border of Poland that overrode the logic of change brought by warfare in both its diplomatic and military forms. By encompassing most of the Western world, it obviated the need for diplomatic jockeying and arms races that had characterized most of European history. Sealing this arrangement was the weakness of Russia and the abiding political and military involvement of the United States in European affairs. Lacking a serious threat, surrounded by the world’s largest trade bloc and backed by the conventional and nuclear guarantees of the world’s greatest superpower, Europe was sheltered, more than any other region, from traditional geopolitics. FRONTLINE ALLIES 4 No one benefited from this pause of history more the small and mid-sized states occupying Europe’s historically troubled eastern frontier.1 One need only look at the frenzied diplomatic alignments and military preparations undertaken by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania during the 1930s to see how the threat of war forces diplomatic realignments and moral dilemmas on states that are small and geographically exposed. For CEE states, and above all, for the traditional chief victim of geopolitics, Poland, the order and stability brought by NATO promised to forever remove the need for these unending evolutions that would normally be required for polities in their position— perhaps indefinitely. Russia’s attack on Ukraine shattered these illusions, which had already been severely tested by the 2008 war in Georgia. The invasion of Europe’s largest country showcased appetites and, more importantly, abilities on the part of Russia that defied Western expectations. The war demonstrated that Russia is more traditionally (that is to say, territorially) acquisitive in its contemporary foreign-policy goals: it wants to grab more land. It also showed that Russia has improved its military capabilities enabling it to carry out those goals against local political and military resistance without incurring serious diplomatic or military Western opposition. The inadequacies of NATO that were laid bare by Russian aggression in Ukraine are well-documented and do not need to be recounted at length here.2 The important point about the emergence of a more determined and capable Russia is that it has challenged the solvency of NATO as a system of security provision. Until now, this solvency had been either taken for granted or deemed unnecessary, insulating the Alliance’s members, especially along its eastern frontier, against the historical process of adaptive alliance-building and military self-help. The war changed this, in two ways. First, politically, the war in Ukraine modeled a new type of threat—quick, stealthy, low- intensity, and limited land conquests—perfectly engineered to exploit divergences of threat perception among NATO’s western and eastern members, isolating vulnerable frontline states by impeding the process of political consensus needed for the Article 5 Collective Security guarantee to function. 1 Bulgaria, Estonia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Romania. 2 For a detailed analysis of NATO’s shortcomings exposed by the Ukraine War, see “Collective Defence and Common Security, Twin Pillars of the Atlantic Alliance,” Group of Policy Experts report to the NATO Secretary General, June 2014. 5 FRONTLINE ALLIES Secondly, militarily, the “limited war” tactics adopted by Russia in Crimea and the Donbas, with their emphasis on fast territorial faits accomplis, are a form of warfare well-designed to defeating NATO’s security posture characterized by weak perimeter states reliant upon distant reinforcements. While NATO plans a defense-in-depth, Russia threatens to rewrite the map around the extremities.3 Backed by an “escalate-to-deescalate” nuclear doctrine and growing Russian control of air superiority assets, these techniques represent a formidable strategic problem for the NATO alliance. That the war in Ukraine has produced these effects is now widely understood. But for the most part, the conventional wisdom holds that any allied responses to the sharper security dynamics introduced by the war will remain within the bounds of NATO cooperation. That is to say, while the war may represent traditional security behavior on the part of Russia, the assumption is that the adverse effects of this behavior on NATO members will be heavily mitigated by the presence of NATO (and perhaps, to a different degree, of the European Union). Put differently, European states—including exposed CEE ones—remain sheltered from the ‘normal’ pressures that war creates for state-level diplomatic and military adaptation. Indeed, the widespread assumption is that the war has strengthened NATO by providing a reinvigorated military purpose for Western security cooperation after years of drift. The policy focus is therefore overwhelmingly on finding new mechanisms within the NATO context to make the Alliance more effective against the threat. To some extent, this reasoning is valid. The war provides a clearer and more immediate (even existential) threat than any since the end of the Cold War and, in theory, this threat could come to form a “glue” binding the Alliance together more tightly with time. Russia’s aggressive behavior may strengthen alliance solidarity.