Vagdoutis, Nikolaos (2018) Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt in Weimar: a riddle of political constitutionalism. PhD thesis. https://theses.gla.ac.uk/9076/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt in Weimar: A riddle of political constitutionalism Nikolaos Vagdoutis LLB, LLM Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of PhD School of Law College of Social Sciences University of Glasgow May, 2018 2 Abstract This thesis approaches the Weimar constitutional debate by focusing on its most significant participants, Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt. It reveals that this debate concerned the constitutional question in the context of the contradiction between the democratic modern state and the capitalist economy. It was in that sense a debate on the 'riddle' that was identified by the young Marx concerning the problem of the political form through which modern societies are regulated, caught between the political question, namely that of political power, and by the social question, namely that of the socio- economic structures of power. In effect the term “political constitutionalism” captures this tension through which Hans Kelsen and Carl Schmitt approached the constitutional question. The historical context of the Weimar Republic is important in order to bring into the light the theories of Kelsen and Schmitt (and, secondarily, of other Weimar theorists who also approached the constitutional question through similar problématiques). Regarding this context, it is, firstly, demonstrated that the Weimar Constitution was a post-traditional constitution that dealt both with the political question (the introduction of parliamentary democracy) and with the “social question” through its “economic constitution”. It is, secondly, demonstrated how the relationship between political and socio-economic power affected, in turn, the constitutional order throughout Weimar by leading ultimately to its structural transformation. This thesis argues, firstly, that Schmitt’s solution to Marx’s riddle dissociated the constitution from its democratic promise in order to protect a concept of constitutionalism that would maintain the 19th century liberal political-economic divide. Hence, it ended up as a theory of “authoritarian liberalism” that legitimized the “structural transformation” of the Weimar constitutional order between 1930-32; secondly, that Kelsen’s solution, while placing emphasis on the association of the constitution with the democratic promise, underplayed the power of the capitalist mode of production to affect both the State and the constitutional order itself. As a result, and although he defended the Republic and the Weimar Constitution, he could not see that the constitution itself was traversed by the power of capital in its entanglement with the mode of production. 3 Table of Contents Abstract ................................................................................................................................. 2 Table of Contents ................................................................................................................. 3 Acknowledgements .............................................................................................................. 5 Author’s Declaration ........................................................................................................... 6 List of Abbreviations ........................................................................................................... 7 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 8 Part A: The founding of the Weimar Constitution ......................................................... 27 Chapter 1: From the councils to the Constituent Assembly: the first conflict towards a new concept of a “we” ................................................................................................................. 27 Chapter 2: Rosa Luxemburg: glimpses of a democratic “we” between Bernstein’s evolutionism and the Leninist strategy. ............................................................................... 41 2.1. Eduard Bernstein: evolutionary road to socialism .................................................... 42 2.2. Rosa Luxemburg's critique: representative democracy as a “shelter” of public life.48 Chapter 3: The “political question’’ in the Weimar Constitution ........................................ 58 3.0. Discontinuities and Continuities in the Weimar Constitution: An Introductory Note on the “political question” ............................................................................................... 59 3.1. The President of the Reich: The par excellence concept of continuity? ................... 64 3.2. Max Weber’s constitutional theory ........................................................................... 74 Chapter 4. The “social question” in the Weimar Constitution ............................................. 90 4.1. The Weimar welfare state ............................................................................................. 4.2. The “economic constitution”: its architecture and its “hijacking” ............................ 98 4.3. The economic constitution as a question of strategy: advocates and critics ........... 111 Part B: Carl Schmitt and Hans Kelsen: Between state and legal theory .................... 130 Chapter 5. Carl Schmitt in Weimar: An authoritarian liberal? ......................................... 130 5.1. Young Schmitt’s pre-Weimar influences: law and its realization .......................... 138 5.2. Schmitt in early Weimar: The conservative shift, decisionism and the exception . 140 5.2.1. “Political Romanticism” ...................................................................................... 142 5.2.2. Between “sovereign” and “commissary” dictatorship ......................................... 144 5.2.3. Schmitt in Jena: The economy in the “exception”? Theory and practice ............ 155 4 5.3. Schmitt’s ‘‘exceptionalism’’ and his concept of political representation ............... 164 5.4. Schmitt’s “Constitutional Theory” ......................................................................... 172 5.5. Schmitt’s political engagement and theoretical shift: ‘‘Strong State-Free Economy’’, Institutionalism and article 48 .................................................................... 183 5.5.1. The transition to the authoritarian state ............................................................... 184 5.5.2. Between dictatorship and Nazi’s ascent to power: Schmitt the advisor .............. 197 5.5.3. Schmitt’s response to the Weimar crisis .............................................................. 204 Chapter 6. Hans Kelsen’s Staatslehre: Back to the State? ................................................. 214 6.1. Hans Kelsen and the Austrian Constitution ............................................................ 224 6.2. Kelsen’s political theory: the “class equilibrium” State theory .............................. 228 6.3. Kelsen’s legal theory: Law as a “social technique” and his critique of ideological dualisms ......................................................................................................................... 242 6. 4. Kelsen’s constitutional review: the political in the legal ....................................... 251 6.5. Kelsen’s theory, the late Weimar Republic and the “family” of social democratic approaches ...................................................................................................................... 259 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 268 Bibliography ..................................................................................................................... 277 5 Acknowledgements I would like to express my sincere gratitude to everyone who has supported, encouraged and made it possible for me to complete this thesis. I would especially like to thank: The main supervisor of my dissertation, Professor Emilios Christodoulidis for his constructive supervision, advice and support during these years. The second supervisor, Professor Hans Lindahl for his insightful comments. Dr Marco Goldoni for his generous encouragement during the difficult periods of my studies and for his splendid friendship. The rest of the colleagues at the Legal Theory reading group and especially Dr Su Bian and Dr Pablo Marshall. My friend and colleague Dr Alexandros Kessopoulos for his genuine interest in my research and kind inspiration. My parents for their generous support and love, and certainly my sisters Georgia and Triantafyllia for their encouragement and thoughtfulness. 6 Author’s Declaration I declare that, except where explicit reference is made to the contribution of others, this