The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare Volume 20 Issue 1 March Article 2 March 1993 Theory and the Generation and Subversion of Knowledge Dennis Saleebey University of Kansas Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw Part of the Social Work Commons, and the Theory, Knowledge and Science Commons Recommended Citation Saleebey, Dennis (1993) "Theory and the Generation and Subversion of Knowledge," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 20 : Iss. 1 , Article 2. Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol20/iss1/2 This Article is brought to you by the Western Michigan University School of Social Work. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Theory and the Generation and Subversion of Knowledge DENNIS SALEEBEY The University of Kansas School of Social Welfare This essay is an argument for the refurbishing of theoretical thinking in social work. In particular, the author calls for the infusion of generative as opposed to normative theory in the profession. Only generative theory has been proven to invigorate the thinking and doing of professional social workers. The current debate in the social work academy about posi- tivist versus more heuristic approaches to knowledge develop- ment is clearly an epistemological struggle that, more often than not, hinges on concerns about method and methodology (Fis- cher, 1981; Gordon, 1983; Heineman [Pieper], 1981). Certainly in epistemological inquiry method must be of interest but it should not be, as it has turned out here, a singular obsession. Method, and the data that it may help us accumulate, is not synonymous with meaning, does not add up to understand- ing or even, except in the merest sense of the word, learning. Jeffrey Alexander (1983b) in his massive four-volume critique and exposition of the current state of sociological theory and governing theoretical logic puts it this way in decrying the sway of methodology over theory: The crucial proposition of the positivist persuasion ... is the belief that factual statements can be ontologically separated from non- factual statements or generalizations. From this central tenet other components of the positivist persuasion inevitably follow: the notions that philosophical or metaphysical issues play no essential part in a true empirical science, that theoretical disputes must be decided by reference to crucial empirical experiments alone, that methodological techniques of verification or falsification are of critical and ultimate importance. In opposition to these positivist tendencies, I suggested that general as well as specific thinking 6 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare is crucial to science, and I defined this "theoretical" ... logic as the concern with the effects of more general assumptions on the more specific formulations (p. xiv). Theory is not only a critical element in the advance of thinking in a particular discipline or profession, but it is absolutely es- sential, as Alexander argues, to method; without theory method makes little sense, and has little relevance in addressing com- pelling questions about the human condition. This essay is an argument for reinstating theory into the epistemological debates in which social work is embroiled, as well as a plea for the particular poignance of generative theory over normative theory. Once a discipline or profession has decided that philosophical and theoretical issues are too far removed from the exigencies of life, and once empirical obser- vation has become reasonably problem-free, then most practice issues and questions will inevitably be decided by method. At that point, theory becomes relatively useless to a profession, and what theory might conceivably arise out of this positivist, inductive scenario is, in the end driven by method, not concep- tion, not value, not urgency, and certainly not philosophy. This "normative" view of theory, it will be contended, is inadequate for illuminating the concerns of the social work profession. Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1984), in his attempt to revive organization theory, makes the distinction between normative theory and science, and what he calls the substantive view. The former, regnant over social science, is "scientistic... it assumes that the correct model of reality can only be articulated accord- ing to the ...technical language of natural science" (p. 40). He goes on to maintain that a "sound argument against (norma- tive) science. simply asserts that method and technique are not standards of truth and proper scientific knowledge.... To consider this mode of knowing as the paradigm of knowledge in all realms of reality is precisely what Whitehead called the 'fallacy of misplaced concreteness'" (p. 40). The Necessity of Theory If method is insufficient as a means for revealing, shaping, or informing the world of language and action and if the ac- cumulation of methodically derived fact will not add up to Generative Theory 7 knowledge, truth, reality, or understanding, maybe even not interest, then it behooves us to carefully examine the nature and role of theory. The other side of this coin is that probably no methodological entre into the world of experience is without presumption or "theory," anyway, although usually implicit. Theory can be formally defined. The prototypical definition in social science is probably Robert Merton's: It is only when concepts are interrelated (my emphasis) in the form of a scheme that a theory begins to emerge. Concepts, then, con- stitute the definitions (or prescriptions) of what is to be observed; they are the variables between which empirical generalizations are to be sought. When propositions are logically interrelated, a theory has been instituted (1957, p. 89). The task of the theorist is to explain and account for rela- tionships between empirical generalizations, usually at a higher level of abstraction. An empirical generalization, which may or may not have theoretical pertinence, is a proposition which as- serts, thanks to replicated observation, a consistent relationship between at least two variables. Frequently mistaken for model, concept or even empirical generalization, it is theory's work to explain the relationships between seemingly isolated empirical generalizations at a more abstract level of conceptualization. The classical example often referred to in the sociological literature is Emile Durkheim's theory of suicide (Greenwood, 1960; Merton, 1957). Durkheim's initial observations revealed a number of puzzling uniformities (empirical generalizations): Protestants have more suicides than Catholics; unmarried indi- viduals more than the married; urban dwellers more than rural. The quest for explanatory devices for these empirical generaliza- tions led Durkheim (1951) to the concepts of social integration (cohesion, richness of social relationships) and individualism. He eventually constructed a theory of suicide out of this and other conceptual material, posing the central formulation of the theory as: "suicide varies inversely with the degree of integra- tion of social groups" (p. 209). This ultimately yielded three kinds of suicide-altruistic, egoistic, and anomic, all variants of the differing relationships between degrees of solidarity and individualism. 8 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare Once having established the theoretic pertinence of a uniformity (e.g. the suicide rate differential) by deriving it from a set of interrelated propositions provide for the cumulation both of theory and research findings. The differentials-in-suicide rate uniformities add confirmation to the set of propositions from which they, and other uniformities, have been derived. This is a major function of systematic theory (Merton, 1957, p. 97). Although Merton seems of two minds about the function of more general and sweeping theories (at one time suggesting they yield theoretical insights and help clarify the relationship between concepts; at another arguing that they are too remote from the reality of behavior), he has consistently promoted the value of "theories of the middle-range" which focus on "verifiable statements of relationships between specified variables" (Alexander, 1983a). Perhaps the best examples of theories of this scope exist in social psychology: attribution, cognitive dis- sonance, reactance, and reference group theories. Thomas Kuhn (1970) has argued that if you want to get at the gist of "normal science" (i.e., the prevailing views of method and instrumentation, of theory and theory-building in a given discipline or area of investigation) look to the textbooks that "scientist-to-be" (or practitioners-to-be, we might add) read. Let us, then, turn to one representative text used to teach research to social science and social work students, Nachmias and Nach- mias' Research Methods in the Social Sciences (1987) to see what they have to say about theory in normal social science. A theoretical system is one that provides a structure for the complete explanation of empirical phenomena .... A theoreti- cal system... consists of a set of propositions, that is, statements of relationships between two or more empirical properties that can be verified or refuted: such a set of propositions forms a deductive system ... (and) some propositions are deduced from others... (and) they are said to be explained as well as to provide predictions ... (p. 43). Thus, the normative approach to theory is that it explains relationships in a systematic way, between discrete groups of uniformities that, without