Anti-libertarianism Worth Hoping for: A Consequentialist Defense for Hard Incompatibilist Moral Responsibility Revisionism Student Name: Willem Marijnus Smit Student Number: 6030807 Master Program: Applied Ethics Date: 21-6-2018 Word Count: 18413 Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Niels van Miltenburg Second Reader: Dr. Hanno Sauer 1 Abstract: If we do not have a free will, this could have significant implications for our morality. Hard incompatibilism is the belief that there is no free will, and that therefore no ‘true’ moral responsibility exists either. In this thesis, I will argue for the moral desirability of hard incompatibilism by arguing for its moral revisionist implications regarding our responsibility practices. I will describe a consequentialist view of moral responsibility that is not undercut by hard incompatibilism. By doing so, I will show that hard incompatibilists still have a reliable way to hold people responsible. The consequentialist view also fits well with the hard incompatibilist ideal of revisionism, as most of these good consequences are good regardless of incompatibilism, and therefore make the incompatibilist theory more morally attractive than compatibilism and even libertarianism. This will also affect our emotional reactions that are related to responsibility. Although I accept some natural basis in our responsibility related emotions, I will argue that we have good reason for a revision in the expression of our pre-reflected reactive emotions by means of a change in cultural emotional norms. Still, a reflective stance is also at all times desirable. Both of these are thus in way to approach revisionism there. I end up taking a more moderate stance than my incompatibilist predecessors, by saying that incompatibilist blame is non-deserved, rather than undeserved. Therefore, I do not opt for full abolishment of these reactive emotions, which I think is not realistic anyway. 2 Table of contents Introduction............................................................................................... pp. 4-6. 1. Metaphysical starting point................................................................... pp. 7-11. 2. Moral responsibility without 'true' moral responsibility....................... pp. 11-12. • 2.1 Two notions of moral responsibility......................................... pp. 12-13. ▪ 2.1.1 Merit-based views on responsibility........ p. 13. ▪ 2.1.2 consequentialist views on responsibility. pp. 13-14. ▪ 2.1.3 compatibility of responsibility account... pp. 14-18. • 2.2 a defence for my consequentialist view.................................. pp. 18. ▪ 2.2.1 practical accounts of blame and punishment................................................ p. 19. ▪ 2.2.1.1 'merely a means to an end'................... pp. 19-22. • 2.2.1.2 Two problematic punishments.......................................... pp. 22-26. • 2.2.2 Personal interactions............................................................ pp. 26-27. • 2.3 Conclusion.............................................................................. pp. 28. 3. Moral responsibility and our attitudes................................................ pp. 29-31. • 3.1 Against the insulationist move................................................ pp. 31-33. • 3.2 The impossibility challenge.................................................... pp. 33-34. o 3.2.1 'Natural' emotions ............................................... pp. 34-38. o 3.2.2 Impossible to live in?........................................... pp. 38-42. • 3.3 The outcome challenge .......................................................... pp. 42-44. • 3.4 Conclusion............................................................................... p. 45. Conclusion and final remarks................................................................... pp. 46-48. References................................................................................................ pp. 49-51. 3 Introduction Do we have a ‘free will’, in the sense that we are ultimately able to decide what we do? I don’t know. Does it matter, morally speaking? I think it does. Many philosophers have aimed to answer these questions over centuries. Regarding the first question, those who answer to it positively can be called ‘libertarians,’ and those who answer it negatively can then be called ‘anti-libertarians’. Among the defenders of anti- libertarianism are those who think the universe is deterministic. I am specifically interested in causal determinism, a variant of which I will explore in this thesis. Causal determinism, roughly speaking, the belief that everything that happens is determined since it is the only possible outcome of all previous relevant events in the universe following the laws of nature. Many determinists think that it is then consistent to believe that these determined things include our thoughts and choices as well, since those are ultimately caused by natural facts about the world that we have no control over. This anti-libertarian understanding of determinism is typically referred to as ‘hard determinism’. So, adhering to hard determinism leads a possible answer to the first question and, in this essay, I will assume that a variation of it is true, in order to explore the second question: “does it matter for our morality whether we have a free will or not?” As I said before: I think it does, and so I will argue in this thesis. This means that I will be siding with the ‘incompatibilists’, and oppose those who say it does not matter, namely the compatibilists. I think incompatibilism is true, because, if anti-libertarianism is true, for example by means of causal determinism, it implies that people are not ultimately the cause for their actions, and thus also not morally responsible for their actions.1 From this the moral claim follows that it would be wrong to hold people responsible. If ‘no free will’ implies no moral responsibility, this situation would appear to be very problematic for our moral practices. Are people never allowed to blame others since all blame is undeserved? Should we not want for hard determinism to be wrong, so we can have our morally desirable free will, by means of which we can keep 1 Incompatibilism as described by Kane: “U: For every X and Y (where X and Y represent occurrences of events and/or states), if the agent is personally responsible for X, and if Y is an arche (or sufficient ground or cause or explanation) for X, then the agent must also be personally responsible for X.” Robert Kane, The Significance of Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University press , 1998), 35. 4 these important moral practices? The compatibilist is right to point out that we have a lot to lose that we might not be able to afford to lose. I agree with the compatibilist worry that we cannot just give up these moral practices, but I agree more strongly with optimistic incompatibilists: we should and can significantly change our practices. Therefore, some incompatibilists have argued for significant moral responsibility revisionism, so that our practices are more in line with a determinist, anti-libertarian worldview.2 We can devise alternative practices concerning moral responsibility that do not require desert. If this is true, it appears that we might be able to keep most aspect of our morality. But still this would seem to be a bad thing as compared to having a free will; it would be much easier if we could just continue business as usual. In this thesis, my first goal is to defend incompatibilist based revisionism against a variety of strong compatibilist claims that say that revisionism would either be morally problematic, or just practically impossible. However, the upshot is that I manage to give good consequentialist reasons for that we should want the world to be anti-libertarian, since it would open up for revisionism that would make a better world than our current libertarian one. I claim that the implications of anti-libertarianism are morally desirable. To do this, I will describe a consequentialist based moral responsibility that is compatible with incompatibilism and defend this against a variety of theoretical and practical worries that could be, and have been, raised by compatibilists or pessimist incompatibilists (Chapter 2). Subsequently, I take on the most crucial challenge for incompatibilist revisionism, namely our reactive attitudes. 3 It being thought that we, as humans, have certain emotional intuitions that are crucial for our responsibility practices. As these are typically in line with the standard libertarian or compatibilist beliefs regarding responsibility they therefore thought to be morally undesirable. Hard incompatibilist revisionists typically claim that revisionism is required in our emotional repertoire by abolishing our reactive attitudes. I will discuss this ‘abolitionist’ position of revisionist hard incompatibilism, and take a more modest, but also more realistic, stance than other abolitionists (Chapter 3). Before I do this, I will give a short explanation of the metaphysical position which moral impact I am going to defend. I will be modest in my 2 This is most prominently defended by Pereboom in various works. 3 Peter F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 48 (1962), 1–25. 5 metaphysical claims, as this is a thesis in ethics, not in metaphysics. Yet, as for any discussion it is important to sketch out a clear playing field - what is being compared to what? Furthermore, I think the metaphysical position I defend needs