United States Space Management and Organization: Evaluating Organizational Options Keith Kruse Charles B. Cushman, Jr. Darcy M.E. Noricks DFI International And Craig Baker Space Commission Staff Member Prepared for the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization The information presented in this paper is based on research done by the author. Although it was prepared for the Commission in conjunction with its deliberations, the opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author alone and do not represent those of the Commission or any of the Commissioners. 1 United States Management and Organization: Evaluating Organizational Options Table of Contents I. Introduction. 5 II. Construct for Evaluation. 10 A. Organizational Management Functions . 10 B. Methodology. 12 C. Assumptions . 12 D. Criteria . 13 III. Baseline. 14 A. High-Level Guidance . 14 1. Executive Office of the President . 15 2. Interagency/Inter-sector Cooperation (DoD-Civil) . 18 3. Interagency/Inter-sector Cooperation (DoD-Commercial) . 24 4. Interagency/Inter-sector Cooperation (DoD-IC) . 32 5. Congress . 37 B. Implementation Guidance, Policy and Oversight. 42 1. Intelligence Community . 43 2. Office of the Secretary of Defense . 49 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff . 57 4. Military Services . 62 5. Programming and Budgeting . 68 C. Requirements Determination . 84 1. Intelligence Community . 86 2. OSD . 88 3. Joint Chiefs of Staff . 88 4. CINCs/Services . 91 D. Research, Development and Acquisition . 103 1. Intelligence Community . 104 2. Office of the Secretary of Defense . 106 3. Military Services . 110 4. CINCs . 128 E. Operations, Use, Training and Education. 129 1. Intelligence Community . 130 2. CINCs . 132 3. Military Services . 143 4. Training and Education . 146 3 United States Management and Organization: Evaluating Organizational Options IV. Desired Outcomes and the Limitations of the Baseline . 154 A. High-Level Guidance . 154 B. Implementing Guidance, Policy and Oversight . 157 C. Requirements Determination . 158 D. Research, Development and Acquisition . 159 E. Operations, Use, Training and Education. 160 V. Options for Space Management and Organization. 162 A. Congressionally Mandated Options . 162 1. An Independent Military Department and Service . 163 2. A Space Corps within the Air Force . 164 3. An Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space . 166 4. A Space Major Force Program . 167 B. Other Suggested Options . 168 1. Centralized Space Management and Operations Option . 169 2. Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Information and Intelli- gence Option 171 3. Improved DoD/IC Cooperation Option . 172 4. “Nuclear Navy” Option . 173 5. Air Force’s Recommended Changes . 175 1. Transition/Executive Agent Option . 178 2. National Security Space Organization Option . 181 3. Joint Option . 182 VI. Summary of Organizational Options . 186 A. High-Level Guidance . 186 B. Implementing Guidance, Policy and Oversight . 187 1. OSD-DCI cooperation options . 188 2. Policy guidance options . 189 3. Budget-Programming guidance options . 191 C. Requirements Determination . 193 D. Research, Development & Acquisition . 194 E. Operations, Use, Training and Education. 196 4 United States Management and Organization: Evaluating Organizational Options Preface This document is not intended to be exhaustive, although it is intended to be sufficiently comprehensive to support those topics the Commissioners discussed during the course of their deliberations. In several cases, this paper touches on topics but does not completely detail those topics. This occurs where the Commissioners did not delve too deeply into issues not considered vital to the execution of their charge. Readers desiring more information on specific units or agencies not covered here should contact those agencies directly. The information is only as accurate and as current as could be obtained from published sources describing some of the organizations, since the authors did not specifically contact every organization addressed herein to verify the accuracy and currency of the information presented. The materials collected and the analyses provided to the Commissioners are reflected in the background paper that follows. I. Introduction Since the initiation of the Root reforms in the War Department in 1903, the defense establishment of the United States has confronted several key turning points when American leaders discovered that defense organization, technology and doctrine were not aligned optimally. At the end of both World War I and World War II, Congress engaged in a series of major discussions aimed at producing legislation that would reorganize the military in a way that more completely meshed technological advances (such as the airplane, the tank, aircraft carriers, and radio communications), improvements in doctrine, and military organization. Specifically, the history of the nearly half-century long evolution of the military’s organization to use aircraft from the Wright brothers’ first flight in 1903, and the establishment of an independent Air Force in 1947 is a case in point, full of military debates on the use of aircraft and legislative battles to build an effective defense organization. The history of these legislative efforts offers some insight into the organizational options facing the United States today as it confronts the challenges of managing the national security space mission. In particular, the history of military reorganization over the past century indicates both the gradual pace of change and the importance of congressional involvement in advancing defense reorganizations.1 5 United States Management and Organization: Evaluating Organizational Options The evolution of the Army Air Corps into the United States Air Force presents interesting parallels to the evolution of military space. Following the successes of American aviators in the First World War, military leaders and legislators in Congress began to discuss the appropriate organization for the future of U.S. military aviation. Army aviators, led by the fiery advocate for aviation’s independence, Brigadier General William “Billy” Mitchell, argued for the creation of a new, independent Air Force, but the Army’s senior leaders convinced Congress that such a move was premature. Instead, Congress reorganized the Army, moving the aviators out of the Signal Corps and into the Air Corps, designated a separate branch of the Army in 1926, equivalent to the other combat branches (infantry, cavalry, and artillery). In these years, Air Corps leaders developed a detailed doctrine for the use of aircraft for close air support, pursuit of enemy aircraft, and bombardment. In 1936, the Army established General HQ, Army Air Forces (GHQ, AAF), to provide field command of air units, and later designated the Chief of the Air Corps as Commander, GHQ, AAF in order to centralize command of Army air assets. Further evolution of the air arm occurred in World War II. The Chief of the Air Corps was designated the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air, and in 1942, a wartime reorganization made the AAF an independent headquarters within the Army, parallel to the Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply, which provided common items and basic logistics, supply and support services to the field units. The AAF managed their own research and development (R&D) and procurement programs for aircraft, weapons, and aircraft-specific support equipment, with their budget under the final decision authority of the Secretary of War, who submitted the entire Army budget to the Congress.2 Throughout this period, the AAF operated largely as an independent organization, with its own chain of command and acquisition infrastructure, but the Air Forces personnel were still members of the Army. The head of the AAF, General Henry “Hap” 1 This historical example is drawn from several sources: I.B. Holley, Ideas and Weapons (1953, USAF reprint, 1997); Warren Trest, Air Force Roles and Missions: A History (US Air Force History and Museum Program, 1998); John Shiner, Faulois and the US Army Air Corps 1931-35 (US Air Force History and Museum Program, 1983), and “The Coming of GHQ Air Forces,” in Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume I (1907-1950) (US Air Force History and Museum Program, 1997); Maurer Maurer, Ph.D., Aviation in the US Army, 1919- 1939 (US Air Force History and Museum Program, 1987); R. Earl McClendon, Autonomy of the Air Arm (US Air Force History and Museum Program, 1996); Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm 1917-1941 (US Air Force History and Museum Program, 1985); and Richard G. Davis, HAP: Henry H. Arnold, Military Aviator (US Air Force 50th Anniversary Commemorative Pamphlet, 1997). 2 Lawrence Benson, Acquisition Management in the Unites States Air Force and its Predecessors (Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 4-19. 6 United States Management and Organization: Evaluating Organizational Options Arnold, also served as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), which was established as an ad hoc organization to coordinate the U.S. war effort, and also included Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest King. The JCS then, unlike today, had no statutory authority to make decisions or advise the President. The Secretaries of War and Navy made decisions and advised the President, and a civilian war resources board managed the industrial war effort. Following the war, Congress engaged in a series