The Practice of Coercive Diplomacy in the Post-9/11 Period by Sharad Joshi B.A. Honors (Economics), University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, India, 1997 M.A. (Politics) School of International Studies Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, India, 2000 Submitted to the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS This dissertation was presented by Sharad Joshi It was defended on October 27, 2006 and approved by Prof. Davis B. Bobrow Prof. Janne E. Nolan Prof. Dennis M. Gormley Dissertation Advisor: Prof. Phil Williams ii Copyright © by Sharad Joshi 2006 iii THE PRACTICE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE POST 9/11 PERIOD Sharad Joshi University of Pittsburgh, 2006 The concept of coercive diplomacy has been used as a framework for analyzing various cases of confrontation between two or more states. Coercive diplomacy is the use of threats by a state to force an adversary to concede to certain demands.. Formulated by Alexander L. George, this concept has been used to understand a diverse group of case studies, such as the initial stages of the Vietnam conflict, the conflict in Laos, as well as the Cuban missile crisis. This dissertation studies four cases from the post-9/11 period and analyzes them through components of coercive diplomacy. These cases are (a) Operation Parakram 2001- 2002 India-Pakistan crisis, (b) U.S. coercion on the Taliban September-October 2001, (c) U.S. coercive diplomacy against Saddam’s Iraq prior to the March 2003 invasion, and (d) Coercive diplomacy and the North Korean nuclear crisis, 2002-2006. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS....................................................................................................V LIST OF TABLES .........................................................................................................VIII ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................X 1.0 THE PRACTICE OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AFTER 9/11...................1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS.........................................................................................1 COERCIVE DIPLOMACY RESEARCH ................................................................7 COERCIVE DIPLOMACY CASE RESEARCH...................................................18 METHODOLOGY: VARIABLES...........................................................................30 METHODOLOGY: CASE SELECTION CRITERIA..........................................38 CASES ........................................................................................................................41 2.0 OPERATION PARAKRAM – INDIA’S COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AGAINST PAKISTAN 2001–2002...................................................................................50 INTRODUCTION .....................................................................................................50 PERCEPTIONS.........................................................................................................55 INDIAN OBJECTIVES AND DEMANDS .............................................................62 CREDIBILITY OF INDIAN THREATS ................................................................77 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT...........................................95 v INTERNAL FACTORS ..........................................................................................104 COERCIVE DIPLOMACY BY INDIA: DID IT SUCCEED? ...........................110 CONCLUSIONS: CONSEQUENCES OF OPERATION PARAKRAM..........113 3.0 OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM IN AFGHANISTAN – FAILURE OF U.S. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY? ...........................................................................117 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................117 OBJECTIVES..........................................................................................................121 CREDIBILITY OF U.S. THREATS......................................................................132 PERCEPTIONS.......................................................................................................137 INTERNAL FACTORS ..........................................................................................143 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.........................................155 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................161 4.0 OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM – FAILURE OF U.S. COERCIVE DIPLOMACY?.................................................................................................................166 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................166 OBJECTIVES..........................................................................................................169 CREDIBILITY OF THREATS..............................................................................180 PERCEPTIONS.......................................................................................................185 INTERNAL FACTORS ..........................................................................................191 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.........................................200 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................206 5.0 COERCIVE DIPLOMACY AND THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS 2002-06 ................................................................................................................210 vi INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................210 PERCEPTIONS.......................................................................................................212 OBJECTIVES..........................................................................................................217 CREDIBILITY OF THREATS..............................................................................233 INTERNAL FACTORS ..........................................................................................242 INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT.........................................253 CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................260 6.0 CONCLUSION – COERCIVE DIPLOMACY SINCE 9/11.......................264 BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................................................285 vii LIST OF TABLES Table 1. Archetypes ...............................................................................................................7 Table 2: benchmarks ............................................................................................................46 Table 3: Coercive diplomacy (George's model) ..................................................................49 Table 4: South Asia - Summary of arguments...................................................................116 Table 5: Taliban case - objectives......................................................................................132 Table 6: Taliban case - Credibility of threats.....................................................................137 Table 7: Taliban case – Perceptions...................................................................................143 Table 8: Taliban case: Internal factors...............................................................................155 Table 9: Taliban case – International Strategic Environment............................................161 Table 10: Taliban case – Summary of arguments..............................................................164 Table 11: Iraq – Objectives................................................................................................180 Table 12: Iraq – Credibility of U.S. threats........................................................................185 Table 13: Iraq - Perceptions ...............................................................................................190 Table 14: Iraq – Internal factors.........................................................................................200 Table 15: Iraq – International Strategic Environment........................................................206 Table 16: Iraq – Summary of Arguments ..........................................................................209 Table 17: North Korean case: Perceptions.........................................................................217 viii Table 18: North Korean case: Objectives ..........................................................................233 Table 19: North Korean case: Credibility of Threats.........................................................241 Table 20: North Korean case: Internal factors ...................................................................253 Table 21: North Korean case: Summary of arguments......................................................263 ix ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS For a doctoral student the most important part of a successful PhD is a kind and understanding academic adviser. It is safe to say that I would not have reached this stage if it hadn’t been for my adviser, Phil Williams.