Notes Chapter 1 1. Burawoy (1985, 76n) purposively uses the term “adaptation” in the place where other researchers might use “resistance.” He reasons that most workers fail to penetrate the capitalistic secret of “securing and obscuring the surplus value.” However, surplus extraction is only one of many grievances that workers suffer from in their disadvantaged situation. Hence, I am willing to use a broader sense of “resistance.” 2. Attempting to revise the obsolete distinction between class-in-itself and class-for-itself, Katznelson formulates four levels of class. They are eco- nomic structure, patterns of life, dispositions, and action. Nevertheless, he is not entirely free from the Marxian teleology. Katznelson (1986, 21) maintains, “Class formation has occurred only when class exists at four levels . simultaneously.” What happens when the four levels are at disjuncture with one another? In that case, which is arguably more com- mon, class formation is still happening, and workers are also engaged in collective action, albeit not in the fashion that Marx had expected. 3. Bowles and Gintis (1986) use the getting/becoming distinction to emphasize the novelty of “new social movements.” Their conceptu- alization, in my opinion, is superior to the more well-known strat- egy/identity comparison (Cohen 1985). By singling out the identity dimension as the distinguishing feature, the latter fails to notice that all social movements, old and new, construct a new identity for the mobilization of their supporters (Calhoun 1993). Chapter 2 1. Technically speaking, “state and public ownership” (guogongying) is the more appropriate term for Taiwan’s SOEs since the narrow defini- tion of “state ownership” refers to those enterprises managed by the central government while local governments, provincial or city, also have productive facilities. Most important economic units are owned by the central government, including the CCP and the TSC discussed in this book. 194 Notes 2. National Resources Commission, “A Statistic Monthly Report, December 1949” (file number 24-03-034-03). The Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. 3. Citing an official document, Lin (1998) argues that Taiwan’s state workers made up 36% of the working population. 4. The author’s calculation of the data in Council for International Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development (1973, 178). 5. See http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=26269&CtNode=5389 &mp=1 (accessed October 18, 2011). 6. National Resources Commission, “A Combined Report on the Per- formance of Production Enterprises by National Resources Commis- sions, the First Half of 1951” (file number 00006). The KMT Party History Archives. 7. See http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=26269&CtNode=5389 &mp=1 (accessed October 18, 2011). 8. In fact, the March 1946 figure already reflected the postwar change, especially the influx of Mainlanders; however, it remains the closest one available to grasp the situation at the end of colonial rule. 9. This estimate was based on two sources that the author was able to obtain. First, there was an extant copy of the transfer inventory at the Talin Sugar Refinery (Supervisor of the Great Nippon Sugar-Making Company Talin Refinery 1946). That document contained a list of 528 employ- ees, including their positions and salaries. The second source came from the Hsinying Sugar Refinery. There were statistics about the personnel structure as early as December 1945 (National Resources Commission 1947, 5). The ethnic ratios of Talin and Hsinying were very close, with an average of around 75 percent of the workforce being Taiwanese. 10. As a contrasting case of refusing to swallow the bitterness, Li Madou, a communist leader executed in 1953, had worked in a sugar refinery in Tainan [Tainan] in the 1920s. In his final confession, Li wrote that he had been forced to resign because he was so incensed by ethnic discrimination that he had been involved in a physical fight with a Japanese coworker (Ou 2008, 122). 11. Changxun [Factory Newsletter (of Kaohsiung Refinery)] (1973) 259: 5. 12. Zhou Hanqing, who served three years in prison for his involvement in the postwar communist movement, worked in the Kaohsiung Refinery in a staff position. On one occasion, all of the Japanese staff members were given new uniforms, and he was the only one not to receive one. Zhou was extremely unhappy about this flagrant discrim- ination (Taiwan Province History Commission 1998, 5, 58). Chapter 3 1. A note on the term “Mainlander” is needed here. With cultural and political indigenization since the 1980s, there has been a tremendous change in national identity; therefore, the term “Taiwanese” now Notes 195 includes the indigenous peoples and Mainlanders. In this book, how- ever, I follow the earlier usage. “Mainlanders” means those who were born in China before migration to Taiwan after 1945, as well as later generations from these migrant families. 2. The following sections are reused and rearranged from Ho (2014). 3. Until the internal market reforms in the early 1960s, the postwar zhi- yuan position corresponded to the Japanese shokuin [J], connoting those white-collar workers from top managers to bottom-level office clerks. They were mostly hired upon their educational credentials. Since the Chinese characters are the same, I continue to use “staff” in naming them. 4. Jin Kaiying, who oversaw the takeover of Kaohsiung Refinery and was later promoted to CPC general manager, was said to deliberately adopt a personnel policy that diversified the new hires in order to avoid factionalism (Feng 2000, 98–99). Evidently this claim was very questionable. 5. Cited from the National Resources Commission Economic Research Office, “A General Report of Survey on Taiwan’s Industrial and Min- ing Enterprises (1946/2),” in Cross-Strait Publication and Exchange Center (2007, 79: 101). 6. Ibid., 103. 7. For example, a son of a National Taiwan University professor from the mainland was hired as deputy engineer (fujishi) by the TSC on the basis of his father’s recommendation to the NRC. See “The TSC Letters on Appointment and Assignment of Staff (1946/5– 1949/1),” in Cross-Strait Publication and Exchange Center (2007, 105: 305–12). 8. “The TSC First Meeting Proceedings (1946/6),” in Cross-Strait Publication and Exchange Center (2007, 111: 325–53). 9. In May 1946, the government issued the Taiwan Dollar to replace the old colonial currency. It lasted for three years until it was replaced by the New Taiwan Dollar (NTD). 10. In 1946, the official exchange rate was 1 Taiwan Dollar for 30 National Dollars, the currency circulating in mainland China. 11. “The TSC Documents Related to Staff Donations (1946/12– 1948/9),” in Cross-Strait Publication and Exchange Center (2007, 158: 395–97). 12. Chen claimed innocence from communist activities in his 2005 mem- oir. But later on he acknowledged participation in the underground insurgency shortly before his death in 2010. I am grateful for Lin Chuan-kai for this information. 13. “The Telegraph of the TSC General Manager to the NRC (1947/3/3),” The Official Documents Concerning the TSC’s Sub- sidiaries during the February 28 Incident (file number 228-B-5-2), The Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. 14. Cross-Strait Publication and Exchange Center (2007, 79: 91). 196 Notes 15. “The TSC Documents Related to Staff Donations (1946/12– 1948/9),” in Cross-Strait Publication and Exchange Center (2007, 158: 379–89). 16. Taitang tongxun [The TSC Communications] (1948) 2(6): 35. 17. “The Telegraph of the TSC General Manager Shen Zhennan to the NRC (1947/3/5),” The Official Documents Concerning the TSC’s Subsidiaries during the February 28 Incident (file number 228-B-5- 2), The Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. 18. “Detailed Report on Dealing with the Incident from the Third Com- manding Headquarters of the Navy” (file number 228-k-2-2), The Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. 19. Voluntary acts by Taiwanese to limit ethnic violence and to shelter threatened Mainlanders were common during the February 28 Incident and were not limited to nationalized factories. It is true that individual motives might have varied from moral abhorrence against violence to rational calculation of the consequences. Moreover, the popular uprising lasted only a week—a short period that might have encouraged wide- spread fence-sitting behavior given that there was an inevitable logic of collective action among Taiwanese who would be likely to join the anti- regime camp only when there was a clear sign of victory. Therefore, there were necessary ambiguities concerning workers’ militia in this confused period. That Taiwanese workers universally chose this option lent itself to multiple interpretations. It could be seen as their disapproval of ethnic violence, or their anticipation of postuprising repression, or even just their wait-and-see hesitation. It is very likely that the truth is forever bur- ied in history. The author is thankful for Wu Nai-teh for this discussion. 20. According to Perry (2006), worker militias symbolized the idea of revolutionary citizenship in the Marxist tradition. Shanghai work- ers’ armed struggles during the 1926–1967 and 1966–1967 conflicts were a concrete example. Taiwan’s short-lived worker militia, how- ever, did not originate from this great revolutionary lineage. It began as a wartime military drill under Japan colonialism and was revived during the chaotic postwar regime change. Moreover, the actions of the Taiwanese workers during the 1947 uprising were nothing more than attempts to shield their factories against outside violence— arguably a “counterrevolutionary” measure in a brewing revolution- ary situation. 21. “The Nanching Refinery in the Taiwan Incident (1947/3),” The Official Documents Concerning the TSC Subsidiaries during the February 28 Incident (file number 228-M-5-2), The Archives of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica.