Traditionalist' Islamic Activism:Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs Metcalf, B.D. Citation Metcalf, B. D. (2002). Traditionalist' Islamic Activism:Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs. Isim Paper, 1-24. Retrieved from https://hdl.handle.net/1887/10068 Version: Not Applicable (or Unknown) License: Leiden University Non-exclusive license Downloaded from: https://hdl.handle.net/1887/10068 Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable). ‘ Tr a d i t i o na l i st’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Ta l i b s i sim pa p e r s : 1 . James Piscatori Islam, Islamists, and the Electoral Principle in the Middle East 2 . Talal Asad Thinking about Secularism and Law in Egypt 3 . John Bowen Shari»a, State, and Social Norms in France and Indonesia 4 . Barbara D. Metcalf ‘Traditionalist’ Islamic Activism: Deoband, Tablighis, and Talibs ’TRADITIONALIST’ ISLAMIC ACTIVISM: DEOBAND, TABLIGHIS, AND TALIBS Barbara D. Metcalf leiden isim isim, p.o. box 11089, 2301 eb leiden © 2 0 0 2 by i si m all rights reserved. published 2 0 0 2 printed in the netherl a n d s i sbn 9 0 - 8 0 4 6 0 4 - 6 -x i ssn 15 6 8 - 8 313 C o n t e n t s The D a ru’ l -»U l u m and ‘Cultural Strengthening’ / 4 Tablighi J a m a » a t / 8 The Taliban and Their Teachers: The Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI) / 1 2 Deobandis, Talibs, and Tablighis / 1 5 When the Afghan Taliban entered into the international spotlight at the end of the 2 0t h century, no image was more central than what seemed to be their rigid and repressive control of individual behavior justified in the name of Islam. They set standards of dress and public behavior that were particularly extreme in rela- tion to women, limiting women’s movement in public space and their employ- ment outside the home. The Taliban enforced their decrees through public cor- poral punishment. Their image was further damaged, particularly after the bombings of the East African American embassies in 1998, when they emerged as the ‘hosts’ of Usama Bin Laden and other ‘Arab Afghans’ associated with him.1 Many commentators described the Taliban by generic, catch-all phrases like ‘fanatic’, ‘medieval’, and ‘fundamentalist’.2 The Taliban identified themselves, however, as part of a Sunni school of thought that had its origins in the late 1 9t h- century colonial period of India’s history, a school named after the small, coun- try town northeast of Delhi, Deoband, where the original madrasa, or seminary, of the movement was founded in 1867. Many of the Taliban had indeed studied in Deobandi schools, but one spokesman for the movement in its final months went so far as to declare: ‘Every Afghan is a Deobandi.’3 This comment may be disconcerting to those familiar with the school in its Indian environment where its » u l a m a—those learned in traditional subjects and typically addressed as m a u l a n a—were not directly engaged in politics and were primarily occupied in 1 . I am grateful to Muhammad Khalid Masud, ISIM Academic Director, and Peter van der Veer, ISIM Co-Director, who invited me to deliver the annual lecture of the Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), Leiden University, 23 November 2001. This essay is based on the lecture I delivered at that occasion. 2 . An example of the typically imprecise discussion of ‘Deobandism’ is: ‘a sect that propagates […] a belief that has inspired modern revivals of Islamic fundamentalism’. John F. Burns, ‘Adding Demands, Afghan Leaders Show Little Willingness to Give up Bin Laden’, The New York Times, 1 9 September 2001. 3 . Conversation with ‘the ambassador at large’ of the Taliban, Rahmatullah Hashemi, Berkeley California, 6 March 2001, in the course of his tour through the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. 2 teaching and providing both practical and spiritual guidance to their followers. (The comment might also be disconcerting since it was suggestive of a regime shaped by ideals more than reality, given, for example, the substantial Shi»a ele- ment in the Afghan population.) Another movement linked to Deoband came to international attention at the same time: an a-political, quietest movement of internal grassroots missionary renewal, the Tablighi J a m a » a t. It gained some notoriety when it appeared that a young American who had joined the Taliban first went to Pakistan through the encouragement of a Tablighi J a m a » a t m i s s i o n a r y .4 This movement was intrigu- ing, in part by the very fact that it was so little known and, despite not having any formal organization or paid staff, it sustained networks of participants that stretched around the globe. The variety of these movements is in itself instructive: clearly, not all Islamic activisms are alike, and each of these movements deserves attention on its own. However, for all their variety, these Deoband movements were, in fact, alike in one crucial regard that set them apart from other well-known Islamic move- ments. What they shared was an overriding emphasis on encouraging a range of ritual and personal behavioral practices linked to worship, dress, and everyday behavior. These were deemed central to s h a r i » a—divinely ordained morality and practices, as understood in this case by measuring current practice against tex- tual standards and traditions of Hanafi reasoning. The anthropologist Olivier Roy calls such movements ‘neo-fundamentalist’ to distinguish them from what can be seen as a different set of Islamic movements, often called ‘Islamist’.5 L i m i t e d , as he puts it, to ‘mere implementation of the s h a r i » a’ in matters of ritual, dress, and behavior, ‘neo-fundamentalist’ movements are distinguishable from Islamist parties primarily because, unlike them, they have neither a systematic ideology nor a global political agenda. A more precise label for them is, perhaps, ‘tradi- tionalist’ because of their continuity with earlier institutions, above all those associated with the seminaries and with the » u l a m a in general. The contrasting Islamist movements include the Muslim Brothers in Egypt and other Arab countries, and the Jama»at-i Islami in the Indian sub-continent, as well as many thinkers involved in the Iranian revolution. All these construct- ed ideological systems and systematically built models for distinctive polities 4 . See, for example, ‘A Long, Strange Trip to the Taliban’, N e w s w e e k, 17 December 2001; and Don Lattin and Kevin Fagan, ‘John Walker’s Curious Quest: Still a Mystery How the Young Marin County Convert to Islam Made the Transition from Spiritual Scholar to Taliban Soldier’, S a n Francisco Chronicle, 13 December 2001. 5 . Olivier Roy, ‘Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?’, in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley (New York: N Y U Press, 1998), 208. 3 that challenged what they saw as the alternative systems: nationalism, capital- ism, and Marxism.6 Participants were Western educated, not seminary educated. They were engineers and others with technical training, lawyers, doctors, and university professors, and, generally speaking, they had little respect for the tra- ditionally educated » u l a m a. These ‘Islamist’ movements sought to ‘do’ modernity in ways that simultaneously asserted the cultural pride of the subjects and avoid- ed the ‘black’ side of Western modernity. Many of the jihad movements that arose in Afghanistan in opposition to the Soviets were heirs of Islamist thought (although over time they also moved to define their Islamic politics primarily as encouragement of a narrow range of Islamic practices and symbols).7 P a r t i c i- pants in militant movements, including Bin Laden’s A l - Q a » i d a, often belonged to extremist, break-away factions of Islamist parties. What is perhaps most striking about the Deoband-type movements is the extent to which politics is an empty ‘box’, filled expediently and pragmatically depending on what seems to work best in any given situation. Islam is often spo- ken of as ‘a complete way of life’—arguably a modernist and misleading distinc- tion from other historical religious traditions—so that political life must be informed by Islamic principles. In fact, as these movements illustrate, virtually any strategy is accepted that allows the goal of encouraging what are defined as core, s h a r i » a-based individual practices, coupled with a range of mundane goals that may or may not be explicit—from protection of life and property, to social honor and political power, to the dignity that comes from pious adherence to what are taken as divine commands. Indeed, these movements often work well in the context of secular regimes where they can pursue their emphasis on dis- seminating adherence to correct practice with relative freedom. Secondly, the movements illustrate another important corrective. A great deal is written about modern Muslim societies being consumed with antipathy toward America, American values, and American international political activities. No one, especially after 11 September 2001, would deny that this anger exists. However, 6 . Here I differ from Salman Rushdie, who uses the term too broadly: ‘These Islamists [here he speaks of “radical political movements”]—we must get used to this word, “Islamists”, meaning those who are engaged upon such political projects, and learn to distinguish it from the more general and politically neutral “Muslim”—include […] the Taliban.’ Salman Rushdie, ‘Yes, This is about Islam’, The New York Times, 2 November 2001.