Patrick R. Ireland October 2010 DRAFT Only Distant Cousins: Irish Protestants and Politics in the U.S., Canada, and Australia ABSTRACT: In the United States, the (re)discovery and celebration of Irish Protestant ancestry has extended in recent years to arguments by some journalists and politicians— albeit fewer scholars—that there exists yet today an identifiable ―Scots-Irish vote‖. This paper explores the political behavior of Irish Protestant migrants and their descendants in the U.S. and in a critical state-level case (Kentucky). To assist in identifying the factors that have fostered or mitigated an Irish Protestant political identity, comparative analysis will be constructed between the American experience and the very different ones of two other major recipient countries: Canada (and the province of Ontario) and Australia (and the state of New South Wales). The timing and magnitude of mass migration, settlement patterns, source regions, and religious affiliation have all mattered in determining the political roles played by Irish Protestants in the three former British colonies since the 18th and 19th centuries. Even more important have been the local economic and political contexts, including prevailing political party structures and competition. These factors explain why none of the three case countries, the U.S. included, bears witness to a coherent, identifiable Irish Protestant political legacy. For the past decade or so, awareness of Irish Protestant ancestry has grown in North America, Oceania, South Africa, and other areas that have welcomed non-Catholic emigrants from Ulster and other parts of Ireland over the centuries. In the United States, especially, this ethnic (re)discovery has extended to arguments by some political journalists and politicians that there exists today a ―Scots-Irish vote‖. Yet there is no such discussion in Canada and Australia, which have had more recent histories of more intense Irish Protestant political activism. This paper will try to explain that puzzling discrepancy, relying on the secondary literature, historical sources, and census and voting data to examine the three national cases, as well as the critical sub-national cases of Kentucky in the U.S., Ontario in Canada, and New South Wales in Australia. The comparative analysis is organized around the major cross-national differences that scholars have identified in the Irish Protestant experience: the timing and magnitude of migration and settlement patterns in the receiving country; migrants‘ regional origins in Ireland and their religious affiliations; and the local economic and political contexts into which they migrated, including prevailing political party structures and competition. In Ireland/page 2 the end, contextual factors have outweighed cultural and demographic ones, making clear why it is misleading in all three of the case countries—including the U.S.—to speak of a coherent, identifiable political legacy of Irish Protestant migration. IRISH PROTESTANT MIGRATION, LOST AND FOUND. Reflecting the current boom in interest in oral history and genealogy, people in various parts of the world have been discovering and celebrating their membership in the Protestant branch of the Irish diaspora.1 Of the millions who left Ireland between the 18th century and World War II, a sizable share consisted of Protestants, most of them from the nine counties of the province of Ulster but many as well from the south. From the colonial period until the 1930s, something on the order of 1.9 million (40 percent of all Irish emigrants) went to the U.S. (Jones 1980), 500,000 (almost half) to Canada (McConnell 2001), and 50,000 (between 10 and 20 percent) to Australia (O‘Farrell 2000). In the mid- to late 19th century, Irish Protestant communities were both criticized and lionized. Clashes between ―Orange‖ and ―Green‖ Irish earned both camps a bad reputation in Australia, Canada, and certain American cities. At the same time, in the U.S. and Canada, community leaders of the so-called Scotch-Irish (i.e., Ulster Scot or Scots-Irish) community, seconded by a host of prominent Protestant academics (e.g., Hanna 1902 ; Ford 1915), praised those ―rugged, individualistic, freedom-loving frontiersmen largely responsible for building the American nation‖ (Lynn 2003: 2). From 1889 to 1901, Congresses of the Scotch-Irish Society of America extolled the virtues of what was defined as a distinct, worthy ―race.‖ One speaker at the Third Congress, held in Louisville in 1891, found important parallels between two ―sublime objects‖: the Gulf Stream ―in the ream of creation‖ and the Scotch-Irish ―in the realm of human history‖: ―Freedom, general education, and scriptural faith are [the latter‘s] peculiarity, just as its greater saltiness, its indigo blue, and its higher temperature are the distinctions of the gulf stream‖ (Floyd 1891). A Canadian visitor explained why Ulster Scots in his country ―adhered to their British connection‖; he described Canada‘s political system, ―the most 1 The celebrations have come to involve an undifferentiated mixing of Irish Catholic and Protestant heritages, which has been encouraged by Irish governments (see McCarroll 2010). Popular in southern Ontario and mountainous areas of Ulster Scot settlement in the U.S. are festivals that honor highland Scottish culture—belying the lowland origins of the majority Irish Presbyterians who moved there (see Glasgow 2010; and Virginia 2010). Ireland/page 3 democratic government in the world,‖ as the ―peculiar product of the genius of the Scotch-Irish race‖ (Acheson 1891). After the turn of the 20th century, however, the achievements and distinctiveness of Ulster Scots and other Irish Protestants faded. The mass emigration resulting from the Great Famine was principally, if not solely a movement of Catholics. Their sheer numbers—not to mention their status as victims, sense of exile and persecution, and strong nationalism (see MacRaild 2003/04; compare Gleeson 2001)—effectively made ―Irish‖ synonymous with ―Catholic,‖ at least in the U.S. and Australia. Only once studies of ―white ethnics‖ had become popular and more nuanced ethnic survey data had become available by the 1970s and 1980s was there evidence of ―growing awareness of the diversity of the Irish diaspora‖ (Walker 2007: 268). The ongoing celebration of Irish Protestant roots has resulted in more serious and critical studies of this group in one or more countries (Walker 2007). The old stereotypes and maudlin portrayals have persisted in some quarters, even so, in particular with respect to America‘s Scots-Irish (see Fitzpatrick 1989; and Kennedy 2001). The non- Presbyterians among Irish Protestant migrants have for the most part been ignored. James Webb, now a conservative Democratic Senator from Virginia, published Born Fighting: How the Scots-Irish Shaped America in 2004. In it he argued that the Scots-Irish‘ rugged individualism, militaristic honor culture, mistrust of authority, and populist religious sensibilities inherited from the Scottish Kirk (see Zito 2008) generated a value system that affects their descendants‘ voting behavior to this day. David Hackett Fischer (1989) has argued that rural white voters in large swathes of the South and West share viewpoints rooted in this common cultural heritage. The Scots-Irish first settled in New Hampshire and other parts of New England in the early 1700s before escaping the Puritans‘ intolerance (even toward fellow Calvinists) and moving on to interior Pennsylvania. Within a generation, they had spread to the western parts of that state and southern Ohio and down along both sides of the Appalachian Mountains into upland Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. Some would head further west to Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Texas, and others eventually ―migrated out to the Bakersfield region of California (think The Grapes of Wrath), and up the Great Plains to parts of Michigan, Ireland/page 4 Kansas, Nebraska and Colorado (James Dobson and Tom Tancredo territory, not Denver and Boulder)‖ (Joseph 2009). By the 1980s, many of these areas had seen a shift among conservative Democrats to supporting Republican candidates, and the Scots-Irish have been cast as archetypal ―Reagan Democrats‖ and the ―core culture around which Red State America has gathered and thrived‖ (Tilove 2008; see Phillips 1999). Author Tom Wolfe, the National Endowment for the Arts‘ Jefferson Lecturer in 2006, agreed with James Webb that the Scots-Irish of the South had provided the needed margin of victory for Republican George W. Bush in the 2004 presidential election (Wolfe 2006). This heritage was fingered again in 2008 to explain Barack Obama‘s poor performance among working-class white voters in Appalachia—as opposed to those in, for example, the Upper Midwest and the Pacific Northwest—against Hillary Clinton in the Democratic primaries and against John McCain in the general election (Scallon 2008). Conservative Southern commentators have responded to charges that racism was the problem by alleging that Senator Obama‘s Appalachian unpopularity was owing to Scots-Irish traditions of patriotism and military service that worked against the liberal, ―culturally confusing‖ candidate (Reese 2009). According to political analyst Michael Barone (2008), these sorts of attitudinal continuities may suggest that modern political choices are not so much rational responses to the issues of the day as they are links to the past, to Abraham Lincoln‘s ―mystic chords of memory‖