View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by UC Research Repository Effects on structures and infrastructures 2.12 Emergency management for lifelines and rapid response after L’Aquila earthquake M. Dolce 1-3 , S. Giovinazzi 2, I. Iervolino 3, E. Nigro 3, A. Tang 4 I 2.12.1 Introduction recover the systems and restore their functional - Performance of lifelines during the April 6 event ity in the shortest possible time are described. may be considered generally good if compared Finally , criteria adopted to define priorities and to the extended losses related to buildings to allocate resources for the temporary housing (Verderame et al., 2009) , nevertheless damages camps are discussed. From the reported investi - and service downtime, which required recovery gations it is concluded that the emergency man - and emergency management , occurred . In the agement of the lifelines networks provided a following, for each of the main lifelines in the rapid and resilient response to the earthquake. L’Aquila area (i.e., road network, water distribu - The emergency management procedures imple - tion, gas distribution, power distribution, water mented for the physical and functional restora - distribution and treatment, telecommunications tion of lifelines , after a proper codification may and post-event aid to population ), the emer - become a reference model for the Civil Defence gency management strategies adopted to at international level. 2.12.2 Road Network Rockfalls (Fig. 1a) and landslides triggered by ANAS S.p.A. is the agency that manages in the the earthquake and aggravated by the heavy Abruzzo Region, as well as in the rest of the rain that hit the area in the days following the national territory, the state road network. The event , were identified as the most problematic residual functionality and safety investigation of situations affecting the network mobility . How - the road network were the first priorities identi - ever , the rock falls and landslides occurred fied by ANAS for the management of the first mainly in mountainous areas around L’Aquila, phase of the emergency. Physical and human while the main road network in the city was not resources were deployed to achieve the follow - affected by the aforementioned phenomena . In ing goals: 1) rapid survey of the road network to the urban area, mobility limitations were caused ensure, at the largest possible extent, the by debris following damaged and/or unsafe regional mobility; 2) activation of emergency residential and monumental buildings adjacent contracting procedures (“somma urgenza” to the roads. agreements) to immediately begin, where possi - Immediate activities for the restoration of normal ble, activities for the restoration of normal mobil - mobility conditions included: 1) removal of rocks ity conditions; 3) damage survey of the road- and soil from the roads; 2) rock slope consolida - network components; 4) short term planning for tions; 3) enhancement of soil slope stability. the repair of damaged components. These activities were conducted employing, At the same time, physical and human resources where possible, internal resources or activating, were deployed in support of the Civil Defence alternatively, emergency contracting procedures for a first partial debris removal and for the with external organisations. Securing of unsafe excavations works necessary for the installation buildings adjacent to roads was carried out by of relief campsites. It worth mentioning that, fur - firemen. ther to the local resources, additional ones were Temporary traffic management measures were used to manage the emergency. These resources extensively implemented in order to minimize were available from few ANAS’ Regional com - road closures; these measures included traffic partments differently located on the national ter - flow restrictions; alternating one-way; lane and ritory, with an average daily commitment of 80 velocity restrictions (Fig. 1b). men and 70 vehicles . The only significant damages occurred to the 1 Ufficio Rischio Sismico, Dipartimento della Protezione Civile , Roma. www.protezionecivile.it 2 Department of Civil and Natural Resources Engineering, University of Canterbury, Christchurch. www.civil.canterbury.ac.nz 3 Dipartimento di Ingegneria Strutturale, Università degli Studi di Napoli Federico II . www.unina.it 4 Technical Council on Lifeline Earthquake Engineering, American Society of Civil Engineers, US. www.asce.org/instfound/techcomm_tclee.cfm 209 Progettazione Sismica 20% 46% 28% 6% Road closed Passable with limitations Alternating one way Lane and velocity restictions a. b. Fig. 1 road network components were the structural Command and Control, Di.Coma.C represented Impact of the earthquake on the road network: (a) SS80 failure of the viaduct “Corfinio” on the national this information in a cartographic format. Road “Gran Sasso d’Italia” road roadway SS5 and the collapse of a bridge on closures and other temporary traffic management affected by rock falls, but the main road SP36 “Forconese”. No further measures were overlaid to aerial photographs, featuring rock-proof tunnels . (b) Distribution of traffic significant damages were reported to the com - technical regional maps, etc. providing maps that management solutions ponents of the road networks including the had a fundamental role in supporting many emer - (updated to 01/05/09) for numerous tunnels present in the Region that per - gency management operations . the 61 road tracts affected by the earthquake (red = formed well. As for the public information, emergency bul - road closed; dark green = The urgent need for a standardized and struc - letins were regularly issued to update in real- passable with limitations; yellow = alternating one tured survey form to report damages and dis - time the end-users about the mobility situation in way; light green = lane and ruptions in the road networks was highlighted the Abruzzo Region. Communications and velocity restictions ). while performing safety investigation and dam - timely news were , as well , posted on the ANAS age survey operations. A rapid survey form and website. an ad-hoc procedure were therefore identified Once the firth phase of the emergency was man - and formalised while the survey work was in aged, efforts and resources were concentrated, progress. on one hand, to handle the modified traffic con - The timely information on the mobility conditions ditions in L’Aquila city due to the closure of the was a key component of the effective emergency main road that ran through the city and, on the management. The Civil Defence issued daily a other hand, to respond to the new mobility report summarising road closures, mobility restric - requirements created by the relief camps, and tions and repair works carried out in the road net - by the construction of the provisional accommo - work. Using a Geographic Information System, dation: Temporary Housing Modules M.A.P., GIS, the technical compartment of the Direction of and C.A.S.E. project. 2.12.3 Water distribution network maintenance. The water is distributed from the Gran Sasso Acqua G.S.A. SpA is the water tanks to approximately 100000 customers provider for L’Aquila city and for 37 municipalities through a 1100 km distribution network made of in the earthquake area. The organisation offers an quite old cast iron and steel pipes. The pressure integrated water service including potable water inside the main pipeline network is quite high, supply, sewerage and wastewater treatment. reaching 30-50 atm ., as well as in the distribution The G.S.A. has 3 major supply systems (Chiarino, networks where it can reach 6-8 atm. Gran Sasso, Water Oria) in addition to some sec - Thanks to a remote control service and guided ondary ones. The water supplied is transported valves connected , through cables or wireless by a network consisting of approximately 900 km connection, to the main reservoirs and supply of large diameter pipes and is stored in a huge systems, it is possible to check the water flow number of tanks (about 200) that require contin - inside the pipeline network and to manage par - 210 uous functional and hygienic monitoring and tial or total opening/closing operations directly Effects on structures and infrastructures Joint slip-off in a main water network pipeline in Paganica. a. b. from the Gran Sasso Acqua headquarters. In ices, secondly to the commercial and industrial Fig. 2 Impact of the earthquake on particular, electromagnetic sensors , measuring activities, including the hotels to be reopened for the water distribution input low pressure , and electromagnetic gauges the G8 meeting , and finally to the residential network: (a) Joint slip-off in a (or “Clamp on”) , measuring output differential buildings classified safe, after the specific AeDES main water network pipeline in Paganica. (b) Repair on pressures , are installed in the tanks. The remote survey. The partial restoration of the water distri - a cast iron pipe in a control service allows furthermore the assess - bution was possible because of secondary net - Paganica at the moment when some of the ment of the water level in the tanks. works and of a shutter system that allowed the evacuated people were The equipment connected to the remote control exclusion of areas where the water supply was returning home . system revealed, on the morning of April 6, a not urgently needed. A few days after the earth - significant and sudden change in the water flow quake (19