Defining and Redefining Svalaksana: Dharmakirti's Concept and its Tibetan Modification 著者 Yoshimizu Chizuko journal or Three mountains and seven rivers : Prof. publication title Musashi Tachikawa's felicitation volume page range 117-133 year 2004 URL http://hdl.handle.net/2241/103850 Chapter 8 Defining and Redefining Svalaksana: Dharmakirti's Concept and its Tibetan Modification CHIZUKO YOSHIMIZU Recent contributions to the Tibetan development of Buddhist philosophical systems have attracted considerable attention, not only because of their significant results but also because of their methodological consciousness that any intellectual tradition must be examined in light of its historicaland cultural circumstances. Continuity and discontinuity of thought as well as the character- istics of Tibetan interpretations firstbecome clear through a thorough investigation of both Indian and Tibetan traditions, and yet the significance of individual thought is finally to be considered in its contemporary context. In this respect, the latest studies of the Tibetan development of Dharmakirti's (7c.) epistemology were most successful in indicating the consistency and inconsistency of Tibetan interpretations with Dharmakirti's original ideas.1 Special attention has been paid to the originality of dGe lugs pa thinkers. They indeed made several theoretical modifications to, reinterpretations and reevaluations of Indian original thought, especially with regard to logicoepistemological 118 THREE MOUNTAINS AND SEVEN RIVERS DEFINING AND REDEFINING SVALAKS, .19 issues in both major fields of Buddhist philosophy, viz., the identifying it with that which has causal efficacy (arthakriydsdmarthya, Madhyamaka system and that of Dharmakirti.2 In order to gain a arthakriydsakti. don byed nus pa), that is, an ability to produce an clear picture of the dGe lugs pa position on these Buddhist effect. He explicitly defines this alone (eva) as ultimately exis- philosophical systems, we have attempted to reveal what might tent (paramdrthasat) or as a real entity (vastu), in contrast to the actually underlie their problematic commitments to traditional 'universal' or 'common characteristic' (sdmdnya or sdmdnyalaksana). teachings, i.e.,to reveal its historicalbackground, probable tex- The latter, in contrast to svalaksana, refers to the object of con- tual sources, possible misinterpretations and wrong transmis- ception or of words that lacks causal efficacy and hence is con- sions of text,as well as particular aims and motivations they may sidered to be merely conventional and unreal.5 We may be able have had in mind. to give the broad outlines of the development of the idea from The present paper too is an attempt to clarifythe way dGe Dignaga to Dharmaklrti, or from the epistemological to the lugs pa scholars redefined the concept svalaksana (rang mtshan) ontological characterization of svalaksana, as follows: The fact and to specify the reasons for this redefinition on the basis of that a thing is actually perceived by someone, sometime and the writings by the three main figures from the earlier period of somewhere indicates that this thing exists at that moment at the school, i.e.,Tsong kha pa Bio bzang grags pa (1357-1419), that place, unless this perception is proven to be false by some- rGyal tshab Dar ma rin chen (1364-1432) and mKhas grub dGe one else. Since this thing causes a direct perception of its own legs dpal bzang po (1385-1438).3 I also wish to consider the image, it is admitted to be causally efficacious. Furthermore, this question of how Dharmaklrti and these Tibetan thinkers under- thing must be allowed to be real, for unreal things such as a stood the meaning of the individuality and reality of existents horn of a rabbit or. an abstract concept like 'eternity' cannot under the concept of svalaksana, since defining svalaksana is cause any direct perception. In other words, the arising of a none other than defining what an individual and real entity is. direct perception should properly presuppose the presence of Through the following discussion,one willsee thatboth Dharmakirti something real as its object. Hence the object of direct percep- and the dGe lugs pa thinkers define svalaksana not in isolation tion proves to be existent in reality. In this way, a svalaksana to from, but in complete accordance with, their respective consid- be cognized by a direct perception can be identified as a real erations of relating philosophical issues. As for the dGe lugs pa, entity: however, it can be said that they aimed to comprehend such The term svalaksana, as opposed to sdmdnyalaksana or com- fundamental concepts as svalaksana from a wider perspective, mon characteristic, entails from the beginning that the phenom- namely they tried to formulate a version of individuality and enon is individual, unique and distinct. Dignaga's description realitywhich holds true not only for the Sautrantika tradition of of svalaksana as the object of direct perception may well reflect Dharmakirti but for Buddhist philosophical systems in general, the idea that svalaksana is a substantially individual thing, since including Madhyamaka. I would like to focus on this point in it is the function of perception to make substantial distinctions the last part of the paper. among its objects. To this extent, one could also say that svalaksana is a spado temporally individual and unique occurrence, which 1. Dharmaklrti on svalaksana necessarily occupies a certain location in space and time, in Littie needs to be said about the considerable significance of contrast to a merely imagined object. The more strict spatiotem- the term svalaksa?ia which literally means 'own characteristic', poral qualification of svalaksana can be derived from Dharmaklrti's and conies down to term for 'particular'or 'individual'.Svalaksana definition of a real existent as having causal efficacy, if this is characterized by Dignaga (6c.) as the object of direct percep- qualification is linked to the theory of momentariness (ksanikatva), tion (pratyaksa), i.e.,the object of a cognition which is free of viz., that whatever is existent in reality is exclusively momentary.6 conceptual construction (kalpandpodha).A Dharmakirti added to It is theoretically consistent to interpret svalaksana as a unique this epistemological notion a clear ontological ground by and single phenomenon that occurs and disappears every single DEFINING AND REDEFINING SVALAKSANA 121 120 THREE MOUNTAINS AND SEVEN RIVERS tioned here as the definiens or the defining characteristic. Nor moment, since svalaksana is a real existent to be defined as that is it possible to interpret the phrase 'consisting in its essential which has causal efficacy, although such a momentary thing is nature ' as implying 'consisting in its own causal efficacy' and far beyond the range of perceptual object. the phrase 'not being conceptually imposed' as implying 'being Besides svalaksana being distinguished.the one from the other directly perceived', once one takes account of the views peculiar in virtue of their distinct substances, we can also understand to the dGe lugs pa with regard to rang mtshan and spyi. from the literal sense of the word that svalaksanas are known to One should firstrecall the dGe lugs pa position that rang be unique because of their characteristics (laksana). Although it mtshan is identical with a real existent which has causal efficacy is beyond the function of perception to specify the features of (don byed nus pa), but not only rang mtshan is counted as real, nor an entity as, for instance, being a pot, being gold, being round, is it determined for the object of direct perception alone, for and so on, these kinds of unique features of one svalaksana can they maintain that there exist real universals (sdmdnya, spyi),10 be perceived through its image as a whole and help to differen- and that a rang mtshan appears in a conceptual cognition. Even tiate this svalaksana from other svalaksanas. Theoretically speak- it is not contradictory that one and the same thing is rang ing, such a distinction of svalaksana by its nature too is grounded mtshan as well as universal (spyi) in its different aspects. They in its causal efficacy, because, according to Dharmaklrti, the are not opposing notions but are relative.A pot, for instance, is difference of nature consists in the difference of causal efficacy7 a particular (rang mtshan) in relation to its property of being in the following manner: a svalaksana is known as individual impermanent (anitya, mi rtagpa), but at the same time it is a and unique by its essential nature (svabhdva), since the essen- universal as well in relation to its individuations, since the prop- tial nature of a real entity is determined by a particular ability of erty of being a pot is common to all kinds of pots such as its cause to produce this entity, and this entity in turn arises golden pots, silver pots, copper pots, and the like." Under this being endowed with a particular ability that is its essential na- condition, the dichotomy between rang mtshan and spyi accord- ture,8 Thus considered, it may be proper to say that Dharmakirti's ing to whether it is real or unreal, or whether it is cognized by identification of svalaksana as that which has causal efficacy direct perception or conceptual cognition is on no account provides a clear theoretical ground for both the reality and the conducive to clarifying the dGe lugs pa idea of individuality individuality of the entity that is defined by Dignaga as the arid reality. object of direct perception. Nor can causal efficacy define the reality of rang mtshan. Although the dGe lugs pas accept the concepts 'that which has 2. The dGe lugs pa on rang mtshan causal efficacy', 'that which is ultimately existent' and 'rang The dGe lugs pa thinkers formulated the definition of rang mtshan as synonyms in accordance with the statement of mtshan according to their own interpretation of individuals and Pramdnavdrtiika III 3, they explicitly note that neither causal real entities.