LONDON AND NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY. Berkeley Square House, W.1. 28th May, 1947. I have the honour to report for the information of the Minister of Transport, in accordance with the Order of 4th January, 1947, the result of my Inquiry into the accident which took place at about 11.17 pm. on 2nd January at Gidea Park station, on the Liverpool Street-Colchester line of the London & North Eastern Railway (Southern Area). As the 1028 p.m. train from Liverpool Street to Southend was starting from the station a following train, the 10.25 p.m. from Liverpool Street to Peterborough, collided with it at a speed estimated at 30-35 m.p.h., wrecking the three rear coaches. I regret to report that five passengers were killed and that two succumbed to their injuries a few days later ; 45 passengers remved injuries necessitating detention in hospital, and a number of others were able to continue their journeys after treatment. All four tracks through the station were blocked ; two were cleared for traffic within a couple of hours, and the remaining two about noon on 3rd January. Ambulances and medical attention were promptly available, and several of the less seriously injured were despatched to hospital, on a passing bus, 13 minutes after the accident. Valuable assistance was given by the National Fire Service in releasing the injured, the last of whom left by ambulance at 1.40 am. There was a dense fog and the night was cold. SITE AND S~GNALLING~ARRANGEMENTS. 2. At Gidea Park, 1% miles from Liverpool Street, there are four tracks, running roughly east and west, namely the Down Local, Up Local, Down Through, and Up Through, in that order from north to south ; the collision took place on the Down Through line. The line rises steadily, though not skeeply, in the down direction : from Romford, a mile nearer London, the gradient varies between 1 in 264 and 1 in 367, and the line lies in cutting for the greater part of the distance. The signalling arrangements on the Down Through line, with relevant distances, are shown on the accompanying diagram. Sykes lock and block is in use from Liverpool Street to Romford inclusive, with the usual controls to ensure that the signals are worked in proper sequence, and to prevent a second train being accepted unless they have been restored to Danger (or Caution) behimd the one preceding it. There is no manual block working between Romford and Gidea Park, as the line is continuously track circuited. The signals from Romford advanced starter onwards are controlled by track circuit, with apparatus to ensure that they are put to Danger behind each train. Train descriptions are passed forward from Romford on magazine train describers, having storage for three successive descriptions. If the Romford signalman omits to set up a description on the apparatus when a train passes his box an N.D. (i.e. not described) indication appears on the Gidea Park instrument as soon as the train passes Romford advanced starting signal (No. IS) and occupies track circuit N ; the Gidea Park signalman's attention is drawn to the appearance of any fresh description on his instrument by the sounding of a buzzer. There is also a block bell circuit between the boxes for use if the describing apparatus fails, and for emergency bell signals. The line between Romford and Gidea Park may thus be regarded as a transition section between semaphore signalling, with Sykes lock and block, in the London direction, and the more modem colour light installation, with automatic signals, on the country side of Gidea Park. This installation was brought into use in 1934 when the local lines were extended from Gidea Park to Shenfield. .3. It is the Company's practice on the busy suburban lines in the Eastern Section of the Southern Area to allocate fog signalmen to most of the stop signals as well as to distant signals. There is con- sequently a fogman's post at each of the signals concerned in this accident, except at Crowlands home signal. The position of these fog posts relative to the Down Through line varies, as shown on the diagram ; at each there are miniature semaphores, worked mechanically, repeating the signal indi- cations. Where the fogman is stationed alongside the Down Local line, as at the Crowlands and Romford distant signals, the Down Through line is equipped with a Clayton magazine fogging machine, with a lever at the fog post. The removable magazine holds 36 fog signals of a special type, which can be withdrawn from it and placed on the rail by working the lever, or removed from the rail when the distant signal is at Clear, for replacement later. Fog signals of the usual pattern, placed on the rail by hand and secured to it by a metal clip, are used on the lines immediately alongside the fog posts. 4. In the absence of manual block working between Romford and Gidea Park there is no offering or acceptance of trains by the signalmen in the two boxes. This necessitates a modification of the usual double section arrangement prescribed by the Company's Block Telegraph Regulations for adoption in fog, until fogmen reach their posts, under which a signalmen may not accept a train offered to him from the box in rear unless the preceding train has reached the box in advance of his own. There is accordingly a Iocal regulation regard@ the acceptance of down trains at Romford, the material portion of which reads :- In foggy weather or during falhng snow, unW the fogmen amve at their p& at the Down Distant and Outer Home s~gnals,down tmns may be accepted when the line is clear to the Starting Signal . This -provides an over-run .of 1,115 yards beyond the outer home signal at such times. , . ' There is a similar arrangement for increasing the over-run at the country end of the Romford- Gidea Park section-.in foggy weather, till fogmen are posted. Normally Romford advanced starting signal (No. 18) cannot be lowered unless track circuits N and NI, the latter of which extends 440 yards beyond Gidea Park dter home signal (No. 27) are clear and unless the last-named signal has been put ' back to danger behind the preceding -train. The 440 yard over-run can however be increased. to 1,660 yards until fogmen are on duty at the signals mentioned by operating a fog switch in Gidea Park - box ;-thisadds track circuits P, PI, Q, Q1 and Q2 to the dontrol ofRomforJadvanced starting signal (No.. 18). thus extending it up to Gidea Park starting signals (Nos. 15 and 25). DESCRIPTIONOF TRAINS AND DAMAGE. 5. The 10.28 p.m. Southend train consisted of 4-6-0 tender engine No. 1565 and of eight non- corridor bogie coaches, having wooden bodies on steel underframes, with screw couplings. Its total weight, including the engine and tender (108 tons) was about 330 tons. As stated, it was just on the move when the collision occurred, completely demolishing the last three coaches. Theunder- frame of the eighth coach was carried forward, with three bogies, about 120 yards in front of the engine of the colliding train, and the sixth and seventh coaches were thrown bodily on to the adjacent Up local line and its platform. The trailing end of the fifth coach was smashed, its rear bogie being damaged &nd derailed. Ahead of this there was neither serious damage nor derailment, except at the leading end of the fmt coach which lifted, penetrating the hack of the tender and-smashing the end of the unoccupied front brake compartment. , 6. The 10.25 p.m. Peterborough train was hauled by 4-64 tender engine No. 1602, a~Idconsisted of nine vehicles, namely four bogie coaches, two bogie mail vans, two bogie coaches, and a %bogie twin composite coach, in that order from front to rear. The leading four coaches and the last three were coupled with Buckeye couplings ; screw couplings were in use at the rear of the tender, and at each end of both mail vans. All underframes were of steel except that of one mail van, which was of com- posite construction ; the bodies of all vehicles were of wood. Its total weight, including the engine j and tender (116 tons) was about 410 tons. The vacuum brake was in operation on all wheels of the train, working in conjunction with the Westinghouse brake on the engine and tender, all wheels of which were braked except those of the leading bogie. l There was no derailment in this train, which ran forward for about 120 yards beyond the polnt of impact. At the front of the engine the frames were damaged, the buffer beam broken, and the smokebox crushed ; elsewhere on the engine and tender the damage was relatively slight. In the train the effects of the colhsion were chiefly felt by the two screw coupled mail vans ; the leading one had its body demolished for about six feet at the trailing end, and the second one was correspondingly damaged at its leading end, the bogie bolsterj being displaced in both cases. There was considerable superficial damage. wth broken windows, on the left side of the bodm of the three leading coaches, through scraping contact with wreckage of the Southend train, fortunately unaccompanied by any serious penetration of the inside panelling ; there was also considerable damage to gear below floor level. Damage ko the permanent way, and to the station structure, was trilling. 7.