ACKERMAN THE NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS HLR.DOC 10/23/08 – 11:18 AM VOLUME 113 JANUARY 2000 NUMBER 3 THE NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS Bruce Ackerman TABLE OF CONTENTS I. DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY ............................................................................................................642 A. Against Presidentialism ........................................................................................................643 1. The Separationist Response ...............................................................................................644 2. Beyond the Westminster Tradition.....................................................................................653 3. The Cult of Personality ......................................................................................................657 B. Constrained Parliamentarianism..........................................................................................664 1. Bringing the People Back In..............................................................................................666 2. The Court as a Constraint ..................................................................................................668 3. From Theory to Practice ....................................................................................................670 C. The One-and-a-Half House Solution.....................................................................................671 1. Elected Federalist Chambers .............................................................................................673 2. Ambassadorial Chambers ..................................................................................................680 3. Bicameralism without Federalism .....................................................................................683 II. FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIZATION ....................................................................................................688 A. The Intellectual Challenge.....................................................................................................690 1. America .............................................................................................................................690 2. Europe ...............................................................................................................................692 B. Two Modest Proposals ...........................................................................................................693 1. The Integrity Branch ..........................................................................................................694 2. The Regulatory Branch ......................................................................................................696 C. Warring Separationisms.........................................................................................................697 D. From Theory to Practice .......................................................................................................702 1. The Costs of Politicized Professionalism ..........................................................................702 2. From Macro to Micro.........................................................................................................709 E. Separationism and the Rule of Law .......................................................................................712 III. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ..............................................................................................................715 A. The Democracy Branch ..........................................................................................................716 B. Safeguarding Fundamental Rights .........................................................................................722 1. Laissez-Faire Liberalism: Will a Constitutional Court Suffice? ......................................722 2. Activist Liberalism: The Distributive Justice Branch ......................................................723 IV. THE SHAPE OF THE NEW SEPARATIONISM ..................................................................................727 633 ACKERMAN THE NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS HLR.DOC 10/23/08 – 11:18 AM THE NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS Bruce Ackerman∗ This essay in comparative constitutional theory considers whether an American-style separation of powers should serve as a model for other countries. Professor Ackerman argues against the export of the American system in favor of an approach based on the constitutional practice of Germany, Italy, Japan, India, Canada, South Africa, and many other nations. According to this model of “constrained parliamentarianism,” the constitution should not create an independently elected presidency to check and balance a popularly elected congress. Instead, it should authorize a prime minister and her cabinet to remain in power as long as they can retain the support of a democratically elected chamber of deputies. Constrained parliamentarianism tries to check the power of the cabinet and the chamber, however, by granting independence to a variety of other checking institutions, including a constitutional court. Professor Ackerman argues that this model offers a more promising path to constitutional development than the American approach. He shows how it can generate a variety of institutional strategies that better serve the three great principles that motivate the modern doctrine of separation of powers ⎯ democracy, professionalism, and the protection of fundamental rights. [T]he Federalist Constitution has proved to be a brilliant success, which uni- tary nation states and parliamentary democracies all over the world would do well to copy. I give it most of the credit for the fact that ours is the wealthiest, most technologically advanced, and most socially just society in human his- tory, not to mention the fact that we have with ease become a military super- power . The rest of the world is quite rightly impressed with us, and it is thus no accident that the United States of America has become the biggest sin- gle exporter of public law in the history of humankind. Almost wherever one looks, written constitutions, federalism, separation of powers, bills of rights, and judicial review are on the ascendancy all over the world right now — and for a good reason. They work better than any of the alternatives that have been tried.1 erhaps Steven Calabresi’s triumphalism is typical today, but it contrasts P sharply with previous American attitudes. A half-century ago this country stood even taller in the world than it does now. As the only great power escaping massive destruction during World War II, America’s mor- alistic pretensions were at their apogee. Yet its constitutional prescriptions ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– ∗ Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale University. Many thanks to Akhil Amar, Olivier Beaud, Aharon Barak, Alexander Blankenagel, James Boyle, Robert Dahl, Mirjan Damaska, Bill Eskridge, Victor Ferreres, Owen Fiss, Larry Lessig, Juan Linz, Jerry Mashaw, Ugo Mattei, David Mayhew, Carol Rose, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Cass Sunstein, Giuseppe de Vergottini, Patrick Weill, and the participants at faculty workshops at Harvard and Yale Law Schools. I am also grateful to Serena Hoy, Ilya Somin, and Rivka Weill for outstanding research assistance. 1 Steven G. Calabresi, An Agenda for Constitutional Reform, in CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL TRAGEDIES 22, 22 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL STUPIDITIES]. 634 ACKERMAN THE NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS HLR.DOC 10/23/08 – 11:18 AM 2000] NEW SEPARATION OF POWERS 635 were a good deal more discriminating. To be sure, the United States sup- ported written constitutions, bills of rights, judicial review — and, on oc- casion, federalism.2 But the separation of powers? American influence reached its zenith in post-war Japan — with Gen- eral MacArthur’s legal staff presenting a draft constitution to the Japanese within a ridiculously short space of time.3 For all the rush, the draftsmen did not propose an American-style separation of powers. In particular, they did not require Japan to embrace an American-style presidency as part of the price of its defeat.4 There emerged instead a distinctive regime- type: one that I will call “constrained parliamentarianism.” As in Great Britain, Japan’s Prime Minister and his Cabinet must retain the confidence of the Diet to remain in office. But, in contrast to the Westminster model, the Japanese Parliament is not fully sovereign. Its legislative powers are limited by a written constitution, a bill of rights, and a supreme court. Nor did the Americans impose a strongly bicameral legislature — fea- turing an upper house checking and balancing the lower with full Madison- ian vigor. The Japanese House of Representatives plays the dominant role in selecting the Cabinet. Although the upper House of Councillors has significant powers, it is not the constitutional equal of the lower House.5 Call this the “one-and-a-half house solution.” ––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 2 Of the three defeated Axis powers, Japan and Italy became unified nation states, and only Ger- many was required by the Allies to adopt a federal form of government. See, e.g., PETER H. MERKL, THE ORIGIN OF THE WEST GERMAN REPUBLIC 8–11, 19, 121 (1963) (recounting American and Al- lied insistence that Germany adopt a federal structure). 3 See