Tech Data Transfer THE IMPACT OF TECHNICAL DATA TRANSFER PROBLEMS DURING A TRANSITION OF WEAPONS SYSTEM PRODUCTION BETWEEN NATIONS Michael E. Schaller In the early 1980s the U.S. Army sought to replace its aging fleet of M102 105mm-towed howitzers with the British M119 under a Non-Developmental Item (NDI) acquisition strategy. This paper addresses the problems experi- enced, their possible causes and effects, and provides a list of lessons learned. Finally, recommendations are made to help future program manag- ers mitigate or avoid the problems experienced by the M119 program. lthough the M119 program has Additionally, the Program Office was been hailed as a very successful restricted in its ability to mitigate some NDI acquisition, there were of the potential risks associated with problems encountered by the program TDP transfer. All in all, the TDP trans- office along the way. The most signifi- fer problem cost the program an in- cant of these was the transition of pro- credible amount of time and money. duction from the original manufac- All of the data presented here (with turer, Royal Ordnance, to the U.S. ar- the exception of Reese and Fowler, senals at Rock Island, Illinois and which are periodical articles) were Watervliet, New York. The major cause drawn from American sources. Neither of this transition problem was the trans- Royal Ordnance nor the government of fer of the Technical Data Package the United Kingdom provided input to (TDP). this work. Representatives from Royal The TDP provided by Royal Ord- Ordnance were contacted via facsimile nance was not, and never would be, but did not respond. One source did found acceptable under U.S. standards. agree to discuss issues contained in this 39 Acquisition Review Quarterly Winter 1996 work based on a grant of anonymity. the LID requirements for light infan- The author was also provided multiple try (HQ, U.S. Army AMCCOM, 1985, examples, from multiple sources, of pg. 1). Over the course of the next five General Officer meddling and pres- months AMC evaluated 20 weapons sure in the M119 acquisition process. and eliminated all but four. It was from these four that the British Light Gun, the L119, was determined to be the FROM WHENCE IT CAME best candidate for the LID (U.S. Army AMCCOM, 1985, pg. 2). The In late 1983, the U.S. Army initiated ARDEC briefed these results to the a program to redesign the structure, CSA in May 1984, recommending the roles, and missions of its light infantry L119. divisions (LIDs). Within this redesign The Chiefs decision was to lease a of the LID, the decision was made to sufficient number of L119 howitzers for procure a longer range, more lethal testing, and to develop new 105mm artillery weapon (Army Magazine, rounds for increased range and lethal- 1986, pg. 365). Importantly, the Army ity (HQ, U.S. Army AMCCOM, 1985, Chief of Staff (CSA) also established pg. 2). After this initial testing was suc- an extreme sense of urgency for field- cessfully completed, the weapon was ing the light division (U.S. Army type-classified in December 1985. Pro- ARDEC, 1987, pg. 1). The program di- duction contracts were prepared and a rection that devolved from this CSA licensing agreement between the U.S. guidance was to search for a howitzer and Royal Ordnance was negotiated that the Army could field immedi- the following year (Armament and ately (U.S. Army ARDEC, 1987, pg. Chemical Acquisition and Logistics 1). In terms of the M119 program, im- Agency, 1994, pg. 1). mediately was translated into a must The licensing agreement was made have fielding date in selection criteria necessary by the Armys decision to that would fall within fiscal year 1987 purchase only a portion of the weap- (U.S. Army ARDEC, 1987, pg. 3). ons desired from Royal Ordnance, with In January 1984, Army headquarters the remainder being produced domes- tasked the Army Materiel Command tically. It authorized American produc- (AMC) to search the inventory of U.S. tion of the L119 and established roy- and NATO 105mm howitzers and de- alty payment procedures. velop a list of those capable of meeting The decision to produce the M119 Major Michael E. Schaller, USA is assigned as a contract specialist to the Army Re- search, Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey. He received his B.S. degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York and his M.S. degree from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. 40 Tech Data Transfer domestically was based on two factors. IMPACT OF THE TECHNICAL The first, maintainability, stressed con- DATA PACKAGE cerns about the availability of spare parts and the lack of control over an A technical data package defines the offshore source. Second and conceiv- systems design configuration and the ably more important, there were na- production, engineering, and logistics tionalistic considerations; specifically, support procedures required to ensure the maintenance of the mobilization the systems adequate performance. base. Each had an impact on the deci- The TDP consists of all applicable tech- sion (U.S. Army AMCCOM, 1987). nical data, including drawings, quality Based on these and other factors, the assurance provisions, and packaging Government opted to perform produc- details (DSMC, 1991). tion at Watervliet Arsenal, which would As part of its licensing agreement manufacture the cannon assembly, and with the U.S., Royal Ordnance agreed Rock Island Arsenal, which would pro- to provide the Americans with a TDP duce the trail assemblies. The two that was sufficient to manufacture in pieces would be assembled, and the the U.S. (Armament and Chemical howitzer completed, at Rock Island. Acquisition and Logistics Agency, 1994, These two arsenals, then, had to pre- pg. 1) and which consists of all the re- pare their facilities for the gradual tran- corded know-how required to manu- sition of production from Royal Ord- facture, assemble and test...the L118/ nance. L119 gun (Nathan, 1995, January 30). The license agreement cost 1,150,000 What Royal Ordnance actually pro- pounds sterling for 145 complete how- vided was much less: an archival set of itzers, 20 carriage assemblies, 15 trail drawings, a set of manufacturing draw- assemblies, additional parts and ings (which showed in-progress draw- equipment from the U.K., and the ings, some gage and inspection draw- royalty fees and TDP required for ings), an il- lustrated subsequent U.S. production (U.S. ...the TDP as delivered parts cata- Army AMCCOM, 1987, pg. 1). The was archival, grossly production contracts were signed in log (similar inaccurate, and missing July 1987, with Royal Ordnance oper- to our -34P essential manufacturing ating off what was considered to be a technical data warm production base. Royal Ord- manuals), nance delivered the first production and a Final Inspection Record (Nathan, guns to the U.S. for Production Verifi- 1995, January 30). While all of these cation Tests in early 1988. Production documents are valuable in and of them- began in America in fiscal year 1988, selves, they did not satisfy the U.S. with the first howitzers coming off the Governments requirements for TDP line in October 1990 (Reece, 1991, pg. content and accuracy of drawings. 718). According to the original schedule, the technical data package was to be de- livered in January of 1986. It was not 41 Acquisition Review Quarterly Winter 1996 actually received, however, until August The cost of this domestic fix was $3.0 of that year, due to problems that Royal million (Armament and Chemical Ac- Ordnance experienced in collecting and quisition and Logistics Agency, 1994, assembling the required information pg. 1). The end result was a TDP nearly (Nathan, 1994, pg. 18). Additionally, $7.75 million over budget and more the TDP as delivered was archival, than three years late. grossly inaccurate, and missing essen- These problems highlight the poten- tial manufacturing data (Armament tial difficulty in dealing with sources and Chemical Acquisition and Logis- other than those routinely involved in tics Agency, 1994, pg. 1). production for the U.S. Government. The engineers at Rock Island and This is not to say that similar problems Watervliet recognized that this TDP never occur with domestic manufactur- was of little use to them and returned ers. Rather, the problems were signifi- it to Royal Ordnance for rework. Royal cantly exacerbated by Royal Ordnance claimed in response that the Ordnances inexperience with the Technical Data Package met the re- American way of doing business. quirements, One of the critical requirements of Royal Ordnance had but agreed to an American technical data package is no idea what an Ameri- fix it for an ad- that it provides the information re- canized Technical Data ditional cost of quired by manufacturers to produce Package looked like $4.75 million. to [the] TDP with stringent configura- The Americans tion management requirements in the program office felt in a bind at (Nathan, 1994, pg. 1). This requirement this point: Royal Ordnance had failed caused a significant portion of Royal to comply with the licensing agreement Ordnances TDP problems. The com- and should fix the Technical Data Pack- pany produced the L119 in its own plant age at no cost, yet there was severe pres- using a fit at production philosophy, sure to get the howitzer into the sys- so that the accuracy of drawings used tem quickly. As a result, the program on the production floor was less criti- office opted to avoid lengthy litigation cal. However, Royal Ordnance had dif- by paying Royal Ordnance to rework ficulty putting this process on paper. As the TDP.