TESIS DOCTORAL 2015 WHEN ASYMMETRY GETS CHALLENGED: REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS’ REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRICAL EMPOWERMENT IN CANADA AND SPAIN ANGUSTIAS MARÍA HOMBRADO MARTOS Licenciada en Ciencias Políticas y de la Administración Departamento de Ciencia Política y de la Administración Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia Director de la tesis: JOSÉ ANTONIO OLMEDA Codirector: CÉSAR COLINO DEPARTAMENTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA Y DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS POLÍTICAS Y SOCIOLOGÍA UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL DE EDUCACIÓN A DISTANCIA TITLE: WHEN ASYMMETRY GETS CHALLENGED: REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS’ REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRICAL EMPOWERMENT IN CANADA AND SPAIN ANGUSTIAS M. HOMBRADO MARTOS Licenciada en Ciencias Políticas y de la Administración DIRECTOR DE LA TESIS: JOSÉ ANTONIO OLMEDA (UNED) CODIRECTOR: CÉSAR COLINO (UNED) [2] Meinen Doktorvätern, für ihre Unterstützung in allen Fragen der Promotion und darüber hinaus. To the person who did not want to be singled out, for she is the one who truly deserves it. [3] TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION: REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRY AND REGIONAL GOVERNMENTS ..................................................................................................... 7 1.1. EMPIRICAL PUZZLE, THEORETICAL DEBATES AND GAP IN THE LITERATURE ................. 7 1.2. A NEW APPROACH TO THE INVESTIGATION OF ASYMMETRICAL EMPOWERMENT AND AND DYNAMICS .................................................................................................. 14 1.2.1. First turn of the screw: From ‘need’ to ‘toleration’ of asymmetry ................................ 14 1.2.2. Second turn of the screw: From majority vs. minority nations to Most- Empowered (MER) vs. Less- or Non-Empowered Regions (LER/NER) ......................... 16 1.3. OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS ..................................................................... 20 1.4. RESEARCH STRATEGY .................................................................................................. 22 1.4.1. Staged case selection ...................................................................................................... 24 a. First selection: Canada and Spain ........................................................................................... 25 b. Second selection: Alberta, Ontario, Andalusia and Valencia .................................................. 27 c. Third selection: RTEs ............................................................................................................... 30 1.4.2. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 31 1.4.3. Data ................................................................................................................................ 34 1.5. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS .................................................................................... 35 2. THE DISCUSSION ON THE DYNAMICS, TYPES, CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF ASYMMETRICAL ARRANGEMENTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT .................................................................................... 37 2.1. INTRODUCTION: CONVENTIONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT FEDERAL ASYMMETRY. MEANING, PURPOSE AND PERFORMANCE ..................................................................... 37 2.2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ................................................................................................... 38 2.2.1. On the origins of notion of federal asymmetry: too much of a tribute to Charles Tarlton? .......................................................................................................................... 38 2.2.2. On typologies: ‘de facto/de iure’ dichotomy and beyond ............................................... 43 2.3. NORMATIVE DISCUSSION: DIVERSITY AND RECOGNITION VERSUS THE PRINCIPLE OF TERRITORIAL EQUALITY ......................................................................................... 49 2.4. DEBATE ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF ASYMMETRY FOR THE STABILITY AND INSTABILITY OF FEDERAL SYSTEMS ............................................................................. 57 2.4.1. Asymmetrical federalism as an accommodation solution ............................................... 58 2.4.2. Asymmetrical federalism as Pandora’s box: slippery slope towards secession and resymmetrising trends ............................................................................................. 61 3. A MODEL TO UNDERSTAND REGIONAL REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRICAL EMPOWERMENT: BRINGING THE OTHER REGIONS BACK IN ............................................................................................... 70 3.1. CONCEPTUALISING THE OUTCOME: HOW DO LER/NERS REACT TO ASYMMETRY?............................................................................................................... 70 3.1.1. Catching-up reaction ...................................................................................................... 73 [4] 3.1.2. Blocking reaction ........................................................................................................... 74 3.1.3. Acquiescence reaction .................................................................................................... 75 3.1.4. Issue-linkage reaction .................................................................................................... 76 3.2. EXPLAINING LER/NERS’ REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRICAL EMPOWERMENT: CAUSES AND HYPOTHESES ........................................................................................... 77 3.2.1. Asymmetry involved in the RTE ...................................................................................... 79 3.2.2. Features of the LER/NER ............................................................................................... 82 a. Centre-Periphery explanation ................................................................................................. 82 b. Economic explanations ........................................................................................................... 84 - MER’s weight within the state-wide economy........................................................................ 86 - LER/NER’s economic position relative to the MER .................................................................. 87 c. Cultural explanation: Strenght of LER/NER’s regional identity ............................................... 87 3.2.3. Political-institutional features ........................................................................................ 93 a. Regionalist Parties ................................................................................................................... 93 b. Cross-level government (in)-congruence ................................................................................ 94 3.2.4. Configurational framework ............................................................................................ 98 4. OTHER GOVERNMENTS’ REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRY IN CANADA: A CASE ANALYSIS ......................................................................... 102 4.1. PATRIATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) ............................................................... 102 4.2. MEECH LAKE ACCORD (1987) ................................................................................... 118 4.3. MCDOUGALL-GAGNON-TREMBLAY AGREEMENT ON IMMIGRATION (1991) ............ 136 4.4. CHRÉTIEN’S RESOLUTION ON QUEBEC’S DISTINCT SOCIETY (1995) ......................... 143 4.5. BILL C-110 ON REGIONAL VETOES (1996) ................................................................. 148 4.6. OTTAWA-QUEBEC AGREEMENT ON UNESCO (2006) ............................................... 151 4.7. HARPER’S MOTION ON QUEBEC’S NATIONHOOD (2006)............................................ 157 4.8. HOW DO ALBERTA AND ONTARIO REACT TO ASYMMETRY? OCCURRENCE OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF REACTION ............................................................................... 161 5. OTHER GOVERNMENTS’ REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRY IN SPAIN: A CASE ANALYSIS ................................................................................................ 164 5.1. RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CATALAN GENERALITAT .............................................. 164 5.2. SPANISH CONSTITUTION (1978) AND THE CREATION OF THE AUTONOMOUS COMMUNITIES (1979-1983) ....................................................................................... 171 5.3. MOSSOS D’ESQUADRA: AN ACCEPTED ASYMMETRY ................................................. 180 5.4. BARCELONA DECLARATION AND THE RECOGNITION OF A SPANISH MULTINATIONAL FEDERATION ................................................................................... 185 5.5. REPRESENTATION OF THE ACS AT EU INSTITUTIONS................................................ 189 5.6. DEVOLVED POWERS ON INMIGRATION (2006-2010) .................................................. 193 5.7. HOW DO ANDALUSIA AND VALENCIA REACT TO ASYMMETRY? THE OCCURRENCE OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF REACTION .................................................... 197 6. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: EXPLAINING REACTIONS TO ASYMMETRICAL EMPOWERMENT ............................................................... 199 6.1. ASYMMETRY INVOLVED IN THE RTE ........................................................................ 199 6.2. CENTRE-PERIPHERY POSITION OF LER/NER ............................................................ 200 [5] 6.3. ECONOMIC EXPLANATIONS .......................................................................................